A Galilean Fallacy of Equivocation

2021 ◽  
pp. 21-27
Author(s):  
Maurice A. Finocchiaro
Keyword(s):  
Fallacy Of Equivocation

Burleigh's Paradox

Philosophy ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale Jacquette
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Fallacy Of Equivocation ◽  
Hypothetical Syllogism

AbstractWalter Burleigh in his c. 1323 De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior considers a counterexample to hypothetical syllogism. The paradox implied by Burleigh's inference has come to be known as the problem of the ass (asinum), or, more prosaically, ‘You are an ass’. The argument states: ‘If I call you an ass, then I call you an animal; if I call you an animal, then I speak truthfully; therefore, if I call you an ass, then I speak truthfully’. Burleigh's paradox is reconstructed and formalized for purposes of critical analysis, in which the putative counterexample is ultimately shown to involve a fallacy of equivocation.

What Anti-Individualists Cannot Know A Priori

1998 ◽  
pp. 204-210
Author(s):  
Susana Nuccetelli
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
The World ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Fallacy Of Equivocation ◽  
Priori Knowledge

The attempt to hold both anti-individualism and privileged self-knowledge may have the absurd consequence that someone could know a priori propositions that are knowable only empirically. This would be so if such an attempt entailed that one could know a priori both the contents of one’s own thoughts and the anti-individualistic entailments from those thought-contents to the world. For then one could also come to know a priori (by simple deduction) the empirical conditions entailed by one’s thoughts. But I argue that there is no construal of a priori knowledge that could be used to raise an incompatibility problem of this sort. First, I suggest that the incompatibilist a priori must be a stipulative one, since in none of the main philosophical traditions does knowledge of the contents of one’s thoughts count as a priori. Then, I show that under various possible construals of a priori, the incompatibilist argument would be invalid: either a fallacy of equivocation or an argument without a plausible closure principle guaranteeing transmission of epistemic status from premises to conclusion. Finally, I maintain that the only possible construal of the property of being knowable a priori that avoids invalidity is one that fails to generate the intended reductio.

The B-Edition First Paralogism

2021 ◽  
pp. 104-126
Author(s):  
Ian Proops
Keyword(s):  
Correct Interpretation ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Transcendental Illusion ◽  
Fallacy Of Equivocation

This chapter analyses the second-edition first paralogism. It argues that Kant offers a plausible account of how a philosopher in the grip of transcendental illusion might be led to commit a fallacy of equivocation of the kind Kant discerns in the first paralogism (when its premises are taken to be true), namely, a sophisma figurae dictionis. (The paralogism Kant states is actually an abridged polysyllogism.) The chapter explains how Kant can, by the lights of his own epistemology, regard the premises of the argument as true. The chapter criticizes an interpretation of the Paralogism offered by Michelle Grier and responds to a textual worry raised by Patricia Kitcher. It defends the author’s interpretation against the recent criticisms of Julian Wuerth and Béatrice Longuenesse. Finally, the chapter explains the ways in which the author’s account diverges from that of the (to his mind) close-to-correct interpretation of Karl Ameriks.

scholarly journals On Some Objections to The Deductive Closure of Legal Systems

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (146) ◽  
pp. 125-132
Author(s):  
Hugo R. Zuleta
Keyword(s):  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Decisive Reason ◽  
Deductive Closure ◽  
Fallacy Of Equivocation ◽  
Methodological Considerations ◽  
Selection Of

I criticize an argument presented by Pablo Navarro and Jorge Rodríguez (2014) against the conception of legal systems as sets of statements closed under logical consequence. First, I show that the example on which they ground their argument incurs in a fallacy of equivocation. Then, I recognize that the authors are right about the fact that two different normative bases can react differently to changes, but I claim that that is not a decisive reason for choosing always the expressly enacted norms as the system’s basis, that the selection of the best basis should be guided by methodological considerations and that, to that purpose, it is necessary to consider the whole set of logical consequences as part of the system.

Aristotle and the So-Called Fallacy of Equivocation

1979 ◽  
Vol 29 (114) ◽  
pp. 35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Kirwan
Keyword(s):  
Fallacy Of Equivocation

Hume and The Self: A Critical Response

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-30
Author(s):  
Alan Schwerin
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
David Hume ◽  
The Self ◽  
Critical Response ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Conceptual Apparatus ◽  
Fallacy Of Equivocation ◽  
Rival View ◽  
The Way

In the discussion of personal identity, from his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume reaches a famous, if notorious conclusion: there is no self. We are “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions” (T 252). My argument is that Hume's thesis on the self rests on a questionable rejection of a rival view that appears to commit the fallacy of equivocation. Along the way I identify a few possible problems with Hume's overall analysis of the self. My argument is that these diffi culties center around the conceptual apparatus Hume relies on to explain and analyze consciousness.

Does the Twin-Earth argument rest on a fallacy of equivocation?

Semiotica ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 (188) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska
Keyword(s):  
Twin Earth ◽  
Fallacy Of Equivocation
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