Can Cosmology Justify Belief in an Eternal Universe?

2018 ◽  
pp. 129-157
Author(s):  
Jacobus Erasmus
Keyword(s):  
Justify Belief

Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate Nolfi
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Justify Belief ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Aim Of Belief ◽  
The Way

At least when we restrict our attention to the epistemic domain, it seems clear that only considerations which bear on whether p can render a subject’s belief that p epistemically justified, by constituting the reasons on the basis of which she believes that p. And we ought to expect any account of epistemic normativity to explain why this is so. Extant accounts generally appeal to the idea that belief aims at truth, in an effort to explain why there is a kind of evidential constraint on the sorts of considerations that can be epistemic reasons. However, there are grounds for doubting that belief, in fact, aims at truth in the way that these accounts propose. This chapter develops an alternative explanation of why it is that non-evidential considerations cannot be epistemic reasons by taking seriously the idea that the constitutive aim of belief is fundamentally action-oriented.

Reasons First

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Justify Belief ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Common Currency ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
The World ◽  
Explanatory Priority

The last fifty years or more of ethical theory have been preoccupied by a turn to reasons. The vocabulary of reasons has become a common currency not only in ethics, but in epistemology, action theory, and many related areas. It is now common, for example, to see central theses such as evidentialism in epistemology and egalitarianism in political philosophy formulated in terms of reasons. And some have even claimed that the vocabulary of reasons is so useful precisely because reasons have analytical and explanatory priority over other normative concepts—that reasons in that sense come first. Reasons First systematically explores both the benefits and burdens of the hypothesis that reasons do indeed come first in normative theory, against the conjecture that theorizing in both ethics and epistemology can only be hampered by neglect of the other. Bringing two decades of work on reasons in both ethics and epistemology to bear, Mark Schroeder argues that some of the most important challenges to the idea that reasons could come first are themselves the source of some of the most obstinate puzzles in epistemology—about how perceptual experience could provide evidence about the world, and about what can make evidence sufficient to justify belief. And he shows that along with moral worth, one of the very best cases for the fundamental explanatory power of reasons in normative theory actually comes from knowledge.

Miracles

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Justify Belief ◽  
Justified Belief

Because miracles have supernatural causes, a justified belief that a given event is a miracle requires that one be justified in believing that its cause is supernatural. But the only way to infer that a supernatural cause exists is through a kind of inference -- inference to the best explanation. Unfortunately, inference to the best explanation cannot justify belief in the supernatural. Thus, belief in miracles is unjustified.

A Leibnizian Account of why Belief in the Christian Mysteries is Justified

1995 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Cave
Keyword(s):  
Justify Belief ◽  
The Trinity

The Christian mysteries, which consist of such doctrines as the Incarnation and the Trinity, pose a problem for anyone who seeks to reconcile the tenets of Christianity with reason. As Leibniz puts it, the mysteries are incomprehensible, improbable, and against appearances. Why should a reasonable individual believe in such mysteries? By answering this question, one responds to the objection that Christianity requires individuals to embrace patent nonsense. Leibniz maintains that the mysteries, although incomprehensible, can be explained sufficiently to justify belief in them. But how can the mysteries be both incomprehensible and explicable? In this paper, I will develop a Leibnizian account of why belief in the mysteries is justified.

Perception

2019 ◽  
pp. 74-112
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Justify Belief ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
De Re ◽  
Epistemic Role ◽  
New Evil Demon Problem

Chapter 3 explores the epistemic role of consciousness in perception. Section 3.1 argues that unconscious perceptual representation in blindsight cannot justify beliefs about the external world. Section 3.2 argues that this is because phenomenal consciousness, rather than access consciousness or metacognitive consciousness, is necessary for perceptual representation to justify belief. Section 3.3 argues that perceptual experience has a distinctive kind of phenomenal character—namely, presentational force—that is not only necessary but also sufficient for perception to justify belief. Section 3.4 uses a version of the new evil demon problem to argue that the justifying role of perceptual experience supervenes on its phenomenal character alone. Section 3.5 defends this supervenience thesis against the objection that phenomenal duplicates who perceive distinct objects thereby have justification to believe different de re propositions.

Interpreting Hume on miracles

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-338
Author(s):  
ROBERT A. LARMER
Keyword(s):  
Justify Belief ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Marked Contrast

AbstractContemporary commentators on Hume's essay, ‘Of miracles’ have increasingly tended to argue that Hume never intended to suggest that testimonial evidence must always be insufficient to justify belief in a miracle. This is in marked contrast to earlier commentators who interpreted Hume as intending to demonstrate that testimonial evidence is incapable in principle of ever establishing rational belief in a miracle. In this article I argue that this traditional interpretation is the correct one.

scholarly journals Religious Experience, Pragmatic Encroachment, and Justified Belief in God

Open Theology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 296-305
Author(s):  
Alex R Gillham
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Justify Belief ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Secondary Literature ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Awkward Position ◽  
To Come ◽  
Threshold Problem

AbstractThe secondary literature on religious epistemology has focused extensively on whether religious experience can provide evidence for God’s existence. In this article, I suppose that religious experience can do this, but I consider whether it can provide adequate evidence for justified belief in God. I argue that it can. This requires a couple of moves. First, I consider the threshold problem for evidentialism and explain pragmatic encroachment (PE) as a solution to it. Second, I argue that religious experience can justify belief in God if one adopts PE, but this poses a dilemma for the defender of the veridicality of religious experience. If PE is true, then whether S has a justified belief in God on the basis of religious experience depends on how high the stakes are for having an experience with God. This requires one to determine whether the stakes are high or low for experiencing God, which puts the experient of God in an awkward position. If the stakes are not high, then justified belief in God on the basis of religious experience will be easier to come by, but this requires conceding that experiencing God is not that important. If the stakes are high, then the experient can maintain the importance of experience with God but must concede that justified belief in God on the basis of experience with God is less likely to happen, perhaps impossible.

Immortality: A Pragmatic-Processive Model

2000 ◽  
pp. 200-218
Author(s):  
Eugene Fontinell
Keyword(s):  
Human Life ◽  
Justify Belief ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Crucial Aspect ◽  
Acceptable Model ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter offers a model of the cosmic process that would justify belief in immortality as attractive and as life-enhancing. In keeping with the experiential character and this-worldly focus of pragmatism, any acceptable model will have to offer possibilities for the enhancement and enrichment of life. Readers might be aided by mentally placing the term “this life” in quotation marks, because the nature and scope of human life are precisely what has been and will likely continue to be a matter of intense dispute among reflective human beings. The chapter shows that a crucial aspect of the dispute centers on what ought to be the relationship between the present and future characteristics of this life.

5. Can there be miracles without the supernatural?

2017 ◽  
pp. 84-102
Author(s):  
Yujin Nagasawa
Keyword(s):  
Unique Feature ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Justify Belief ◽  
Scientific Observation

The unique feature of miracles is their violation of the laws of nature. However, this very feature makes it difficult to justify belief in miracles because the laws of nature have been confirmed through solid and uniform scientific observation. If belief in miracles cannot be justified, what are the closest acts to miracles that we can rationally believe in? ‘Can there be miracles without the supernatural?’ considers altruistic acts, concluding that extremely altruistic acts are as close to miracles as any acts one can perform within the laws of nature and belief. It also asks whether altruism is a product of evolution or an incoherent concept.

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