An evolutionary dynamics model for metastatic tumour growth based on public goods games

2021 ◽  
pp. 105783
Author(s):  
Jose M. Sanz Nogales ◽  
S. Zazo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Tumour Growth ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Metastatic Tumour ◽  
Dynamics Model ◽  
Public Goods Games

scholarly journals Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (10) ◽  
pp. 103105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linjie Liu ◽  
Shengxian Wang ◽  
Xiaojie Chen ◽  
Matjaž Perc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Goods Games

scholarly journals Ecological feedback on diffusion dynamics

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 181273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hye Jin Park ◽  
Chaitanya S. Gokhale
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Spatial Patterns ◽  
Spatial Organization ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Reaction Diffusion ◽  
Reaction Diffusion Equations ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Diffusion Dynamics ◽  
Spatially Extended

Spatial patterns are ubiquitous across different scales of organization in ecological systems. Animal coat pattern, spatial organization of insect colonies and vegetation in arid areas are prominent examples from such diverse ecologies. Typically, pattern formation has been described by reaction–diffusion equations, which consider individuals dispersing between subpopulations of a global pool. This framework applied to public goods game nicely showed the endurance of populations via diffusion and generation of spatial patterns. However, how the spatial characteristics, such as diffusion, are related to the eco-evolutionary process as well as the nature of the feedback from evolution to ecology and vice versa, has been so far neglected. We present a thorough analysis of the ecologically driven evolutionary dynamics in a spatially extended version of ecological public goods games. Furthermore, we show how these evolutionary dynamics feed back into shaping the ecology, thus together determining the fate of the system.

scholarly journals Neighborhood size-effects in nonlinear public goods games

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory J. Kimmel ◽  
Philip Gerlee ◽  
Joel S. Brown ◽  
Philipp M. Altrock
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Size Effects ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Logistic Growth ◽  
Neighborhood Size ◽  
Frequency Dependent ◽  
Frequency Dependent Selection ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Goods Games

Ecological and evolutionary dynamics can be strongly affected by population assortment and frequency-dependent selection. In growing populations, a particular challenge is to disentangle global ecological effects from local frequency-dependent effects. Here we implement a logistic growth and death model on the global scale, coupled to frequency-dependent growth rates influenced by a public goods game between cooperators and defectors. For each individual, the public good is only effective within a neighborhood of other individuals, and the public good-growth rate relationship can be nonlinear. At low numbers of cooperators, increases of public good accumulate synergistically; at high numbers, increases in public good only provide diminishing returns-the inflection point of this pattern is given by the strength of frequency-dependent selection in relation to the background fitness effect. We observed complex critical behavior in the evolutionary dynamics’ equilibria, determined by the relative magnitude of frequency-dependent to constant (background) growth benefits. We predict neighborhood-size-driven state changes, hysteresis between polymorphic and monomorphic equilibria, and observed that type-dependent differences in neighborhood sizes can destabilize monomorphic cooperative states but increase coexistence of cooperators and defectors. Stochastic neighborhood size fluctuations also led to coexistence and could stabilize the purely cooperative equilibrium. Our results quantify the role of assortment through neighborhood-size effects and nonlinearity of the gains function in eco-evolutionary dynamics, which is relevant for a variety of microbial and cellular public goods games.

scholarly journals Probabilistic participation in public goods games

2007 ◽  
Vol 274 (1625) ◽  
pp. 2639-2642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatsuya Sasaki ◽  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Tatsuo Unemi
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Voluntary Participation ◽  
Dynamical Regime ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Public Enterprises ◽  
Interior Equilibrium ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Pure Strategies

Voluntary participation in public goods games (PGGs) has turned out to be a simple but effective mechanism for promoting cooperation under full anonymity. Voluntary participation allows individuals to adopt a risk-aversion strategy, termed loner. A loner refuses to participate in unpromising public enterprises and instead relies on a small but fixed pay-off. This system leads to a cyclic dominance of three pure strategies, cooperators, defectors and loners, but at the same time, there remain two considerable restrictions: the addition of loners cannot stabilize the dynamics and the time average pay-off for each strategy remains equal to the pay-off of loners. Here, we introduce probabilistic participation in PGGs from the standpoint of diversification of risk, namely simple mixed strategies with loners, and prove the existence of a dynamical regime in which the restrictions no longer hold. Considering two kinds of mixed strategies associated with participants (cooperators or defectors) and non-participants (loners), we can recover all basic evolutionary dynamics of the two strategies: dominance; coexistence; bistability; and neutrality, as special cases depending on pairs of probabilities. Of special interest is that the expected pay-off of each mixed strategy exceeds the pay-off of loners at some interior equilibrium in the coexistence region.

scholarly journals Ecological feedback on diffusion dynamics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hye Jin Park ◽  
Chaitanya S. Gokhale
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Spatial Patterns ◽  
Spatial Organization ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Reaction Diffusion ◽  
Reaction Diffusion Equations ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Diffusion Dynamics ◽  
Spatially Extended

AbstractSpatial patterns are ubiquitous across different scales of organization. Animal coat pattern, spatial organization of insect colonies, and vegetation in arid areas are prominent examples from such diverse ecologies. Typically, pattern formation has been described by reaction-diffusion equations, which considers individuals dispersing between sub-populations of a global pool. This framework applied to public goods game nicely showed the endurance of populations via diffusion and generation of spatial patterns. However, how the spatial characteristics, such as diffusion, are related to the eco-evolutionary process as well as the nature of the feedback from evolution to ecology and vice versa, has been so far neglected. We present a thorough analysis of the ecologically driven evolutionary dynamics in a spatially extended version of ecological public goods games. We show how these evolutionary dynamics feedback into shaping the ecology thus together determining the fate of the system.

Pool punishment in public goods games: How do sanctioners’ incentives affect us?

2021 ◽  
Vol 185 ◽  
pp. 513-537
Author(s):  
Adriana Alventosa ◽  
Alberto Antonioni ◽  
Penélope Hernández
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Games

Public goods games on random hyperbolic graphs with mixing

2021 ◽  
Vol 144 ◽  
pp. 110720
Author(s):  
Maja Duh ◽  
Marko Gosak ◽  
Matjaž Perc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Hyperbolic Graphs
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