An Evaluative Norm for Belief
It is often argued that belief is partly constituted by a norm of truth. Most recent discussions have assumed that the norm is deontic concerning what may or ought to be believed. I criticize two proposals, one canvassed by Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi, and the other defended by Daniel Whiting. Instead, I argue in favour of an evaluative norm, according to which we would do well to believe the truth. I show that an evaluative norm fares better than its deontic competitors with respect to the demandingness of truth, the aim of truth, and epistemic blame.
1969 ◽
Vol 27
◽
pp. 6-7
Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
pp. 130-140
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
Nglyc: A Random Forest Method for Prediction of N-Glycosylation Sites in Eukaryotic Protein Sequence
2020 ◽
Vol 27
(3)
◽
pp. 178-186
◽
2019 ◽
Vol 15
(5)
◽
pp. 472-485
◽
Keyword(s):
2021 ◽
Vol 27
(3)
◽
pp. S237-S238