Choosing a Legal Theory on Moral Grounds

1986 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Soper

I. INTRODUCTIONTwenty-five years is roughly the time that has elapsed since the exchange between H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller and the subsequent revival in this country of the natural law/positivism debate. During this time, a curious thing has happened to legal positivism. What began as a conceptual theory about the distinction between law and morality has now been turned, at least by some, into a moral theory. According to this theory, the reason we must see law and morality as separate is not (at least not entirely) because of the logic of our language, but because of the practical implications of holding one or the other of the two traditional views in this area. The natural law theorist, it is said, can connect law and morality only at the cost of investing official directives with undeserved moral authority, thus encouraging obedience where there should be none. The natural law position should therefore be rejected – and the positivist's accepted – on moral grounds.

2021 ◽  
pp. 65-80
Author(s):  
José Luis López Fuentes

RESUMEN: En el presente trabajo, con base en las teorías iusnaturalistas y del positivismo jurídico, se busca ofrecer un breve acercamiento al desarrollo que han tenido a través del tiempo las tesis más importantes en torno al problema de la relación entre derecho y moral, hasta llegar a lo que actualmente es denominado antipositivismo jurídico, pues el objetivo de este documento es presentar un análisis y exposición de las aportaciones de esta corriente de pensamiento a la teoría jurídica contemporánea, para lo cual, se analizan las propuestas de Ronald Dworkin y Robert Alexy, en especial de la tesis de los principios, y su relevancia en la interpretación y aplicación de la ley.ABSTRACT: In this work, based on natural law theories and legal positivism, I seek to offer a brief approach  to the development that the most important theses have had throughout time regarding the problem of the relationship between law and morality, arriving at what we now call legal anti-positivism, the objective of this document is to present an analysis and exposition of the contributions of this current of thought to contemporary legal theory, for which the proposals of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy are analyzed, specially the thesis of the principles, and its relevance in the interpretation and application of the law.Keywords: Natural law theories, legal positivism, legal antipositivism, moral, thesis of principles.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Constanze Semmelmann

General principles are en vogue in EU law – and in need of conceptual clarification. A closer look at several concepts of principle in legal philosophy and legal theory sheds light upon the concept of general principles in EU law. A distinction between an aprioristic model of principle and a model of principle informed by legal positivism may contribute to clarifying the genesis of a (general) principle in EU law, as well as its nature and functions. This paper demonstrates that an evolution has taken place from a reliance on seemingly natural law inspired reflections of general principles via the desperate search to ground general principles in various kinds of sources based on a more or less sound methodology  towards an increasing reliance on strictly positivistic approaches. Against this backdrop, general principles are likely to lose significance where there are other norms while retaining an important yet uncontrollable role where the traditional canon of sources is silent.


2019 ◽  
pp. 174-203
Author(s):  
Lenn E. Goodman

Natural law links moral and legal theory with natural theology and science. It is critical to thinking about God’s sovereignty and human freedom. Tracing the roots of the natural law idea, I defend the approach against conventionalism and legal positivism. For they leave human norms ungrounded. Chapter 7 opens by disarming Hume’s elenchus about ‘is’ and ‘ought’. I do not deny the reality of a naturalistic fallacy, but I do argue that facts make rightful claims on us and that the unity of reality and value central to Jewish thinking and to the philosophical great tradition does not confuse facts with values but does appreciate the preciousness of being—of life and personhood most pointedly. Once again here transcendence consorts with immanence. For we find God’s law writ subtly in nature, not least when we discover what it means to perfect ourselves as loving and creative human beings.


Legal Theory ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 427-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen R. Perry

To understand H.L.A. Hart's general theory of law, it is helpful to distinguish between substantive and methodological legal positivism. Substantive legal positivism is the view that there is no necessary connection between morality and the content of law. Methodological legal positivism is the view that legal theory can and should offer a normatively neutral description of a particular social phenomenon, namely law. Methodological positivism holds, we might say, not that there is no necessary connection between morality and law, but rather that there is no connection, necessary or otherwise, between morality and legal theory. The respective claims of substantive and methodological positivism are, at least on the surface, logically independent. Hobbes and Bentham employed normative methodologies to defend versions of substantive positivism, and in modern times Michael Moore has developed what can be regarded as a variant of methodological positivism to defend a theory of natural law.


1994 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard F. Devlin

In this essay, the author briefly outlines recent trends in Canadian jurisprudence. Beginning with a brief overview of the classical jurisprudential debate between natural lawyers, legal positivists, and legal realists, the author then provides an introduction to a new theoretical tradition which he terms "Artifactualism", as well as a survey of contemporary "Artifactualist Jurisprudence". He argues that there has been a significant theoretical shift away from the classical conceptualization of law as morality (as embodied in natural law, and challenged by legal positivism and legal realism), toward the conceptualization of law as politics (as promulgated by artifactualism). This new conceptualization of law as the "terrain of struggle over the meaning and quality of social existence" has informed the works of Artifactualist jurisprudents in the areas of Liberalism, Marxism, Feminism, First Nations and Critical Legal Studies, and serves to elucidate some of the tensions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-214
Author(s):  
B.L.S. Nelson

This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a “third way”? in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential “third theories”? of law—legal pragmatism and legal dualism—and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s treatment of civil law, and argue that the pragmatic interpretation can only be successful if we can resolve two textual issues in that chapter. First, while Hobbes argues that law entails the existence of public (sharable) reasons, he does not adequately defend the view that the sovereign is the unique authority over such reasons in all cases, especially as far as they concern known collective emergencies. Second, Hobbes both affirms and denies that a sovereign can fail to do justice, which is paradoxical. Both problems are best resolved by legal pragmatism, though the second problem resists a fully satisfying resolution. The upshot is that, although Leviathan ought to be regarded as an episode of legal pragmatism, there are trade-offs on every reading.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
V. Yu. Perov ◽  
A. D. Sevastianova

The law and morality the interrelation issue has been the subject for many discussions, recent works in the philosophy field and law ethics of renowned authors as H. Hart, L. Fuller and J. Finnis, who contributed significantly to the topic. The key question about the moral content of law is examined within the polemics between theorists of legal positivism and natural law legal theorists. This article touches upon this issue by the example of the concept of John Finnis, one of the most brilliant contemporary law philosophers, his neo-naturalistic concept of natural law includes some ideas of modern positivism. J. Finnis claims natural law appears as a set of principles of practical reasonableness for the ordering of human life and the human community. Law acts as a method to ensure “the common good” of the community and is based on seven self-evident, as he believes the basic human goods necessary for the human flourishing. The requirements of practical reasonableness compose the content of natural law, contain recommendations on how to carry out these self-evident goods. For Finnis, the aim of law is to provide conditions, according to the requirements of practical reasonableness, in which these seven goods can be realized. It is outlined that J. Finnis regards law as a social institute which purpose is to regulate human affairs, and thus to promote the creation of a community where everyone could realize the seven fundamental goods for humankind.


Author(s):  
Marcin Pieniążek

The paradigm of legal positivism, historically the most important attempt at turning law into science, has been subject to thorough criticism in past decades. The criticism has concerned the most important features of legal positivism, and especially the assumption of separation of law and morality, the dogma of statue being the only source of law, and the linguistic methods of interpreting legal texts. With a crisis of the positive paradigms, the demand for new, humanistic grounds for analysing philosophical and legal questions is intensifying. This is the reason for this article’s attempt to point to the application of Paul Ricoeur’s achievements to the key questions of the philosophy of law. It must be emphasised that his works, and especially Soimême comme un autre, may serve as a foundation for a philosophy of law rejecting the problematic claims about the dualism of being and obligation, the distinction of descriptive and prescriptive languages, and also the separation of law and morality. Thanks to this, the legal topos pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) finds a reinforcement in the ontology of the subject applying law and can be understood as an ethically significant pattern of identity of the self. Equally fruitful seems the possibility of combining the questions of the ontology of the subject applying law with the question of a legal text and its interpretation. The assumption of Ricoeur’s perspective leads to a reduction in the distance between the legal text and its addressee, emphasised by the critics of legal positivism. This rapprochement becomes possible thanks to the connection of the question of the narrative that a legal text is with the question of narrativisation of the subject (i.e. the interpreter of a legal text), being itself in the ipse sense, i.e. applying the law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-61
Author(s):  
Dian Latifiani ◽  
Raden Muhammad Arvy Ilyasa

Moral values in legal science are important. However, the flow of law sees a variety of moral values. This paper aims to see the position of moral values in the science of law. Legal positivism separates strictly between law and morals. According to him, there is no law other than the command of the authorities. Even extreme identifying the law (Recht) as the law (wet). Legal positivism activities are aimed at concrete problems, which are different when compared to natural law thinking which engages itself with the validation of man-made law. For adherents of natural law theory, an unjust law is not law. there is an absolute relationship between law and morality. the two cannot be separated, so the law must refer to moral principles.


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