Current Trends in the Definition of ‘Perpetrator’ by the International Criminal Court: From the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in the Lubanga case to the Katanga judgment

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALICIA GIL GIL ◽  
ELENA MACULAN
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Critical Elements ◽  
Current Trends ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

AbstractThe jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) up to the Lubanga judgment showed definite interpretive trends on the modes of principal liability. This article aims first to make a critical assessment of these trends by focusing on methodological and substantive aspects. On the one hand, the practice of having resort to theories derived from Continental legal systems, albeit legitimate, is based on a methodology that raises some concerns as to the selection and (mis)interpretation of such theories. On the other hand, the Court has clearly adopted a wide interpretation of some critical elements in which the different modes of principal liability are grounded. This choice has caused a significant expansion of the scope of principal liability as well as a breach of the principles of legality and of individual criminal responsibility. In our opinion, the underpinning of these interpretations is a flawed understanding of the criteria for distinguishing between principals and accessories.This perspective has been overturned by the Katanga judgment, on which the second part of this article will focus. This judgment correctly argues that the distinction between perpetrators and accomplices is grounded only on the autonomous or vicarious character of their contribution to the offence. Furthermore, it follows a partly different approach as to both the methodology and the interpretation of the constitutive elements of principal liability. In our view, this approach better fits both the relevant statutory provision and the basic principles of criminal law.

Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Human Rights Law: The Contribution of the International Criminal Court

1970 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Mohammed
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
The Road ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

The road to developing an international institutional capacity to prosecute crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide has been a long one, and has in many ways concluded with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). By looking at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as the ICC, this paper traces the evolution of the concept of individual criminal responsibility to its present incarnation. It argues that while the ICC presents its own unique ‘added value’ to the prosecution of international criminals, its application of justice continues to be biased by the influence of powerful states.

Individual Criminal Responsibility before the International Criminal Court

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Goy
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Former Yugoslavia ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

For more than 15 years the two ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have interpreted the requirements of different forms of individual criminal responsibility. It is thus helpful to look at whether and to what extent the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR may provide guidance to the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this end, this article compares the requirements of individual criminal responsibility at the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC. The article concludes that, applied with caution, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR – as an expression of international law – can assist in interpreting the modes of liability under the ICC Statute. ICTY/ICTR case law seems to be most helpful with regard to accessorial forms of liability, in particular their objective elements. Moreover, it may assist in interpreting the subjective requirements set out in Article 30 ICC Statute.

Rough justice: Anatomy and interpretation in the exclusion of individual criminal liability in international criminal justice

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-233
Author(s):  
Dimitris Liakopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
International Criminal Justice ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

The present study aims to explore the relationship between the dogmatic conditions of the founding and the exclusion of international individual criminal responsibility. There are few cases in which an International Criminal Court has used previous international jurisprudence to establish a crime of conduct in international customary law, and in any case the importance of international judgments can not be underestimated as a general interpretative tool.

scholarly journals AGGRESSION AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

2021 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 961-990
Author(s):  
Meagan S. Wong
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
State Responsibility ◽  
Material Element ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Jus Cogens ◽  
Peremptory Norms

AbstractThe definition of the crime of aggression in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) stipulates that a State act of aggression is a material element of the crime, suggesting an intrinsic link between individual criminal responsibility and State responsibility for aggression. This article argues that the Rome Statute provides a legal basis for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to determine State responsibility for aggression when considering the material elements of the crime of aggression, which has important practical and conceptual implications for the law of international responsibility. Although the content of State responsibility flows automatically from the breach of the obligation, it is argued that a finding of aggression pursuant to Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute may be considered as a form of satisfaction for the purposes of Article 37 of the 2001 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001 ILC Articles). Furthermore, the material element of the crime in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute requires the act of aggression by its character, gravity, and scale to constitute a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, in line with the nomenclature used within the 2001 ILC Articles regarding serious breaches of obligations arising from peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens). The article considers the important role that the ICC may play in relation to serious breaches of the jus cogens obligation to refrain from an act of aggression.

Part 3 General Principles of Criminal Law: Principes Généraux Du Droit Pénal, Art.25 Individual criminal responsibility/Responsabilité pénale individuelle

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Schabas William A
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Legal Traditions ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

This chapter comments on Article 25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 25 distinguishes various forms of criminal participation. Like much of the Rome Statute, it was a negotiated compromise crafted by jurists from different legal traditions. Concepts and words in one system did not necessarily have the same connotations as they did in others. Judge Van den Wyngaert has described article 25 as being ‘based upon an eclectic combination of sources from several national legal traditions’, adding that ‘such multi-faceted origins comes as no surprise, considering the States Parties' obvious wish to find a compromise between different legal traditions’.

Culture-specific Evidence before Internationalized Criminal Courts

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 1031-1055 ◽  
Author(s):  
W L Cheah
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Cultural Knowledge ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Criminal Courts ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

Abstract As commentators press the International Criminal Court and other internationalized criminal courts to adopt a more sensitive approach to culture-specific evidence when determining individual criminal responsibility, this article argues that important lessons may be obtained from Asian jurisdictions where courts have discussed and assessed such evidence. The Asian examples studied here highlight the possibilities and challenges of having courts consider culture-specific evidence. By comparing judicial experiences, this article also shows that a more sensitive judicial approach to culture-specific evidence may be cultivated if attention is given not only to the cultural knowledge of judges, but also the court’s broader legal architecture, the position of the accused, and judicial identity.

Individual Criminal Responsibility

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chantal Meloni
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
International Community ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Crimes ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

The recognition of individual criminal responsibility under international law is relatively recent. The commission of mass atrocities during the 20th century prompted the international community to recognize that individuals can be criminally responsible directly under international law and to work for the establishment of an international criminal court having jurisdiction on international crimes committed by individuals. Thus, after World War II, the principle was established that individuals—and not only states—can be the addressee of obligations, commit crimes, and therefore bear criminal responsibility directly under international law. As affirmed by the judges sitting in Nuremberg: “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” As a consequence, it is now undisputed that individuals shall be punished for the commission of crimes under international law (or “international crimes”) that seriously damage the interest of the international community as a whole, so that the goals of prevention and deterrence can be achieved. This principle is now well expressed in the Preamble of the Rome Statute of 1998, where it affirms that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished” and that the International Criminal Court aims “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.” The attribution of criminal responsibility to individuals does not exclude that states can be held responsible for the violations of international law that also potentially amount to international crimes; however, individual criminal responsibility under international law possesses the same legal nature as the criminal responsibility under domestic law, whereas the responsibility of states is of an international/civil nature. Given the macro-criminal dimension of the crimes at stake, which normally involve the state apparatus and are committed by an organized group or in a systematic manner, the process of “individualization” of the responsibility encounters more than one challenge. First, the issue of immunities for heads of states and other subjects under international law; second, the regulation of the modes of liability, which need to take into account the collective dimension of commission of international crimes. To overcome some of the difficulties, the rules of attribution of criminal liability to individuals had been partly reinterpreted and new modes of liability developed. Moreover, the principle of personal culpability excludes collective and strict liability. As a consequence, several grounds to exclude criminal responsibility are recognized. Finally, the enforcement of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes is the real challenge in a context of collective commission and macro-dimension of the crimes, where, moreover, the mechanisms of enforcement are not homogeneous.

Part 2 Jurisdiction, Admissibility, and Applicable Law: Compétence, Recevabilité, Et Droit Applicable, Art.11 Jurisdiction ratione temporis /Compétence ratione temporis

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Schabas William A
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Applicable Law ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

This chapter comments on Article 11 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 11 states that the Court only has jurisdiction over crimes committed since its entry into force, that is, since July 1, 2002. Article 11(1) is related to articles 22 and 24, both of which also contemplate the temporal application of the Statute. In particular article 24(1), which specifies that ‘No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute’, essentially restates the norm expressed in article 11(1), although from the standpoint of individual criminal responsibility rather than jurisdiction ratione temporis. In the case of States that become party to the Statute subsequent to July 1, 2002, the Court may only exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed since the date of entry into force for that State.

A Historic Breakthrough on the Crime of Aggression

2011 ◽  
Vol 105 (3) ◽  
pp. 517-533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Barriga ◽  
Leena Grover
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
State Consent ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Article 5

At 12:20 in the morning on Saturday, June 12, 2010, the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in Kampala, Uganda, adopted by consensus a comprehensive package of amendments on the crime of aggression. States parties to the Rome Statute thereby delivered on their promise, reflected in Article 5 (2) of the Statute, to define the crime of aggression and to agree on the conditions for the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over that crime. Despite a thorough and more than decadelong preparatory process, few, if any, had predicted such a substantive outcome on the crime of aggression in light of the serious disagreements on major questions, which persisted until the last days of the conference. The key elements of the final package are a definition of the crime of aggression, which limits criminal responsibility to leaders who are responsible for the most serious forms of the illegal use of force between states, and a complicated set of conditions for exercising jurisdiction. Investigations would be based on either a Security Council referral or state consent.

The First and Second Sessions of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court

1999 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 283-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Knut Dörmann
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Financial Regulations ◽  
Rules Of Procedure ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
Definition Of

The adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court in July 1998 in Rome was the culmination of years of effort by the international community. Under Article 126, the Statute will enter into force once it is ratified by 60 states. As many states will have to enact national legislation or even change their constitutions before ratification to comply with the obligations of the Statute, the required number of ratifications will probably not be reached in the short term.Besides, a number of tasks still remain to be undertaken by states, as indicated in the Statute itself, namely, drafting of a document called ‘Elements of Crimes’ (EOC), drafting of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) and reaching agreement on the definition of the crime of aggression. Therefore, the UN General Assembly has mandated a Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) to prepare draft texts of the RPE and EOC and proposals for a provision on aggression, including its definition, elements and the conditions under which the International Criminal Court (ICC) shall exercise its jurisdiction with respect to this crime. The drafts of the EOC and RPE must be finalized by 30 June 2000, when they should be formally adopted. The definition of aggression does not have to be agreed on until the first review conference seven years after the entry into force of the Statute. In addition to these tasks, which this article will describe in greater detail, the PrepCom will work on a relationship agreement between the Court and the United Nations, basic principles governing a headquarters agreement and financial regulations and rules.

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