scholarly journals United in Diversity? The Relationship between Monetary Policy and Prudential Supervision in the Banking Union

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-310
Author(s):  
Matthias Goldmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Holistic Approach ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Prudential Supervision ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
European Central

Banking Union – Single Supervisory Mechanism – Economic interplay between monetary policy and prudential supervision – Strict separation envisaged by the Single Supervisory Mechanism legal framework – Legal framework does not prevent a more holistic approach – Financial stability is a legitimate consideration for monetary policy-making – Price stability is a legitimate concern for prudential supervision – Challenge to European Central Bank legitimacy and independence – Democratising the European Central Bank

scholarly journals The ECB’s accountability within the SSM framework: Mind the (transparency) gap

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-135
Author(s):  
Marta Božina Beroš
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Positive Outcomes ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
Policy Practice ◽  
European Central ◽  
Supervisory Process ◽  
Over Time

With the establishment of the Banking Union, the European Central Bank has become the main banking supervisor within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Unlike monetary policy tasks, which the European Central Bank performs in line with numerically set objectives, supervisory ones are more difficult to quantify. At the same time, supervisory decisions entail a margin of discretion, which opens the way for potential ‘political interferences’ within the supervisory process. Considering that in supervision the European Central Bank disposes with the same level of independence as in monetary matters, concerns emerge on how to secure the European Central Bank’s accountability in this domain. Indeed, recent reports by European Union actors have warned about a ‘transparency gap’ undermining the European Central Bank’s accountability within the Single Supervisory Mechanism. This contrasts the European Central Bank’s monetary policy practice where transparency has been consistently prioritized over time with positive outcomes. This article highlights the shortcomings in respect of European Central Bank’s supervisory transparency by reviewing standards and practices in the monetary and supervisory domain. Arguing that transparency is salient to the European Central Bank’s accountability within the mechanism’s multilevel governance framework, the paper suggests potential enhancements of existent information channels in line with the unique requirements of supervision.

Titles II and III: Preparation and Early Intervention

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Moss QC ◽  
Bob Wessels ◽  
Matthias Haentjens
Keyword(s):  
Early Intervention ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Financial Situation ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
European Central ◽  
Early Action ◽  
The Individual

As the European Commission has succinctly explained, ‘institutions will be required to draw up recovery plans setting out arrangements and measures to enable it to take early action to restore its long term viability in the event of a material deterioration of its financial situation. Groups will be required to develop plans at both group level and for the individual institutions within the group. Supervisors will assess and approve recovery plans’. Thus, institutions must draw up ‘recovery plans’ which are to be approved by the relevant supervisory authorities, so as to have a plan in place that might be useful to help turn around a material deterioration of the financial situation that institution may face. The ‘relevant supervisors’ are the European Central Bank (ECB) under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for systemically important institutions, and the national supervisory authorities for less systemically important institutions, as well as for institutions outside of the Banking Union.

The ECB as Lender of Last Resort in the Eurozone? An analysis of an optimal institutional design of Emergency Liquidity Assistance competence within the context of the Banking Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 628-668
Author(s):  
Sara Elisa Dietz
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
European Central

The latest financial crises in Europe and the United States have reminded us of the importance of the role of central banks as Lender of Last Resort. This article examines the current legal framework in the European Union with regard to the allocation of Lender of Last Resort competence, which until now has been exercised by the national central banks in the Eurozone. The new Emergency Liquidity Assistance Agreement 2017 sustains this institutional design, leaves the Emergency Liquidity Assistance competence with the national central banks and specifies the cooperation between the European Central Bank and the national central banks with regard to the veto-option of the European Central Bank to national Emergency Liquidity Assistance operations. Against this background, the paper discusses whether the current legal competence structure of the European and Monetary Union would also allow for more authority of the European Central Bank with regard to Emergency Liquidity Assistance powers. The paper concludes there is a sufficient legal basis in the monetary policy and financial stability mandate of the European Central Bank to allow it to grant Emergency Liquidity Assistance at least with regard to ‘significant’ banks, as defined under the current European Banking Supervision regime.

The Response of the European Central Bank to the Current Pandemic Crisis: Monetary Policy and Prudential Banking Supervision Decisions

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 231-256
Author(s):  
Christos V. Gortsos
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
European Central ◽  
Policy Measures ◽  
Systematic Point

Immediately after the outbreak of the current pandemic crisis, the EU developed a (rather) consistent strategy, by taking measures in order to deal with health emergency needs, support economic activity and employment, preserve monetary and financial stability and prepare the ground for recovery; these contain a combination of government fiscal stimuli (with extensive resort to the principle of solidarity), emergency liquidity and monetary policy measures and measures relating to financial stability. After briefly reviewing all these measures from a systematic point of view, the present article further analyses the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) during the first phase of this crisis, both in its capacity as a monetary authority within the Eurosystem and in its capacity as prudential banking supervisory authority within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), with particular emphasis on the treatment of non-performing loans (NPLs). Its specific contribution to financial macro-prudential oversight within European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is also highlighted.

scholarly journals Confidentiality behind transparent doors: The European Central Bank and the EU law principle of openness

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-76
Author(s):  
Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Prudential Supervision ◽  
European Central ◽  
Decision Making Framework ◽  
The Eu

This paper questions to what extent the confidential decision-making structure maintained at the European Central Bank is still compatible with the EU principle of openness recognized in Article 15 TFEU. To that extent, it analyses the different confidentiality regimes in place as well as the openness features adopted in both monetary policy and prudential supervision. It subsequently questions how those features comply with the letter and spirit of Article 15 TFEU. Aiming better to integrate existing confidentiality features with EU constitutional transparency obligations, this paper finally proposes some minor modifications to the European Central Bank decision-making framework to align it more directly to the spirit of openness reflected in Article 15.

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