Bliss from Bricks: Saul Bellow’s Moral Phenomenology

A ‘phenomenology of God’ will characterize human experience of God, at least regarding some of its distinctive aspects. This article contends that theism acknowledging a God worthy of worship owes its ultimate credibility to a morally relevant phenomenology of God, given the centrality of God’s unique moral character and will in all things divine. The neglect of such a phenomenology has left many versions of theism speculative and uncompelling, even if they call themselves a ‘phenomenology of the Spirit’. So, inquirers about a God worthy of worship should attend carefully to the prospect of a morally relevant phenomenology of God. The article explains that this phenomenology is interpersonally responsive and thus interactive in a manner foreign to typical moral phenomenology, and that it contributes to an illuminating approach to varying divine evidence among humans. The article also identifies a morally relevant challenge, based in conscience, for sincere inquirers about God.

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Moral Phenomenology

Particularism and the Space of Moral Reasons ◽

10.1057/9780230292437_5 ◽

2011 ◽

pp. 110-136

Author(s):

Benedict Smith

Keyword(s):

Moral Phenomenology

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The viability of Kolnai’s moral phenomenology

Aurel Kolnai’s The War Against the West Reconsidered ◽

10.4324/9781351260848-12 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 189-210

Author(s):

Chris Bessemans

Keyword(s):

Moral Phenomenology

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Buddhist Moral Thought and Western Moral Philosophy

10.1093/oso/9780190499778.003.0003 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Christopher W. Gowans

Keyword(s):

Virtue Ethics ◽

Moral Philosophy ◽

Moral Theory ◽

Moral Pluralism ◽

Moral Particularism ◽

Moral Thought ◽

Moral Principles ◽

Moral Phenomenology

This essay discusses interpretations of Indian Buddhist moral thought in terms of common categories of Western moral philosophy. Problems are raised for interpretations of Buddhism as being committed to a theory of what makes an action morally right (specifically deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics). Following the lead of the poison arrow simile, a nontheoretical understanding of Buddhist moral thought is proposed: it was implicitly supposed that we do not need to act on the basis of universal moral principles but simply need to overcome the roots of unwholesome actions (greed, hatred, and delusion) and act skillfully. This interpretation is compared with other nontheoretical interpretations of Buddhist moral thought by reference to moral particularism, moral phenomenology, moral pluralism, and a nontheoretical conception of virtue ethics. It is also suggested that we should not be perplexed by the absence of explicit moral theory in Buddhism. Featured figures include Aristotle and Śāntideva.

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