Filosofia, politica e società ai tempi della pandemia. Agamben e la «paranoia della ragione»

In this essay we will try to analyze the thought of the philosopher Giorgio Agamben on the pandemic. The aim of the work is twofold. On the one hand, we will try to demonstrate that Agamben’s positions on the pandemic are not to be understood as mere extemporaneous statements, but as integral parts of his philosophy. On the other hand, we will try to show how these positions are based on a deeply paranoid and anti-scientific vision, since Agamben believes that the effects of the epidemic have been exaggerated by the centers of power in order to create a “state of exception” that allows to crumble social life and to use the fear of poverty as a tool to dominate society. We will try to demonstrate that it is precisely starting from the critique of Agamben’s positions that it is possible to rethink a philosophy and a politic to come and a new reorganization of social and intimate relations between human beings.

When the Face Becomes a Carrier: Biopower, Levinas’s Ethics, and Contagion

In the midst of a pandemic, what does it mean to see the Other as Other and not as a carrier of the virus? I argue that in seeking a Levinasian response to the pandemic, we must be mindful of the implications of the mechanisms of surveillance and control that, presented as ways to protect the Other, operate by controlling the Other and rendering our relation to the Other increasingly impersonal. Subjected to these mechanisms, the Other becomes a dangerous entity that must be controlled, and the state that deploys them comes increasingly to mediate the relation between self and Other. The more we rely on such mechanisms for protection, the easier it becomes to regard the Other not as one who summons me to an infinite responsibility but as a vector of disease. Despite all the differences between Levinas’s and Foucault’s approaches, reading them in conversation shows that the control and surveillance of the population functions within a discourse that medicalizes and objectifies the Other in favor of the centralizing power that uses those technologies. In defiance of Levinas’s warning against imposing a narrative on the Other’s suffering, this discourse coopts that suffering as a justification for biopower.

Einwanderung in Zeiten von Corona

After the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, most states enacted new measures to constrain international mobility. By May 8th, 2020, more than 93% of the world’s population lived in states with special entry bans and more than three billion lived in countries whose borders were almost completely closed to non-citizens. Can such measures be justified? If so, would this undermine the open borders view? This paper examines these questions. It argues, first, that, although short-term entry bans and other similar measures designed to protect public health can be justified, these bans need to be designed with a number of exemptions, in particular, for asylum seekers and refugees. Even in times of pandemic, completely closed borders are indefensible. It argues, second, that although extreme versions of the open borders position may have difficulty accepting this conclusion, other versions of the position can consistently justify special entry restrictions.

Theories of Justice Applied to the Pandemic: The Case of Vaccine Distribution

The problem of the distribution (in a broad sense) of the coronavirus vaccines – concerning the criterion by which the beneficiaries of the vaccine are selected – constitute a particular case of the general problem of the distribution of social goods. For this reason, it is necessary to discuss whether the selection criterion to be adopted is that of commutative justice or that of distributive justice and, consequently, whether the approach to the problem must follow an individualist perspective or a collectivist perspective, such as it happens regarding the general problem of the distribution of social goods. Therefore, problem of the distribution of the coronavirus vaccines is still a problem of social justice. In this essay, I will rehearse an application of each of these criteria to the problem at hand.

The Ethics of Social Distance and Proximity in the City

The genealogy of ethics starts in the polis. Plato and Aristotle had an optimistic view of polis life, even though Plato was born shortly after the plague of Athens, an experience that left a deep imprint in his society, and interestingly not a very good opinion of democracy. The idea of the polis as the ideal locus for human flourishing can be contested because we do not share the same face-to-face form of life with the ancient polis-dwellers. Contemporary megacities do not harbor an agora in which citizens debate current affairs. Such debates have shifted to social media. It is worth investigating the value of face-to-face interaction even today. Despite the risk of spreading airborne lung diseases like the Corona virus, the possibility of face-to-face interactions allows the cultivation of attention necessary for ethics. Knowing your neighbor by acquaintance, seeing her face every day can make pedestrians better attuned to the need to protect her in times of the pandemic, by maintaining distance and wearing a mask. If this is indeed the case, then it has implications for urban design: urban density can be designed in a way that affords functional proximity (the likelihood of encounters) and more humane neighborhoods.

Philosophical Practice as a Way to Address the Students’ Existential Problems during the Pandemic

This article is devoted to the study of the academic and existential problems of students during the pandemic. The authors conducted sociological surveys among first- and second-year students of a higher educational institution, where they analyze students’ attitudes towards distance learning and identify the most pressing existential problems of students. The authors concluded that during the quarantine period, learning has lost its semantic basis. The reason for this is the inability of the education system to respond to the challenges of the new educational format, as it develops in accordance with the modern technology, as modern pedagogy develops, as a rational system of objective knowledge, and as it does not take into account the internal, value-based meanings of education itself. The authors see a solution to this problem in shifting the emphasis from transferring knowledge to helping students find personal meanings that coincide with the objectives of philosophical practice. The authors give examples of how the techniques of philosophical practice could unlock students’ potential in understanding and solving existential problems.