The German Council Presidency I

2013 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Council Presidency

The rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU – Still an agenda-setter?

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-518
Author(s):  
Austė Vaznonytė
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Changes ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Issue Salience ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Agenda Setter ◽  
Panel Model ◽  
The Government ◽  
Council Presidency ◽  
Over Time ◽  
The Eu

What role does the rotating Council Presidency maintain a decade after Lisbon? This article argues that, regardless of institutional changes, the rotating Presidency still shapes the Council agenda to a large extent. Based on an original hand-coded dataset of rotating Presidency programmes between 1997 and 2017, I show that some policies are ‘stickier’ on the Council agenda, while the others exhibit significant changes in salience over time. Since the magnitude of these shifts varies from Presidency to Presidency, the analysis focuses on domestic political factors and the country positioning vis-à-vis the European Union to determine their relationship with agenda volatility. By means of a panel model, the examination demonstrates that the government issue salience can best explain the levels of issue salience in the Presidency programmes.

scholarly journals I Do It My Way: Analysis of the Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the European Union

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-48
Author(s):  
Johana Galušková ◽  
Petr Kaniok
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Czech Republic ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Sociological Institutionalism ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Critical Junctures ◽  
Variable Character ◽  
Council Presidency

Abstract This article analyses development of the Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the European Union (PermRep) from 2004, when the Czech Republic joined the European Union, until 2013. Its main aim is to test four concepts related to the three neoinstitutionalist theories – firstly, the path dependency and critical junctures models related to the historical neo-institutionalism, secondly principal-agent relation typical for the rational neo-institutionalism and the concept of the logic of appropriateness related to the sociological institutionalism. The authors try to determine which of these four models have the best explanatory potential when it comes to the development of the Czech PermRep. After analysing three independent variables (changes in executive, EU Council Presidency, EU strategies), and their impact on the dependent variable (character of the Czech PermRep), the authors conclude that particularly historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism models have the greatest explanatory power while the contribution of rational institutionalism model of principal-agent is relatively weak.

Interview with Janez Lenarčič

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
International Law ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Treaty Negotiations ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
State Position ◽  
Council Presidency

Janez Lenarčič is currently serving as Commissioner for Crisis Management in the European Commission, a mandate he took up in December 2019. In this capacity, he is responsible for EU civil protection as well as humanitarian aid. Mr Lenarčič served as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the European Union (EU) in Brussels from 2016 to 2019. From 2014 to 2016, he held the Secretary of State position in the cabinet of the Slovenian Prime Minister. His previous experience also includes the position of Director of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, in Warsaw, from 2008 to 2014. He has also served as Secretary of State for European Affairs, including representing Slovenia during the Lisbon Treaty negotiations in 2007 and later representing the Slovenian EU Council Presidency to the European Parliament in 2008. In 2002 and 2003 he held the position of State Secretary in the cabinet of the Slovenian Prime Minister, after which he served as Slovenian Ambassador to the OSCE. In 2005, he was also Chairman of the Permanent Council of the OSCE in Vienna. In 2000 he served as Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the following year he became the Diplomatic Adviser to the then Slovenian Prime Minister. Between 1994 and 1999 he was posted to Slovenia's Permanent Representation to the United Nations (UN) in New York, where he also served as the alternate representative of Slovenia on the UN Security Council. Mr Lenarčič holds a degree in international law from Ljubljana University.

Slovenia will remain polarised, whatever Jansa’s fate

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
European Council ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Government ◽  
Council Presidency ◽  
The Eu

Significance The government led by the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) is under mounting pressure as Slovenia prepares to take over the European Council presidency. This is due mainly to hostility in parliament and society to Prime Minister Janez Jansa, who promotes a popular but divisive form of national conservatism. Impacts A successful no-confidence vote in the government followed by early elections would complicate Slovenia’s handling of its EU presidency. The fall of the current government and its replacement by the centre-left would improve Slovenia’s relations with the EU and United States. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban would lose an ally at EU level if Jansa lost office.

Lobbying cycles in Brussels: Evidence from the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 597-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Hollman ◽  
Zuzana Murdoch
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
National Interest ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Level ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Rotation Scheme ◽  
Council Presidency ◽  
Unique Dataset

The Council presidency holds direct responsibility for the Council’s functioning and moves between EU member states via a six-month rotation scheme. We argue that this rotating Council presidency causes a lobbying cycle among interest groups at the European level, whereby national interest groups from the country holding the presidency temporarily become active at the European level. Using a unique dataset including almost 16,500 registrations of interest groups in the European Transparency Register over the 2008–2017 period, we confirm that holding the Council presidency increases the number of interest groups from that member state in the Transparency Register. We also find that national interest groups generally have a higher likelihood to exit the register following the end of their country’s presidency.

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