Critical Realism for Ethnography

Author(s):  
Grant Banfield

While specific applications of critical realism to ethnography are few, theoretical developments are promising and await more widespread development. This is especially the case for progressive and critical forms of ethnography that strive to be, in critical realist terms, an “emancipatory science.” However, the history of ethnography reveals that both the field and its emancipatory potential are limited by methodological tendencies toward “naïve realism” and “relativism.” This is the antimony of ethnography. The conceptual and methodological origins of ethnography are grounded in the historical tensions between anti-naturalist Kantian idealism and hyper-naturalist Humean realism. The resolution of these tensions can be found in the conceptual resources of critical realism. Working from, and building upon, the work of British philosopher Roy Bhaskar, critical realism is a movement in the philosophy of science that transcends the limits of Kantian idealism and Humean realism via an emancipatory anti-positivist naturalism. Critical realism emerged as part of the post-positivist movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. From its Marxian origins, critical realism insists that all science, including the social sciences, must be emancipatory. At its essence, this requires taking ontology seriously. The call of critical realism to ethnographers, like all social scientists, is that while they must hold to epistemological caution this does not warrant ontological shyness. Furthermore, critical realism’s return to ontology implies that ethnographers must be ethically serious. Ethnography, if it is to hold to its progressive inclinations, must be about something. Critical realism for ethnography pushes the field to see itself as more than a sociological practice. Rather, it is to be understood as a social practice for something: the universalizing of human freedom.

Author(s):  
Mats Alvesson ◽  
Yiannis Gabriel ◽  
Roland Paulsen

This chapter introduces ‘the problem’ of meaningless research in the social sciences. Over the past twenty years there has been an enormous growth in research publications, but never before in the history of humanity have so many social scientists written so much to so little effect. Academic research in the social sciences is often inward looking, addressed to small tribes of fellow researchers, and its purpose in what is increasingly a game is that of getting published in a prestigious journal. A wide gap has emerged between the esoteric concerns of social science researchers and the pressing issues facing today’s societies. The chapter critiques the inaccessibility of the language used by academic researchers, and the formulaic qualities of most research papers, fostered by the demands of the publishing game. It calls for a radical move from research for the sake of publishing to research that has something meaningful to say.


1995 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 225-240
Author(s):  
Kenneth Minogue

It is one of Karl Popper's great distinctions that he has an intense—some would say too intense—awareness of the history of philosophy within which he works. He knows not only its patterns, but also its comedies, and sometimes he plays rhetorically against their grain. He knows, for example, that the drive to consistency tends to turn philosophy into compositions of related doctrines, each seeming to involve the others. Religious belief, for example, tends to go with idealism and free will, religious scepticism with materialism and determinism. Popper does not believe in a religion, was for long some kind of a socialist, and takes his bearings from the philosophy of science. Aha! it seems we have located him. Here is a positivist, a materialist, probably a determinist. But of course he denies he is any of these things. Again, like many modern thinkers, he wants to extend scientific method not only to the social sciences but also to history. So far so familiar, until we discover that he regards nature as no less ‘cloudy’ than human societies.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Little

AbstractThis article addresses Tuukka Kaidesoja’s critique of the philosophical presuppositions of Roy Bhaskar’s theories of critical realism. The article supports Kaidesoja’s naturalistic approach to the philosophy of the social sciences, including the field of social ontology. The article discusses the specific topics of fallibilism, emergence, and causal powers. I conclude that Kaidesoja’s book is a valuable contribution to current debates over critical realism.


1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 64-81
Author(s):  
Albrecht Wellmer

If one were to write a history of the philosophy of science in the spirit of T. S. Kuhn, one would have to consider the model of scientific explanation which Popper proposed and Hempel and Oppenheim developed to be one of the great paradigms of contemporary analytical philosophy of science. This analogue to the historically important paradigms of the individual sciences seems to me to be justifiable for the following reasons: first, the Hempel—Oppenheim model (or HO-model, as I shall call it) claims universal methodological validity; second, discussions on the problem of explanation have centred on this model for some time; third, the recent cognitive progress in this field has been largely the result of the interrelation between criticism of this model on the one hand and its improvement and explication on the other hand; and lastly, this model stands for a particular comprehension of the problems and possibilities of science, a concept of quite important practical consequence.


2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juha Käpylä ◽  
Harri Mikkola

International Relations as a scientific discipline can be considered elusive and, in a sense, “under debate.” A distinctive feature of the theoretical debates of the discipline has been the various calls for different kinds of theoretical and metatheoretical “turns.” In this atmosphere, the return of ontologically oriented IR theorizing based on Critical Realism has increased in influence. The aim of this article is to problematize some of the formulations of Critical Realist metatheory, especially in relation to the notions of correspondence, retroduction and emergence. The article will argue that in the context of the social sciences, two things are highly problematic. The first problem is the quest for establishing “heavy ontological furniture” as a backbone for scientific research. The second problem is the attempt to combine the fallibility of human knowledge with the “getting things right” attitude based on correspondence-like concepts of truth. The article concludes with a recommendation for a healthy caution towards the Critical Realist aspiration for the “ontological turn” in the social sciences.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  

Trends in information-library support of the social sciences are investi-gated, as well as issues in the use of the latest innovations of the social sci-ences in library science, and the interaction of research libraries in the infra-structure of social sciences; library collections as information resources, technologies for discovering information from sources and communication networks of the scientific communities are analyzed. This work is geared to library and information professionals, social scientists, as well as those who are interested in interdisciplinary research at the intersection of library science and bibliography, and humanities and social sciences, history of science, and information science.


2005 ◽  
pp. 159-169
Author(s):  
Mark Herkenrath ◽  
Claudia König ◽  
Hanno Scholtz

Earlier versions of the articles in this issue were presented and discussed atthe international symposium on “The Future of World Society,” held in June 2004 at the University of Zurich.¹ The theme of the symposium implied two assumptions. One, there is in fact a world society, though still very much in formation. And two, as social scientists we are in a position to predict the future of that society with at least some degree of certainty. The ?rst of these assumptions will be addressed in Alberto Martinelli’s timely contribution, “From World System to World Society?” It is the second assumption which is of interest to us in this introduction. Are the social sciences really able to predict the future of world society?


2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozana Cucu-Oancea

Abstract This article envisages critically present the use of the personal documents, looking from a historical perspective at how it was practiced in different paradigms in the humanistic-social sciences. The exposé also considers the methodological and the ethical implications of using the method, underlining, in this respect, the aspects related to the preservation and reuse of the materials of this kind. By putting into balance the trumps and downsides of the personal documents method, the article highlights, in fact, the importance of using the personal documents method in studying a wide range of specific problems of the humanistic-social sciences. The ultimate purpose of the article is, therefore, that of prompting the social scientists to look more carefully and more trustingly at the alternative of choosing the personal documents method, as a potential powerful tool for sociological research, providing them, at the same time, with possible directions in discerning between the favourable and unfavourable situations for using it.


1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 64-81
Author(s):  
Albrecht Wellmer

If one were to write a history of the philosophy of science in the spirit of T. S. Kuhn, one would have to consider the model of scientific explanation which Popper proposed and Hempel and Oppenheim developed to be one of the great paradigms of contemporary analytical philosophy of science. This analogue to the historically important paradigms of the individual sciences seems to me to be justifiable for the following reasons: first, the Hempel—Oppenheim model (or HO-model, as I shall call it) claims universal methodological validity; second, discussions on the problem of explanation have centred on this model for some time; third, the recent cognitive progress in this field has been largely the result of the interrelation between criticism of this model on the one hand and its improvement and explication on the other hand; and lastly, this model stands for a particular comprehension of the problems and possibilities of science, a concept of quite important practical consequence.


2005 ◽  
Vol 44 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Murmis

Full institutionalization of sociology, anthropology and political science occurred in Argentina in the late 1950s. While sociology started out as an established field having radically broken with the past of the discipline, both anthropology and political science established linkages with traditional versions of their fields. Although there were differences between them, the three disciplines evolved through a process of frequent crises, resulting mostly from military interventions at the national level. Institutionalization brought with it an expansion of the labor market and the opportunities for obtaining research funds, thus generating growing professionalization. This expansion as well as the response of social scientists to repression in universities was strongly related to links with foreign foundations and international organizations. Until 1983, the dramatic history of the social sciences was marked by disappearances (desapariciones) and exile. In recent years the three disciplines have grown and diversified.


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