The 1989 Tiananmen Movement and Its Aftermath

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rowena Xiaoqing He
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Collective Memory ◽  
Student Leaders ◽  
Actual Number ◽  
Hunger Strike ◽  
Tiananmen Square ◽  
The World ◽  
The Government ◽  
China Today ◽  
The Military

In spring 1989, millions of Chinese took to the streets calling for reforms. The nationwide movement, highlighted by a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, ended on June 4 with the People’s Liberation Army firing on unarmed civilians. Over 200,000 soldiers, equipped with tanks and machine guns, participated in the lethal action. Student leaders, intellectuals, workers, and citizens were subsequently purged, imprisoned, or exiled. Tiananmen remains one of the most sensitive and taboo subjects in China today, banned from both academic and popular realms. Even the actual number of deaths from the military crackdown remains unknown. Every year on the anniversary of June 4, the government intensifies its control, and citizens who commemorate the events are put under various forms of surveillance. The Tiananmen Mothers are prohibited from openly mourning family members who died in the massacre, and exiles are prohibited from returning home, even for a parent’s funeral. Many older supporters of the movement, leading liberal intellectuals in the 1980s, died in exile. The post-Tiananmen regime has constructed a narrative that portrays the Tiananmen Movement as a Western conspiracy to weaken and divide China, hence justifying its military crackdown as necessary for stability and prosperity and paving the way for China’s rise. Because public opinion pertaining to nationalism and democratization is inseparable from a collective memory of the nation’s most immediate past—be it truthful, selective, or manipulated—the memory of Tiananmen has become highly contested. While memory can be manipulated or erased by those in power, the repression of both memory and history is accompanied by political, social, and psychological distortions. Indeed, it is not possible to understand today’s China and its relationship with the world without understanding the spring of 1989.

Constructing Public Opinion and Manipulating Symbols: China's Press Cover-age of the Student Movement in 1989

1995 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 412-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guo-Qiang Zhang ◽  
Sidney Kraus
Keyword(s):  
Content Analysis ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Student Movement ◽  
Dominant Ideology ◽  
Tiananmen Square ◽  
The Press ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Military

This content analysis of Chinese newspapers before and after the Tiananmen Square protest examines the symbolic representation of the Student Movement of 1989 in China. The study reveals that top leaders manipulated symbols given to the media and that these symbols rigorously highlighted the dominant ideology of the Chinese Communist Party and isolated the movement participants. Officials attempted to legitimize the military suppression of the movement. The press construction of public opinion echoed the hegemonic process created and maintained by the party structure.

1989 People's Movement

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Wasserstrom ◽  
Yidi Wu
Keyword(s):  
Code Word ◽  
Hunger Strike ◽  
Political Liberalization ◽  
Design Elements ◽  
Tiananmen Square ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Common Term ◽  
The Government ◽  
Local Students ◽  
The Right

The People’s Movement began in mid-April 1989, with gatherings of students in Beijing. They ostensibly turned out to mourn Hu Yaobang, a recently deceased Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official associated with reformist ideas, who had been General Secretary and Deng Xiaoping’s heir apparent as paramount leader until being demoted for taking a soft line on campus unrest in 1986–1987. The students used the mourning ceremonies to speak out on issues that concerned them, especially official corruption and nepotism. In later weeks, the struggle spread rapidly in geographical and social terms and increasingly became a fight for political liberalization and the right to protest. In Beijing, local students, who made Tiananmen Square their main protest site, were joined on the streets by intellectual, workers, and even sympathetic journalists and cadres, as well as by educated youths who streamed into the capital from other cities. By late April and May, very large crowds were filling Tiananmen Square, site of some of China’s most important political monuments, while smaller but still significantly sized crowds gathered at the central squares of other cities. The most dramatic events of the movement included a high-profile hunger strike by student leaders, which increased popular support for the protesters, and the creation of a “Goddess of Democracy” statue, which combined design elements from America’s Statue of Liberty with traditional Chinese features. The struggle ended in June with the government using force to put down demonstrations, after condemning the movement as an effort to create “turmoil” (a code word for Cultural Revolution-style chaos) backed by foreigners wishing to destabilize China. The most significant repression took place in Beijing, where soldiers killed many protesters and bystanders—estimates of casualties range widely, but at least several hundred deaths occurred—on the streets near Tiananmen Square late on the night of 3 June and early in the morning of 4 June 1989. Common names for the upheaval include “Tiananmen Movement,” “June 4th Movement” (the most common term in Chinese language publications is Liusi, literally “Six Four”), “Democracy Movement,” “Beijing Spring,” and “1989 Student Movement,” but “People’s Movement” has two advantages. First, it underscores the multiclass, multilocale nature of the struggles and the repression (demonstrations in scores of cities, a massacre in Chengdu as well as Beijing); and it avoids giving the impression that the sole issue was “democracy” (anger at corruption and a desire for increased personal freedoms were also important).

scholarly journals Media’s Portrayal of Homosexuality and Rape as a Reflection of Cultural Acceptance?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tina C. Touitou
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Video Clip ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Public ◽  
Cultural Taboos ◽  
Short Video ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

The study focuses on media’s portrayal of homosexuality as a reflection of cultural acceptance in the society. The first representation of gay men in the United States to a national audience occurred in 1967 with the airing of a documentary titled “The Homosexuals,” which is filled with harmful, derogatory stereotypes etc. The fact that homosexual characters were mostly guest stars as opposed to leading characters also suggests that gay activist were taking a less radical approach by attempting to improve acceptance of homosexual. In Nigeria, homosexuality is a taboo, abnormal and not accepted. The media can and has with some degree of success helped break down the cultural taboos associated with sensitive sexual topics and bridge some gaps in our sexual knowledge. The paper adopted empirical secondary data, and employed cultivation theory. It proved that the media have power in shaping people’ believe and perception, and can form or modify the public opinion in different ways depending on what the objective is. For example, Pakistani media influenced the opinion against the Taliban in Swat by repeated telecast of a video clip showing whipping of a woman by a Taliban. Before that, the public opinion over the military action against the Taliban was divided, but repeated telecast of this short video clip changed the public opinion overnight in favor of the government to take action. The paper recommended that the media should take a firm stand, not playing two-edge sword on  the reportage of homosexuality, and should remain a ‘watchdog’ and the ‘mirror’ of the society.

Irom Sharmila’s Struggle against Military Repression: A Critique

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-181
Author(s):  
Nandita Haksar
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Collective Memory ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Political Context ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Way

This article argues that although Irom Sharmila’s 16-year-old fast from November 2000 to August 2016 has earned her the status of an icon of non-violent protest, yet she did not seek these appellations; her only aim was to put moral pressure on the government to repeal the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958. The article seeks to assess the efficacy of Irom Sharmila’s protest and how far it has helped or hindered in mobilizing public opinion against the Act. It propounds that the publicity around Irom Sharmila put her on a pedestal and trapped her in her own image, made invisible entire histories of sufferings of people in the northeast, including Manipur, and their struggles against the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. The gains of many struggles and efforts were wiped out of the collective memory of the nation and the only image of Manipur was this frail woman with a tube hanging from her nose. The article also argues that there is a kind of fetish in the way the media celebrates non-violence without reference to the political context.

scholarly journals Current issues of international law in regulating counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mária Bordás
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
International Law ◽  
Public Security ◽  
Legal Regulations ◽  
Counter Terrorism ◽  
Military Literature ◽  
The World ◽  
Practical Reality ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

The study sheds light on the current tendencies if the international law on warfare can successfully be applied in the practical reality in the progress of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts. There have been two phenomena identified recently in the warfare which are endangering public security and public safety of the democratic states of the world: terrorism and insurgency. Both of them mean a threat and violation to the population and the government authorities. It has been queried in the military literature whether these new forms of warfare should be handled by military engagements or law enforcement. This is, nevertheless, not just a dilemma of the strategy how to combat against it, but should be, at the same time, in accordance with the international legal regulations, too

Deng Xiaoping

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Delia Davin
Keyword(s):  
Social Transformation ◽  
Second Phase ◽  
Deng Xiaoping ◽  
Political Liberalization ◽  
Tiananmen Square ◽  
Food Shortages ◽  
Great Leap Forward ◽  
The Government ◽  
Peasant Family ◽  
The Military

Deng Xiaoping became China’s effective leader in 1978, two years after the death of Mao Zedong. He formally retired in 1992 but was referred to in the Chinese press as the paramount leader and remained influential until his death in 1997. Deng presided over the economic reforms of the post-Mao years, which produced dramatic growth, profound social transformation, and, eventually, a market economy. He also oversaw the arrangements by which Hong Kong was returned to China. He did not favor political liberalization, was suspicious of dissent, and suppressed the prodemocracy movement in 1989. Deng was born in rural Sichuan in 1904. He traveled to France when he was only sixteen and, in his six years there, became involved in the nascent Chinese Communist movement. After a further year of study in Moscow, Deng returned to China. He worked as a political commissar with the Communist armies in South China, participated in the Long March in 1934–1935, and served with the Communist armies both in the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the second phase of the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949). When the Communists took power nationally in 1949, Deng became mayor of Chongqing and held various posts in Southwest China. Transferred to Beijing in 1952, he played a major role in the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, at which he was elected general secretary. Although Deng had not opposed Mao’s Great Leap Forward in advance, he expressed concern about the food shortages to which it gave rise, and in its aftermath worked with Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai to bring about economic recovery by increasing peasant family incentives within collective agriculture. In the Cultural Revolution, Deng was criticized, with Liu Shaoqi, for revisionism and dismissed from his posts. Mao brought him back to Beijing in 1973 and subsequently gave him day-to-day control of the government as vice-premier. However, Mao became concerned that Deng valued production more highly than class struggle and that he might one day reverse Mao’s radical policies. On the death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976, Deng was passed over for the premiership, and in April he was again dismissed from office. At Mao’s own death in September 1976, his chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, took his place. But by the end of 1978, Deng’s wealth of experience and his network of loyal supporters in the army, the party, and the government allowed the veteran leader de facto to oust Hua Guofeng from the leadership. Deng’s program of market reform and modernization produced rapid economic advance, greatly improved living standards, and enhanced China’s international standing. However, he did not encourage political reform and is remembered for the military suppression of the student movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

THE POWER ELITE IN THAILAND: A General Survey with a Focus on the Civil Bureaucrats

1975 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Likhit Dhiravegin
Keyword(s):  
Social Mobility ◽  
Educational Achievement ◽  
Family Background ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Student Leaders ◽  
Government Service ◽  
Business Elite ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Power Elite ◽  
The Military

AbstractAt the macro level, we have given a systemic picture of the elite structure of Thai society. We have argued that the most three powerful groups of elite are the military, the civil bureaucratic elite and the business elite. Among these three groups of elite, an alliance has been developed. The business elite have sought political protection from the military and the bureaucratic elite while the latter. two groups obtain economic benefit. Below the three groups of elite lie the people's representatives; the student leaders, the labour leaders and the peasant organizers. We have argued that the people's representatives are on the border line because the democratice structure has not yet become institutionalized. And this is true also for the student leaders, the labour leaders and the peasant organizers. At best, they are at the early stage of getting organized and thus they are classified as interest groups who are becoming more and more active in politics. At the micro level, we have presented an analysis of the general characteristics of the civil bureaucratic elite of Thailand. We have found from our discussion that more than two-fifths (41%) of the elite in our study have fathers in government service; 31.44% are from families of business; only 5.6% are from a peasant background. There ia an inbreeding in the government service career. We have hypothesized that family background plays a crucial role in an individual's educational achievement which, in turn, leads to his social mobility. From our study, we have found that social mobility

scholarly journals Jair Bolsonaro’s diplomacy: dismantling traditional foreign policy of Brazil

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
M. Bezerra
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Brazilian Amazon ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Dictatorship ◽  
Additional Protocol ◽  
The World ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

The author of the article under consideration analyzes Brazilian foreign policy in the period of the two years of Jair Bolsonaro’s government. According to predictions, introduction of the ultraright politician to power radically changed Brazil’s traditional foreign policy recognized for its independence, pragmatism and moderation. ‘Bolsonarist’ diplomacy led by chancellor Ernesto Araújo, following the agenda of the foreign policy of the United States, deconstructs the paradigms of Brazilian diplomacy, including the so-called ‘responsible pragmatism’ formulated by the government of president Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) during the military dictatorship as one of the pillars of Brazil’s role on the world stage, including the 13 years of the center-left government of the Worker’s Party (2003- 2016). Thus, paradoxically, Jair Bolsonaro ignores the lessons of the military regime of which he is an admirer and an apologist. Despite that, however, Bolsonaro’s government has reaffirmed Brazil’s role in BRICS, responded to threats posed to Brazil’s sovereignty over the Brazilian Amazon and reaffirmed its decision not to join the IAEA Additional Protocol. Stripped of its alliance with ‘trumpism’, Brazil will face challenges in environmental and human rights areas with Joe Biden’s administration. Possible dismissal of Ernesto Araújo, being an object of discontent in agribusiness and in the military, political and diplomatic circles, may mean an ‘adjustment’, but it will not bring about significant changes in the foreign policy of ‘bolsonarism’.

German-Franco Relations Since 1945

1952 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 501-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. B. Duroselle
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Considerable Influence ◽  
The World ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Government ◽  
Exhaustive Study ◽  
Democratic Constitution ◽  
De Gaulle

I do not intend to write an exhaustive study of the history of Franco-German relations since the capitulation of Germany on May 8, 1945. Such an undertaking is hardly possible in the present state of documentation. It seems to me more useful to concentrate on the essential characteristics of these relations and present them from an objective French point of view, as is natural for a French historian. The subject of French public opinion with regard to Germany has extremely interesting aspects which scholars, educated people from abroad and especially the average citizens of various countries of the world, find it difficult to understand. It is bseyond doubt that, in a country with a democratic constitution like France, public opinion exercises a considerable influence on the government. But conversely the government's influence on public opinion cannot be overlooked. It happens that in France the policy towards Germany since 1945 has been determined by a very small number of men: General de Gaulle, Georges Bidault, Robert Schuman, André François Poncet, René Pleven, Gilbert Grandval (the last to a lesser extent: he is concerned with the Saar problem).

Controlling Critical Messengers

2021 ◽  
pp. 83-110
Author(s):  
Alexander Dukalskis
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
North American ◽  
Image Management ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Foreign Correspondents ◽  
The World ◽  
Negative News ◽  
The Government

This chapter focuses on how Chinese authorities attempt to control the image of China that the world sees. It first sets the stage by describing China’s domestic media sphere. It then draws on semi-structured interviews with current and former foreign correspondents for European and North American outlets in China. The interviews reveal the techniques that the government uses to try to inhibit negative news about China from reaching global audiences. These include direct persuasion, restricting sites and/or persons from being investigated, surveillance, intimidation, and the specter of visa non-renewal. Ultimately, if these techniques fail, the government sometimes attempts to refute the story that results and/or to impugn the reputation of the journalist. Examining how foreign correspondents are “managed” in China is important because they help shape public opinion about China abroad and thus provide the backdrop to China’s other efforts at image management.

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