God’s Marshall Plan

2021 ◽  
pp. 184-211
Author(s):  
James D. Strasburg

This chapter examines how ecumenical American Protestants sought to come to Europe’s “spiritual aid” through carrying out a “Marshall Plan for the Churches.” By the summer of 1947, these Protestant ecumenists were preparing to rebuild European churches, distribute material aid across the continent, and promote theological exchange across the Atlantic. All the while, they also sought to strengthen the standing of democracy and capitalism in Europe and, in particular, to bolster European spiritual defenses against communism. While German and European Protestants welcomed ecumenical aid, they also protested the Cold War interests of the United States. In particular, they challenged American ecumenists for contributing to the spread of what they deemed a new kind of American imperial order in the world. In response, a growing number of Europeans called on ecumenical Protestants across the North Atlantic to become a “third way” spiritual force between American democracy and Soviet communism.

Author(s):  
William O. Walker

This chapter describes how the United States forged the American Century while pursuing hegemony from 1945 through 1949. More than consultation with friends and allies was necessary after the onset of the Cold War. To demonstrate the nation’s credibility, the Department of State, through the efforts of George Marshall, George Kennan, and Dean Acheson, fashioned programs for military aid and economic assistance, namely, the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. The former prefigured the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, whereas the Marshall Plan, thanks to the work of the Economic Cooperation Administration, became a model for economic reconstruction in strategically vital places in Western Europe and beyond, most notably Japan.


Author(s):  
Mary Ann Heiss

This chapter deals with the term of the Committee of Information from 1947 to 1949, which introduced a variety of proposals for accountability. It points out how solid Western state domination of the General Assembly and the states' manipulation of UN procedure prevented much of the proposals for accountability from being accomplished. It details the importance of the Cold War in shaping discussion of the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories as the Soviet bloc worked to use colonialism as a propaganda weapon against the West across UN forums. The chapter outlines proponents of an activist UN role in the Chapter XI territories built on the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information to advance a variety of proposals for accountability. It looks at the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Berlin Blockade, creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other international developments that marked the superpower confrontation in Europe.


2001 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Connelly

October and November 1960 were two of the coldest months of the Cold War. Continuing tensions over Berlin and the nuclear balance were exacerbated by crises in Laos, Congo, and—for the first time—France's rebellious départements in Algeria. During Nikita Khrushchev's table-pounding visit to the United Nations, he embraced Belkacem Krim, the foreign minister of the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA). After mugging for the cameras at the Soviet estate in Glen Cove, New York, Khrushchev confirmed that this constituted de facto recognition of the provisional government and pledged all possible aid. Meanwhile, in Beijing, President Ferhat Abbas delivered the GPRA's first formal request for Chinese “volunteers.” U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked his National Security Council “whether such intervention would not mean war.” The council agreed that if communist regulars infiltrated Algeria, the United States would be bound by the North Atlantic Treaty to come to the aid of French President Charles de Gaulle and his beleaguered government. After six years of insurgency, Algeria appeared to be on the brink of becoming a Cold War battleground.1


Author(s):  
Gerard Toal

The Georgian Military Assault on Tskhinval(i) began with an artillery barrage by truck-mounted Grad missiles that rained down in a largely indiscriminate manner on the urban area. OSCE monitors in the city counted rounds exploding at intervals of fifteen to twenty seconds. Then Georgian forces began a ground offensive. Scores were killed, mostly civilians but also combatants and, significantly, Russian soldiers serving as peacekeepers. Those wounded were taken to make­shift basement “hospitals” as fighting raged on the streets above them. Many bled to death. Inal Pliyev’s initial claim, made in the fog of war, that two thousand civilians died proved to be more than a tenfold exaggeration, but it was his number that traveled around the world before any verifiable body count got underway. And attached to the false number was the disputatious charge of “genocide” from the script of the conflict already written by the Ossetian authorities. News of the Georgian attack and Russian response reached Beijing (four hours ahead of Tbilisi), where U.S. president George W. Bush was standing in a line of visiting dignitaries in the Great Hall of the People to greet President Hu Jintao. A few places ahead of him was Vladimir Putin. They briefly talked, and when Bush returned to his hotel he placed a call to President Dmitry Medvedev. Medvedev, according to Bush, was angry and charged that Mikheil Saakashvili was a war criminal responsible for the deaths of more than fifteen hundred civilians as well as Russian peacekeepers. Bush told Medvedev that the United States was concerned about the “disproportionality” of the Russian response, adding, “We are going to be with them.” In his memoir Bush recounts how he sought de-escalation while wondering if Russia would have been as aggressive if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had approved Georgia’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) application. Later, at the Opening Ceremony of the Olympics, Bush was in the same row as Putin and asked those in between to shift seats so they could speak. Through a translator Putin also described Saakashvili as a war criminal.


Author(s):  
Tony Smith Jr.

The liberal internationalist tradition is credited with America's greatest triumphs as a world power—and also its biggest failures. Beginning in the 1940s, imbued with the spirit of Woodrow Wilson's efforts at the League of Nations to ‘make the world safe for democracy,’ the United States steered a course in world affairs that would eventually win the Cold War. Yet in the 1990s, Wilsonianism turned imperialist, contributing directly to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the continued failures of American foreign policy. This book explains how the liberal internationalist community can regain a sense of identity and purpose following the betrayal of Wilson's vision by the brash ‘neo-Wilsonianism’ being pursued today. The book traces how Wilson's thinking about America's role in the world evolved in the years leading up to and during his presidency, and how the Wilsonian tradition went on to influence American foreign policy in the decades that followed. It traces the tradition's evolution from its ‘classic’ era with Wilson, to its ‘hegemonic’ stage during the Cold War, to its ‘imperialist’ phase today. The book calls for an end to reckless forms of U.S. foreign intervention, and a return to the prudence and ‘eternal vigilance’ of Wilson's own time. It renews hope that the United States might again become effectively liberal by returning to the sense of realism that Wilson espoused, one where the promotion of democracy around the world is balanced by the understanding that such efforts are not likely to come quickly and without costs.


1945 ◽  
Vol 49 (410) ◽  
pp. 51-54
Author(s):  
A. Gouge

A Study of the air routes of the world brings out almost at once the fact that some of the most difficult route are also the most attractive. For instance, the North Atlantic route which couples North America with Europe is certainly one of the most difficult in the world, but also by the fact that it couples two of the most densely populated, as well as the most wealthy groups of people in the world, one of the most attractive.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-832

With the development of certain administrative frictions (concerning coal quotas, occupation costs, and the scrap metal treaty) between the western occupying powers and the German Federal Republic, early indications were that if the talk of “contractual agreements” did materialize it would reserve, for the occupying powers, wide controls over important areas of west Germany's internal and external affairs. In Washington, however, a general modification of approach was noted during the September discussions between the United States Secretary of State (Acheson), the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary (Morrison), and the French Foreign Minister (Schuman), preparatory to the Ottawa meetings of the North Atlantic Council.


1957 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Speier

The uncertainty about whether atomic weapons will be used in future war, whether local or general, lends itself to political exploitation in the cold war. The efficiency of nuclear weapons in wartime, and their resulting threat-value in either war- or peacetime, constitute their political-military worth. In peacetime, the threat-value of weapons can be exploited in many ways: by an ultimatum, by authoritative or inspired statements on capabilities or intentions, by studied disclosures of new weapons at ceremonial occasions, by means of maneuvers, redeployments of forces, or by so-called demonstrations.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Marie A. Valdes-Dapena

It is apparent that we are still woefully ignorant with respect to the subject of sudden and unexpected deaths in infants. Only by continual investigation of large series of cases, employing uniform criteria to define such deaths and using the investigative procedures outlined above as well as others which will undoubtedly suggest themselves, can we hope to understand and possibly prevent the deaths of some 15,000 to 25,000 infants in the United States each year. These lives, to say nothing of those in other countries throughout the world might provide some of the leadership which is necessary to maintain and advance the human race in the years to come.


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