The Myth of Structural Rationality

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Kiesewetter
Keyword(s):  
Wide Scope ◽  
Structural Requirements ◽  
Rational Requirements ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
Scope Interpretation

While Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that structural requirements of rationality cannot be normative, Chapter 6 argues for the stronger conclusion that there are no such requirements to begin with. The argument is that both narrow- and wide-scope interpretations of structural requirements face problems independently of whether these requirements are understood as being normative. Starting with the narrow-scope interpretation, the chapter discusses the problem that it licenses bootstrapping of rational requirements (6.1), that it entails inconsistent requirements (6.2), and that it entails requirements that undermine each other in a counterintuitive way (6.3). Turning to the wide-scope interpretation, the chapter discusses the charge that wide-scope requirements cannot capture an important asymmetry involved in structural irrationality (6.4–6.5), and that they are incapable of guiding our responses (6.6). It is argued that all of these objections pose serious problems for the respective accounts. This supports the conclusion that there are no structural requirements of rationality (6.7).

Requirements of Structural Rationality

2021 ◽  
pp. 165-195
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip
Keyword(s):  
Wide Scope ◽  
Rational Requirements ◽  
Narrow Scope

This chapter turns to the nature and form of requirements of structural rationality. It presents a recipe for generating requirements of structural rationality from verdicts about which states are incoherent (by the account defended in the previous chapter). On the resulting view, requirements of structural rationality are prohibitions on (incoherent) combinations of states. The chapter compares this with the closely related view that the requirements of rationality are “wide-scope” before reframing the debate over the scope of rational requirements and arguing for a view that is wide-scope, rather than narrow-scope, in spirit. It also argues that requirements of structural rationality are synchronic rather than diachronic. Finally, it defends the view that the demands of structural rationality are best thought of as requirements at all against a recent challenge.

Structural Requirements of Rationality

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Kiesewetter
Keyword(s):  
Wide Scope ◽  
Structural Requirements ◽  
Normative Question ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
The Normative Question

Chapter 3 provides an examination of some elementary questions about structural requirements of rationality. These questions are discussed, as far as possible, in abstraction from the normative question about rationality. The first section introduces the main disagreements about requirements of structural rationality, namely whether they take wide or narrow scope (3.1). The chapter then goes on to discuss several questions about the form of such requirements: whether their objects are propositions or responses (3.2); whether they are conditional or unconditional (3.3); whether they are synchronic or diachronic (3.4); and whether they govern states or processes (3.5). It is argued that on both narrow- and wide-scope readings, structural requirements of rationality are best understood as conditional and diachronic state-requirements that take responses as their object.

Scope

2020 ◽  
pp. 59-89
Author(s):  
John Brunero
Keyword(s):  
Wide Scope ◽  
Rational Requirements ◽  
Narrow Scope

This chapter takes up the debate over the formulation of rational requirements, particularly over whether “requires” should have wide or narrow scope. The chapter shows how if there’s a real disagreement between the wide-scoper and narrow-scoper, it must concern the formulation of diachronic, not synchronic, requirements. It presents what it takes to be the strongest argument for the wide-scope formulations, and show how attempts by narrow-scopers to address this argument will lead them to further difficulties. The chapter then considers the strongest motivation for the narrow-scope view: the objection concerning the symmetry of rational responses predicted by the wide-scope view. The chapter shows how the wide-scoper has resources to deflect the strongest versions of this objection.

Bootstrapping and Other Detachment Problems

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Kiesewetter
Keyword(s):  
Wide Scope ◽  
Structural Requirements ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
Promising Strategy

Chapter 4 discusses the problem that a normative understanding of structural requirements of rationality seems to allow for the detachment of unacceptable conclusions about what we ought or have reason to do. The chapter begins by illustrating the ‘bootstrapping problem’ that occurs when we take the relevant requirements to have narrow scope (4.1), and then discusses and rejects two strategies to solve this problem: the reasons strategy (4.2), and the subjective ‘ought’ strategy (4.3). A third, and more promising, strategy is presented, which blocks bootstrapping by taking structural requirements of rationality to have wide scope (4.4). The remainder of the chapter examines further detachment problems that arise when the wide-scope account is combined with independent principles about the transmission of reasons and ‘oughts’ (4.5–4.7). The conclusion is that the wide-scope account ultimately fails to block detachment of unacceptable normative conclusions (4.8).

Conclusion

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Kiesewetter
Keyword(s):  
Structural Requirements ◽  
Rational Requirements

This concludes my account of structural irrationality. I have argued, in Chapters 9 and 10, that structural irrationality claims such as (AI)–(MI) can be explained without recourse to structural requirements of rationality, by adherence to rational requirements to respond to available reasons alone. This enables us to respond to the problem that I described in ...

The Why-Be-Rational Challenge

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Kiesewetter
Keyword(s):  
Structural Requirements ◽  
The Third ◽  
Rational Requirements ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
Apparent Reasons

Besides the problems with detachment, proponents of the view that structural requirements of rationality are normative face the challenge to identify a reason that counts in favour of conforming to rational requirements. There are three possible ways to account for this challenge. The first is to present instrumental or other derivative reasons to conform to rational requirements (5.1). The second is to argue that rational requirements are themselves reasons (5.2). The third is to give some kind of buck-passing account of rational requirements, according to which such requirements are verdictive statements about reasons that exist independently of them (5.3–5.4). Chapter 5 argues that none of these strategies succeed. Finally, two accounts that have claimed to explain the normativity of structural rationality without assuming that rational requirements are necessarily accompanied by reasons, are discussed and rejected: the transparency account (5.5), and the apparent reasons account (5.6).

Parentheticalism and Requirements of Rationality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Henning
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Wide Scope ◽  
Structural Requirements

It is suggested that parentheticalism obviates the need to think of rationality as a distinct normative category, different from the category of support by normative reasons. So-called structural requirements are discussed as a potential obstacle to this proposal. It is shown that a parentheticalist account of the antecedents of rationality conditionals can explain away the impression that there are structural requirements of rationality. This account also solves the bootstrapping problem without introducing wide-scope oughts or the like. A notion of pseudo-detachment is introduced to describe the inferential behavior of the relevant conditionals. It is also explained how parentheticalism can capture the elusive idea of taking the subject’s point of view.

scholarly journals A new perspective on the shielding property of positive polarity

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 266
Author(s):  
Andreea Cristina Nicolae
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Universal Quantifier ◽  
Positive Polarity ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
Clausal Negation ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Scope Interpretation

In certain languages, disjunctions exhibit positive polarity behavior, which Szabolcsi (2002) argues can be diagnosed via the following four properties: (i) anti-licensing: no narrow scope interpretation under a clausemate negation, (ii) rescuing: acceptable in the scope of an even number of negative operators, (iii) shielding: acceptable under a clausemate negation if a universal quantifier intervenes, and (iv) locality of anti-licensing: acceptable in the scope of an extra-clausal negation. In recent work, Nicolae (2016, 2017), building on Spector 2014, argues that what distinguishes PPI disjunctions from polarity insensitive disjunctions is the fact that PPI-disjunctions obligatorily trigger epistemic inferences. That analysis, however, only accounts for the first two PPI properties. This paper extends that analysis to account for the second two properties, concluding that they should be seen as instantiations of the same phenomena, namely shielding by a universal quantifier.

Prosodic disambiguation of scopally ambiguous quantificational sentences in a discourse context

2014 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 453-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
KRISTEN SYRETT ◽  
GEORGIA SIMON ◽  
KIRSTEN NISULA
Keyword(s):  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Wide Scope ◽  
Correct Interpretation ◽  
Subsequent Work ◽  
Auditory Cues ◽  
Discourse Context ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
One To One

Researchers have long sought to determine the strength of the relation between prosody and the interpretation of scopally ambiguous sentences in English involving quantification and negation (e.g. All the men didn't go). While Jackendoff (1972) proposed a one-to-one mapping between sentence-final contour and the scope of negation (falling contour: narrow scope, fall-rise contour: wide scope), in subsequent work, researchers (e.g. Ladd 1980; Ward & Hirschberg 1985; Kadmon & Roberts 1986) disentangled the link between prosody and scope. Even though these pragmatic accounts predict variability in production, they still allow for some correlation between scope and prosody. To date, we lack systematic evidence to bear on this discussion. Here, we present findings from two perception experiments aimed at investigating whether prosodic information – including, but not limited to, sentence-final contour – can successfully disambiguate such sentences. We show that when speakers provide consistent auditory cues to sentential interpretation, hearers can successfully recruit these cues to arrive at the correct interpretation as intended by the speaker. In light of these results, we argue that psycholinguistic studies (including language acquisition studies) investigating participants’ ability to access multiple interpretations of scopally ambiguous sentences – quantificational and otherwise – should carefully control for prosody.

scholarly journals Information Structure and Scope Interactions: Disjunction Wide Scope Induced by Focus

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cécile Larralde ◽  
Alina Konradt ◽  
Kriszta Eszter Szendrői
Keyword(s):  
Information Structure ◽  
Wide Scope ◽  
Value Judgment ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
Subject Design ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Scope Interactions ◽  
Scope Reading ◽  
Prosodic Focus

In this paper we investigate the scopal reading of disjunctions in French negative sentences with pre-schoolers. We posit that the French disjunctor “ou” does not fit the traditional disjunction PPI/non-PPI dichotomy according to which a wide scope is taken by a PPI disjunction and a narrow scope when the disjunction is not a PPI. We hypothesized that focus could be a succesful scopal manipulator. Using Truth Value Judgment Tasks (TVJT), we tested French pre-schoolers' scopal reading of negated disjunctions in a neutral prosody condition and with prosodic focus on the disjunctor in a between subject design. We found that as predicted, prosodic focus often enduced participants to adopt a disjunction wide scope reading whereas a disjunction narrow scope reading was favored in the neutral prosody condition. This confirmed our hypothesis that focus can manipulate disjunction scope paramaters. It also shows that, when the disjunction is focalised, children have access to the disjunction wide scope reading earlier than previously thought. Finally, we can conclude that the distinction between PPI-disjunctor vs. non-PPI disjunctor languages needs to be more fine-grained.

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