Intention

This chapter develops a view according to which there is a constitutive aim of intention that parallels the constitutive aim of belief, and both of these constitutive aims can be used to explain some of the rational requirements governing intentions and beliefs. The chapter first considers in what sense there is an “aim of intention.” It begins by looking at many of the philosophical ideas associated with the “aim of belief,” noting that some of these won’t easily carry over to the “aim of intention” in the relevant way. However, if we understand constitutive aims in terms of the “job descriptions” of attitudes, there is room for optimism here. It then considers how the constitutive aims might explain certain consistency and coherence requirements, including means–ends coherence. The chapter critiques Michael Bratman’s suggestions for how these explanations might go, and offers an alternative view, which it calls “Non-normative Disjunctivism.”

Belief

Cognitivists about practical rationality argue that some requirements of practical rationality can be explained by the requirements of theoretical rationality, given the way in which intentions involve beliefs. This chapter considers several possible ways a cognitivist could explain means–ends coherence. It first considers accounts that use the Strong Belief Thesis, according to which intending to X involves believing one will X. It considers and reject several important arguments David Velleman has proposed in defense of the thesis. Additionally, the chapter argues that the thesis is vulnerable to counterexamples, and the standard moves made in response to such counterexamples are unhelpful to the cognitivist. It then considers accounts that use a weaker thesis about the intention–belief connection, but even the best available cognitivist account along these lines has trouble showing that the theoretical requirements explain the practical ones.

Normativity II

This chapter turns to the question of whether means–ends coherence is normative in the sense that we always ought, or more weakly, have reason to comply with it. The chapter considers the view, inspired by Prichard’s critique of “moral philosophy,” that rationality provides its own reasons, and so we need not search for “external” reasons to comply with rational requirements. It argues that the request for such reasons is a legitimate request, and it’s hard to see what those reasons might be. It then turns to Strong Normativity—the thesis that we always ought to be means–ends coherent—and present three arguments against it. The first concerns cases of advantageous incoherence, the second concerns transmission to necessary means, and the third concerns transmission to sufficient means.

Normativity I

According to Normative Disjunctivism, when an agent is means–ends incoherent, then she either ought not intend the end, ought not believe intending the means is necessary, or ought to intend the means. If this view is true, it might lend support to the idea that means–ends coherence is a myth. The thought is that we’ve made the mistake of confusing a disjunction of requirements of reason for a disjunctive rational requirement (means–ends coherence). This chapter argues that Normative Disjunctivism is false and wouldn’t support the myth theory even if it were true. It presents four separate arguments against Normative Disjunctivism. And the chapter argues that the myth theorist lacks the resources to explain away relevant intuitions about the separateness, and ways of satisfying, the rational requirement of means–ends coherence.

Bootstrapping

Several philosophers object to the idea that intentions provide reasons on the grounds that this idea licenses an implausible “bootstrapping” of reasons into existence. However, there is no shared understanding of the bootstrapping objection in the literature, and, this chapter argues, available versions of the objection are too strong, since they would also disallow promises as sources of reasons. The chapter develops a new conception of the bootstrapping objection, according to which the problem with the idea that intentions provide reasons is that we find ourselves with a normative theory that issues incoherent advice. It also shows how the objection also targets the view that intentions provide reasons only in cases of ties or incommensurability. However, the objection will still allow for intentions to be normatively significant in some ways.

Conclusion

This concluding chapter sums up the main claims defended in the book, and explains how those claims relate to some of the sources of philosophical interest in means–ends coherence mentioned in the introduction. Although means–ends coherence can’t be traced to some social rule or convention, it can be explained in terms of the constitutive aims of the very attitudes the requirement governs. These constitutive aims—given how we’re understanding them in terms of sthe success conditions of the relevant attitudes—would not raise the same metaphysical, epistemological, and motivational worries that led antirealists like Mackie to doubt that moral requirements are part of the fabric of the universe. Matters would be different if we understood means–ends coherence such that we ought not be means–ends incoherent in the same sense in which we ought not intentionally cause human suffering for fun—in that both would be contrary to the “ought” of practical reason. Then it would be unclear why skepticism about the latter claim about what we ought not do wouldn’t also involve us in skepticism about the former.

Introduction

This introductory chapter sets out the plan for the book, and provides an overview of each of the main chapters. It also looks to a well-known historical precursor to contemporary work on means–ends coherence: Kant’s famous discussion of hypothetical imperatives in the Groundwork. The chapter also explores two contemporary sources of philosophical interest in instrumental rationality: an older debate about the scope of practical reason, and a more recent debate about the normativity of rational requirements. Lastly, the chapter begins to explain and defend the formulation of means–ends coherence that will be used throughout the book.

Scope

This chapter takes up the debate over the formulation of rational requirements, particularly over whether “requires” should have wide or narrow scope. The chapter shows how if there’s a real disagreement between the wide-scoper and narrow-scoper, it must concern the formulation of diachronic, not synchronic, requirements. It presents what it takes to be the strongest argument for the wide-scope formulations, and show how attempts by narrow-scopers to address this argument will lead them to further difficulties. The chapter then considers the strongest motivation for the narrow-scope view: the objection concerning the symmetry of rational responses predicted by the wide-scope view. The chapter shows how the wide-scoper has resources to deflect the strongest versions of this objection.