Balancing Competence and Control

2020 ◽  
pp. 180-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Biermann ◽  
Berthold Rittberger

In recent decades the EU has witnessed a remarkable rise in the number of specialized regulatory agencies and European regulatory networks (ERNs). It is often assumed that agencies and ERNs are mutually exclusive instruments of indirect governance. As this chapter argues, however, they are often used in combination to better address competence–control tradeoffs. The chapter illustrates this argument with two case studies of regulatory policymaking in the EU. First, in the case of aviation safety, the EU and its member states created a new agency, the European Aviation Safety Agency, to overcome a control deficit which had hampered its ability to rein in existing regulatory networks. Second, in the field of food safety, the EU as collective governor sought to overcome the competence deficit of its intermediary, the European Food Safety Agency, by enlisting a second intermediary: the “Focal Point Network” (an ERN).

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Hadjigeorgiou ◽  
Elpidoforos S. Soteriades ◽  
Anastasios Philalithis ◽  
Anna Psaroulaki ◽  
Yiannis Tselentis ◽  
...  

This paper is a comparative survey of the National Food Safety Systems (NFSS) of the European Union (EU) Member-States (MS) and the Central EU level. The main organizational structures of the NFSS, their legal frameworks, their responsibilities, their experiences, and challenges relating to food safety are discussed. Growing concerns about food safety have led the EU itself, its MS and non-EU countries, which are EU trade-partners, to review and modify their food safety systems. Our study suggests that the EU and 22 out of 27 Member States (MS) have reorganized their NFSS by establishing a single food safety authority or a similar organization on the national or central level. In addition, the study analyzes different approaches towards the establishment of such agencies. Areas where marked differences in approaches were seen included the division of responsibilities for risk assessment (RA), risk management (RM), and risk communication (RC). We found that in 12 Member States, all three areas of activity (RA, RM, and RC) are kept together, whereas in 10 Member States, risk management is functionally or institutionally separate from risk assessment and risk communication. No single ideal model for others to follow for the organization of a food safety authority was observed; however, revised NFSS, either in EU member states or at the EU central level, may be more effective from the previous arrangements, because they provide central supervision, give priority to food control programs, and maintain comprehensive risk analysis as part of their activities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-165
Author(s):  
Bodo Herzog

AbstractThis article studies the current debate on Coronabonds and the idea of European public debt in the aftermath of the Corona pandemic. According to the EU-Treaty economic and fiscal policy remains in the sovereignty of Member States. Therefore, joint European debt instruments are risky and trigger moral hazard and free-riding in the Eurozone. We exhibit that a mixture of the principle of liability and control impairs the present fiscal architecture and destabilizes the Eurozone. We recommend that Member States ought to utilize either the existing fiscal architecture available or establish a political union with full sovereignty in Europe. This policy conclusion is supported by the PSPP-judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on 5 May 2020. This ruling initiated a lively debate about the future of the Eurozone and Europe in general.


Subject Agencies in the EU. Significance Preparations for Brexit last year prompted the decision to relocate two EU agencies that had been based in London -- the European Banking Authority (EBA), which will move to Paris, and the European Medicines Agency (EMA), which will move to Amsterdam. This shined a spotlight on an aspect of EU governance that rarely attracts much attention outside specialist circles: the EU’s decentralised regulatory agencies. Impacts Delegating regulatory tasks allows the Commission to focus its limited resources more on policy development and enforcement. EU agencies tend to enhance transparency as they incorporate and replace existing, often opaque, regulatory networks and expert committees. The location of agencies can influence foreign companies’ decisions of where to base their EU headquarters.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 359-385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberta Mungianu

Abstract Operational cooperation at the external borders of the EU is part of the EU process of supranationalisation since 2006, when the Justice and Home Affairs Council Conclusions identified operational cooperation as a component of a common policy on external border control. Operational cooperation is supported by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex). In this article I will focus on the extent to which the establishment of Frontex marks the shift of sovereignty from Member States to EU institutions in EU external border control. The analysis of two aspects of operational cooperation through Frontex – joint operations and European Border Guard Teams – shows the EU’s achievement in implementing a common policy on external border control. Nevertheless, EU Member States’ ‘sovereignty clauses’ for the surveillance and control of their external borders prevent the EU from fully exercising its power.


Author(s):  
Marta Ostrowska

AbstractIDD directive constitutes a piece of EU primary legislation and therefore it is obliged to respect the legal principles ruling the way in which EU acts towards the Member States, among which proportionality principle is of special importance. A legal act complies with the principle of proportionality if the measures adopted by the EU do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question. According to IDD’s recitals, the measures adopted therein are proportional to the aim pursued by the IDD, i.e. customer protection. However, a live discussion boosted over the focal point of the IDD, i.e. a wide range of information duties, may lead to different conclusions and thereby put proportionality of the IDD in doubts. To verify this thesis, the author attempts to carry out the ‘proportionality test’ of the discussed information duties.


Author(s):  
Gijs Jan Brandsma ◽  
Jens Blom-Hansen

This chapter turns from preferences on delegation regimes to decisions and examines how differing preferences are turned into decisions. It focuses on two factors in addition to preferences. First, legislation in the EU is decided under different procedures which provide the actors with different powers to act on their preferences. Second, legislation comes with transaction costs. Controlling delegated powers takes time and requires staff with technical insight. These costs are bearable to the member states in the Council of Ministers because they can rely on their national ministerial systems to exercise control. However, for the European Parliament, exercising control in practice is demanding. The Parliament is therefore likely to choose its battles with more care than the Council. The aim of this chapter is to understand the overall post-Lisbon pattern of delegation and control structures resulting from the numerous negotiations in daily legislative practice.


2017 ◽  
pp. 128-148
Author(s):  
Aneta Skorupa-Wulczyńska

The aim of this article is an attempt to answer the question to what extent language skills improve the economic development of businesses operating in the EU internal market and the employability of the EU citizens. The results of research and analyses, as well as case studies indicate the growing economic importance of multilingualism. Language skills have a significant impact on the development of business activity / enterprise as well as obtaining satisfactory employment and developing one’s career in the internal market, and language barrier impede or preclude development of a business activity or career. The analyses also highlight a large gap between the awareness of the EU citizens about the importance of foreign languages and growing demand in the EU market for high linguistic competences and the actual indicators of language skills of the EU citizens. Appropriate actions aimed at full exploitation of the EU multilingualism should be undertaken mainly by the EU institutions and member states.


Author(s):  
David Coen ◽  
Alexander Katsaitis ◽  
Matia Vannoni

This chapter examines business lobbying in the EU from a historical perspective. Conceptually, it discusses how the EU’s evolution has influenced interest intermediation in Brussels. In doing so, it addresses the increasing authority handed to the European Commission, the growth of European regulatory networks, and multi-level governance; and their influence on business and the strategic choices it makes. From the opposite perspective, it examines the impact that business has had on the EU’s integration, and its policy-making procedures. Empirically, the chapter draws on unique business surveys spanning from the mid-1990s up until today, and a large-N analysis of 12,000 registered organizations on the EU’s transparency register. It also provides a case study on business strategies, focused on the directive on tobacco control. Theoretically, this chapter contributes to discussions on European integration, interest group activity, business lobbying, and governance in the EU.,


Author(s):  
R. Daniel Kelemen ◽  
Giandomenico Majone

This chapter examines why European Union agencies have been created and what impact they are having on European governance. It begins with a discussion of theories that explain law-makersʼ design choices and the increasing popularity of European agencies, focusing on delegation and policy credibility, the politics of agency design, and legal obstacles to delegation. It then looks at the development and operation of three regulatory agencies: the European Environment Agency, the European Medicines Agency, and the European Food Safety Authority. It also considers issues regarding the EU agenciesʼ independence and accountability before concluding with an analysis of the model in which an EU agency serves as the coordinating hub of a network of national regulatory authorities.


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