Evolution and Moral Motivation in Economics

2019 ◽  
pp. 115-137
Author(s):  
Geoffrey M. Hodgson
Keyword(s):  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Economic Man ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Preference Functions ◽  
Recent Addition ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences ◽  
Descent Of Man

Adam Smith argued that humans were motivated by both self-interest and moral concerns. Economics has since moved towards a contrasting utilitarian view where behavior is understood in terms of unifying preference functions. Also most economists have presumed that these preferences are “self-regarding.” Two major treatises in economics were published in 1871, with self-seeking economic man at their center. In the same year Darwin published The Descent of Man, which emphasized sympathy and cooperation as well as self-interest, and argued that morality has evolved in humans by natural selection. This stance is supported by modern research. This article reconciles Darwin’s view that developed morality requires language and deliberation (and is thus unique to humans), with his other claim that moral feelings have a long-evolved and biologically inherited basis. It also questions whether the recent addition of “other-regarding” preferences is adequate, and whether morality and altruism are reducible to preferences or utility maximization.

Cognitive adaptations to criminal justice lead to “paranoid” norm obedience

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr M. Patrzyk ◽  
Martin Takáč
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Agent Based Model ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

People often cooperate and obey norms in situations where it is clear they cannot be caught and punished. Such behavior does not serve their self-interest, as they are foregoing opportunities to exploit others without any negative consequences. Hence, it is not clear how this behavior could have evolved. Some previous explanations invoked the existence of other-regarding preferences, moral motivation, or intrinsic concern for social norms. In this study, we develop an agent-based model illustrating that none of these is necessary for the emergence of norm-abiding behavior. Our model suggests evolutionary pressure against norm violators may lead to the emergence of a bias, causing agents to be extremely sensitive to the probability of being caught. Because of this, they often incorrectly classify anonymous situations as non-anonymous ones and obey social norms due to the fear of being punished. In our simulations, we show that cooperation is promoted by (1) the number of interactions actually observed, (2) the strength of punishments against norm violators, and most importantly, (3) the uncertainty in agent classifications.

Self-Centered Inequity Aversion and the Mass Politics of Taxation

2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (14) ◽  
pp. 1965-1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaobo Lü ◽  
Kenneth Scheve
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Inequity Aversion ◽  
Political Debates ◽  
Policy Alternatives ◽  
Mass Politics ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Economic Conflict ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

The politics of economic crises brings distributive economic conflict to the fore of national political debates. How policy should be used to transfer resources between citizens becomes a central political question, and the answers chosen often influence the trajectory of policy for a generation. This context provides an ideal setting for evaluating the importance of self-interest and other-regarding preferences in shaping public opinion about economic policy. This article investigates whether self-centered inequity aversion along with self-interest influences individual tax policy opinions. We conduct original survey experiments in France and the United States, and provide evidence that individuals care about both how policy alternatives affect their own interests and how they influence the welfare of others relative to themselves.

A cross-species perspective on the selfishness axiom

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 818-818
Author(s):  
Sarah F. Brosnan ◽  
Frans B. M. de Waal
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
The Other ◽  
Capuchin Monkeys ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Cross Cultural Differences ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Relative Gains ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

Henrich et al. describe an innovative research program investigating cross-cultural differences in the selfishness axiom (in economic games) in humans, yet humans are not the only species to show such variation. Chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys show signs of deviating from the standard self-interest paradigm in experimental settings by refusing to take foods that are less valuable than those earned by conspecifics, indicating that they, too, may pay attention to relative gains. However, it is less clear whether these species also show the other-regarding preferences seen in humans.

Smith, Friedman, and Self-Interest in Ethical Society

2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 659-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey S. James ◽  
Farhad Rassekh
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
Milton Friedman ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Individual Actions ◽  
Other Regarding

Abstract:We examine the writings of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman regarding their interpretation and use of the concept of self-interest. We argue that neither Smith nor Friedman considers self-interest to be synonymous with selfishness and thus devoid of ethical considerations. Rather, for both writers self-interest embodies an other-regarding aspect that requires individuals to moderate their actions when others are adversely affected. The overriding virtue for Smith in governing individual actions is justice; for Friedman it is non-coercion.

scholarly journals Charles Darwin, sexual selection and the evolution of other-regarding ethics

BJHS Themes ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Piers J. Hale
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Selection ◽  
Natural Selection ◽  
Charles Darwin ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Woman Question ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Acquired Characters ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Descent Of Man ◽  
Selection Of

Abstract Although many read Charles Darwin's Origin of Species as an endorsement, rather than merely a description, of individualism and competition, in Descent of Man (1871) Darwin intended to show that natural selection could account for the most noble aspects of human morality and conscience. He did so in response to Alfred Russel Wallace's 1869 statement to the contrary. In doing so, Darwin appealed to the natural selection of groups rather than individuals, and to the maternal, parental and filial instincts, as the origin of truly other-regarding moral sentiments. Further, the inheritance of acquired characters and sexual selection had important implications for Darwin's understanding of how other-regarding ethics might prevail in an evolutionary framework that seemed to reward self-interest. In a short addendum to this essay I highlight just three of a number of Darwin's contemporaries who were impressed by this aspect of his work: the science popularizer Arabella Buckley, the Scottish Presbyterian scholar Henry Drummond and the anarchist geographer and naturalist Peter Kropotkin. In closing, I point to an extensive network of others who framed their concerns about both the ‘labour question’ and the ‘woman question’ in evolutionary terms, as a fruitful area for future research in this direction.

scholarly journals Evolution of preferences in structured populations: genes, guns, and culture

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingela Alger ◽  
Jörgen W. Weibull ◽  
Laurent Lehmann
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Population Biology ◽  
Resource Constraints ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Fitness Level ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences ◽  
As If

AbstractDuring human evolution, individuals interacted mostly within small groups that were connected by limited migration and sometimes by conflicts. Which preferences, if any, will prevail in such scenarios? Building on population biology models of spatially structured populations, and assuming individuals’ preferences to be their private information, we characterize those preferences that, once established, cannot be displaced by alternative preferences. We represent such uninvadable preferences in terms of fitness and in terms of material payoffs. At the fitness level, individuals can be regarded to act as if driven by a mix of self-interest and a Kantian motive that evaluates own behavior in the light of the consequences for own fitness if others adopted this behavior. This Kantian motive is borne out from (genetic or cultural) kin selection. At the material-payoff level, individuals act as if driven in part by self-interest and a Kantian motive (in terms of material payoffs), but also in part by other-regarding preferences towards other group members. This latter motive is borne out of group resource constraints and the risk of conflict with other groups. We show how group size, the migration rate, the risk of group conflicts, and cultural loyalty shape the relative strengths of these motives.JEL codesA12, A13, B52, C73, D01, D63, D64, D91.

Rational Choice Theory and Interest in the “Fortune of Others”

2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (6) ◽  
pp. 847-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Paternoster ◽  
Chae Mamayek Jaynes ◽  
Theodore Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Drinking And Driving ◽  
Ultimatum Games ◽  
Hypothetical Scenario ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences ◽  
Sanction Threats

Objectives: We test the relationship between other-regarding preferences (concerns for other people) and intentions to drink and drive and whether these preferences condition the effect of sanction threats on willingness to drink and drive. Methods: A sample of university undergraduates played common economic games (dictator and ultimatum games) and responded to a hypothetical scenario about drinking and driving. Ordinary least squares regression models were used with the full sample and then separate samples for those with differing levels of other-regarding preferences (social preferences). Results: Net of other factors including sanction threats, demographics, measures of individual propensity, and previous experience with drinking and driving, those with strong other-regarding preferences (as indicated by responses to dictator and ultimatum games) were less likely to state that they would drive while drunk under the conditions described by the scenario. In support of differential deterrence, the self-interested were deterred by sanction threats, but those with stronger other-regarding preferences were not deterred by the perceived certainty of sanctions. Conclusions: Our findings speak to the importance of more than self-interest in explaining antisocial behavior and thereby expanding the conceptual boundaries of rational choice theory to include more than self-interest.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document