Neural Interaction between Logical Reasoning and Pragmatic Processing in Narrative Discourse

2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 692-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jérôme Prado ◽  
Nicola Spotorno ◽  
Eric Koun ◽  
Emily Hewitt ◽  
Jean-Baptiste Van der Henst ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Brain Connectivity ◽  
Neural Substrates ◽  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Narrative Discourse ◽  
Logical Inference ◽  
Inference Making ◽  
Innovative Design ◽  
Neural Interaction ◽  
Natural Discourse ◽  
Logical Connectives

Logical connectives (e.g., or, if, and not) are central to everyday conversation, and the inferences they generate are made with little effort in pragmatically sound situations. In contrast, the neural substrates of logical inference-making have been studied exclusively in abstract tasks where pragmatic concerns are minimal. Here, we used fMRI in an innovative design that employed narratives to investigate the interaction between logical reasoning and pragmatic processing in natural discourse. Each narrative contained three premises followed by a statement. In Fully-deductive stories, the statement confirmed a conclusion that followed from two steps of disjunction–elimination (e.g., Xavier considers Thursday, Friday, or Saturday for inviting his girlfriend out; he removes Thursday before he rejects Saturday and declares “I will invite her out for Friday”). In Implicated-premise stories, an otherwise identical narrative included three premises that twice removed a single option from consideration (i.e., Xavier rejects Thursday for two different reasons). The conclusion therefore necessarily prompts an implication (i.e., Xavier must have removed Saturday from consideration as well). We report two main findings. First, conclusions of Implicated-premise stories are associated with more activity than conclusions of Fully-deductive stories in a bilateral frontoparietal system, suggesting that these regions play a role in inferring an implicated premise. Second, brain connectivity between these regions increases with pragmatic abilities when reading conclusions in Implicated-premise stories. These findings suggest that pragmatic processing interacts with logical inference-making when understanding arguments in narrative discourse.

scholarly journals A Semantic Web-based Representation of Human-logical Inference for Solving Bongard Problems

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (10) ◽  
pp. 1343-1363
Author(s):  
Jisha Maniamma ◽  
Hiroaki Wagatsuma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Semantic Web ◽  
Description Logic ◽  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Hierarchical Level ◽  
Logical Inference ◽  
Learning Abilities ◽  
Web Based ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Target Frame

Bongard Problems (BPs) are a set of 100 visual puzzles introduced by M. M. Bongard in the mid-1960s. BPs have been established as benchmark puzzles for understanding the human context-based learning abilities to solve ill- posed problems. The puzzle requires the logical explanation as the answer to distinct two classes of figures from redundant options, which can be obtained by a thinking process to alternatively change the target frame (hierarchical level of analogy) of thinking from a wide range concept networks as D. R. Hofstadter suggested. Some minor research results to solve a limited set of BPs have reported based a single architecture accompanied with probabilistic approaches; however the central problem on BP's difficulties is the requirement of flexible changes of the target frame, therefore non-hierarchical cluster analyses does not provide the essential solution and hierarchical probabilistic models needs to include unnecessary levels for learning from the beginning to prevent a prompt decision making. We hypothesized that logical reasoning process with limited numbers of meta-data descriptions realizes the sophisticated and prompt decision-making and the performance is validated by using BPs. In this study, a semantic web-based hierarchical model to solve BPs was proposed as the minimum and transparent system to mimic human-logical inference process in solving of BPs by using the Description Logic (DL) with assertions on concepts (TBox) and individuals (ABox). Our results demonstrated that the proposed model not only provided individual solutions as a BP solver, but also proved the correctness of Hofstadter's idea as the flexible frame with concept networks for BPs in our actual implementation, which no one has ever achieved. This fact will open the new horizon for theories for designing of logical reasoning systems especially for critical judgments and serious decision-making as expert humans do in a transparent and descriptive way of why they judged in that manner.

scholarly journals Domain-general logical inference by 2.5-year-old toddlers

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicoló Cesana-Arlotti
Keyword(s):  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Logical Inference ◽  
The Third

What are the developmental foundations of logical thought? Here we find that 2.5-year-old toddlers (N=36) can reason using a Disjunctive Inference (i.e., A OR B, NOT A, THEREFORE B) across three contexts, which argues that domain-general logical reasoning may be in place from as early as the third year of life.

Rational Animals

2019 ◽  
pp. 85-106
Author(s):  
Mark Rowlands
Keyword(s):  
Causal Reasoning ◽  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Logical Inference ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Way

There are no good reasons for denying that animals are rational, and many good reasons for thinking that they are. Many animals have displayed impressive capacities for causal reasoning. And some animals have displayed the ability to engage in logical reasoning operations such as modus tollendo ponens. The common reasons that have been used to deny logical reasoning capacities to animals rest on a series of clear confusions concerning the nature of logical inference and what it is to engage in such inference. It is likely that many animals execute logical inferences in the way humans would if they had not developed external formal structures to scaffold the reasoning processes.

scholarly journals Dissociable neural effects of temporal expectations due to passage of time and contextual probability

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Todorovic ◽  
Ryszard Auksztulewicz
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Error ◽  
Brain Connectivity ◽  
Network Connectivity ◽  
Neural Substrates ◽  
List Type ◽  
Gain Modulation ◽  
Additional Information ◽  
Temporal Prediction ◽  
Temporal Intervals ◽  
Parietal Cortices

ABSTRACTThe human brain is equipped with complex mechanisms to track the changing probability of events in time. While the passage of time itself usually leads to a mounting expectation, context can provide additional information about when events are likely to happen. In this study we dissociate these two sources of temporal expectation in terms of their neural correlates and underlying brain connectivity patterns. We analysed magnetoencephalographic (MEG) data acquired from N=24 healthy participants listening to auditory stimuli. These stimuli could be presented at different temporal intervals but occurred most often at intermediate intervals, forming a contextual probability distribution. Evoked MEG response amplitude was sensitive to both passage of time and contextual probability, albeit at different latencies: the effects of passage of time were observed earlier than the effects of context. The underlying sources of MEG activity were also different across the two types of temporal prediction: the effects of passage of time were localised to early auditory regions and superior temporal gyri, while context was additionally linked to activity in inferior parietal cortices. Finally, these differences were modelled using biophysical (dynamic causal) modelling: passage of time was explained in terms of widespread gain modulation and decreased prediction error signalling at lower levels of the hierarchy, while contextual expectation led to more localised gain modulation and decreased prediction error signalling at higher levels of the hierarchy. These results present a comprehensive account of how independent sources of temporal prediction may be differentially expressed in cortical circuits.HIGHLIGHTS- Predictability of tone onset times affects auditory network connectivity- Foreperiod and distribution of events in time have dissociable neural substrates- Decreased prediction error at different levels of cortical hierarchy

scholarly journals The neural development of pragmatic inference-making in natural discourse

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. e12678 ◽  
Author(s):  
Flora Schwartz ◽  
Justine Epinat-Duclos ◽  
Ira Noveck ◽  
Jérôme Prado
Keyword(s):  
Neural Development ◽  
Inference Making ◽  
Pragmatic Inference ◽  
Natural Discourse

The Teaching of Physical Metallurgy — a Rational Approach

1960 ◽  
Vol 2 (10) ◽  
pp. 8-11
Author(s):  
G.B. Clarke
Keyword(s):  
Special Reference ◽  
Scientific Discipline ◽  
Imperial College ◽  
Rational Approach ◽  
Physical Metallurgy ◽  
Logical Inference ◽  
Inference Making ◽  
Inaugural Lecture ◽  
College Professor ◽  
Practice Of Teaching

In his inaugural lecture at Imperial College, Professor J. G. Ball pointed to the tendency of metallurgy to become a scientific discipline of logical inference, making teaching centred on plant skills, and the parrot‐learning of facts and alloy specifications quite out of date. The principles and practice of teaching with special reference to metallurgy have not received the attention accorded to allied subjects such as chemistry. The purpose of this article is to provoke thought, criticism and free discussion among those engaged in the dissemination of metallurgical knowledge.

A New Look at the Logic of the ‘Is’-‘Ought’ Relation

Philosophy ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel J. Kupperman
Keyword(s):  
Logical Relation ◽  
Logical Inference ◽  
Inference Making ◽  
New Look

In the 1950's some prominent philosophers suggested a logical relation weaker than entailment between primarily descriptive statements and ethical conclusions. The paper revisits this suggestion. It examines four ways in which ethical statemnts can be supported by descriptions and evaluations. This provides a similarity bteween some kinds of reason-giving in ethics and familiar cases of logical inference, making it plausible to speak of a logic. The similarity however is limited, and the strength in ethics of descriptive reasons is never precise and always somewhat contestable.

scholarly journals Disrupted modular organization of primary sensory brain areas in schizophrenics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cécile Bordier ◽  
Carlo Nicolini ◽  
Angelo Bifone
Keyword(s):  
Functional Connectivity ◽  
Speech Processing ◽  
Resting State ◽  
Brain Connectivity ◽  
Neural Substrates ◽  
Modular Organization ◽  
Resolution Limit ◽  
Resting State Functional Connectivity ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Higher Cognitive Functions

AbstractAbnormal brain resting-state functional connectivity has been consistently observed in patients affected by Schizophrenia (SCZ) using functional MRI and other neuroimaging methods. Graph theoretical methods provide a framework to investigate these defective functional interactions and their effects on the modular organization of brain connectivity networks. A few studies have shown abnormal distribution of connectivity within and between functional modules, an indication of imbalanced functional segregation ad integration in SCZ patients. However, no major alterations in the modular structure of functional connectivity networks in patients have been reported, and unambiguous identification of the neural substrates involved remains elusive. Recently, it has been demonstrated that current modularity analysis methods suffer from a fundamental and severe resolution limit, as they fail to detect features that are smaller than a scale determined by the size of the entire connectivity network. This resolution limit is likely to have hampered the ability to resolve differences between patients and controls in previous cross-sectional studies. Here, we apply a novel, resolution limit-free approach to study the modular organization of resting state functional connectivity networks in a large cohort of SCZ patients, and in matched healthy controls. Leveraging these important methodological advances, we find new evidence of substantial fragmentation and reorganization involving primary sensory, auditory and visual areas in SCZ patients. Conversely, frontal and prefrontal areas, typically associated with higher cognitive functions, appear to be largely unaffected, with changes selectively involving language and speech processing areas. Our findings provide support to the hypothesis that cognitive dysfunction in SCZ may arise from deficits occurring already at early stages of sensory processing.

scholarly journals On the Babylonian Origin of Symbolic Logic

Studia Humana ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 126-154
Author(s):  
Andrew Schumann
Keyword(s):  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Symbolic Logic ◽  
Direct Influence ◽  
Modus Tollens ◽  
Legal Tradition ◽  
Stone Wall ◽  
The World ◽  
Logical Connectives ◽  
The Law ◽  
Logical Rules

Abstract The logical reasoning first appeared within the Babylonian legal tradition established by the Sumerians in the law codes which were first over the world: Ur-Nammu (ca. 2047 – 2030 B.C.); Lipit-Ishtar (ca. 1900 – 1850 B.C.), and later by their successors, the Akkadians: Hammurabi (1728 – 1686 B.C.). In these codes the casuistic law formulation began first to be used: “If/when (Akkadian: šumma) this or that occurs, this or that must be done” allowed the Akkadians to build up a theory of logical connectives: “... or…”, “… and…”, “if…, then…”, “not…” that must have been applied in their jurisprudence. So, a trial decision looked like an inference by modus pones and modus tollens or by other logical rules from (i) some facts and (ii) an appropriate article in the law code represented by an ever true implication. The law code was announced by erecting a stele with the code or by engraving the code on a stone wall. It was considered a set of axioms announced for all. Then the trial decisions are regarded as claims logically inferred from the law code on the stones. The only law code of the Greeks that was excavated is the Code of Gortyn (Crete, the 5th century B.C.). It is so similar to the Babylonian codes by its law formulations; therefore, we can suppose that the Greeks developed their codes under a direct influence of the Semitic legal tradition: the code was represented as the words of the stele and the court was a logic application from these words. In this way the Greek logic was established within a Babylonian legal tradition, as well. Hence, we can conclude that, first, logic appeared in Babylonia and, second, it appeared within a unique legal tradition where all trial decisions must have been transparent, obvious, and provable. The symbolic logic appeared first not in Greece, but in Mesopotamia and this tradition was grounded in the Sumerian/Akkadian jurisprudence.

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