The Life and Death of BITs: Legal Issues Concerning Survival Clauses and the Termination of Investment Treaties

Author(s):  
James Harrison

This article considers a number of legal issues that arise when states decide to terminate treaties providing protection to foreign investors. This is an area that is governed both by specific provisions in investment treaties, as well as by principles of general international law. The article considers two particular mechanisms that seek to promote legal certainty for investors by limiting the ability of states to peremptorily revoke the protection offered by investment treaties. Firstly, it considers minimum periods of application. Secondly, it analyzes so-called survival clauses, which serve to extend the application of a treaty to established investors for a particular period of time after its unilateral termination. The article compares the scope of these provisions under a variety of investment treaties in order to identify differences in state practice. It also discusses the limits of these mechanisms against the backdrop of general international law. Finally, the article considers whether protection is also available for established investors when both parties to an investment treaty mutually agree to terminate the treaty. In this context, the article looks at the theory of third party rights and its application in the context of investment treaties.

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 60-63
Author(s):  
Michael Waibel

This essay underscores the importance of background understandings in general international law for interpreting brief, open-ended clauses such as most favored nation (MFN) clauses. Contrary to Simon Batifort and J. Benton Heath's claim, I suggest that often interpreters of MFN clauses cannot limit themselves to the text, context, and preparatory materials of a specific MFN clause. A common international negotiating technique, including for investment treaties, is to rely on the general background understanding of what a clause typically means in international law—its default meaning. I also argue that MFN clauses have played a surprisingly limited role in the international investment regime to date. In the main, they have functioned as a stepping stone for procedural and substantive guarantees found in third-party investment treaties. This use, and the limited role of MFN clauses in investment treaty awards, stands in sharp contrast to MFN clauses in the trade regime.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 965-1011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bonnitcha

Following recent events in Egypt, Libya, Myanmar (Burma) and Tunisia, foreign investors have lodged international claims under investment treaties. Several of these cases follow a common fact pattern. They concern foreign investments acquired from authoritarian governments substantially below market value through transactions that were not arms’ length. Subsequently, new governments sought to renegotiate these contracts and concessions, or to change the regulatory arrangements that govern them. The investors then invoked the protections of an investment treaty. This article draws on political science scholarship on transition. It argues that investment treaties risk constraining the ability of incoming democratic regimes to consolidate their position, and questions the normative justifications for applying the principle of full market value compensation to situations in which investments were not acquired on a full market value basis. These conclusions are relevant to wider debates about the tension between legal stability and political change in international law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-61
Author(s):  
Ashraf M. A. Elfakharani ◽  
Rohana Abdul Rahman ◽  
Hamza E. Albaheth ◽  
Nor Anita Abdullah

Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), as the name indicates, are meant to govern investment relations between two signatory states. In this context, Egypt holds a significant place among all respondent states, having to face a very high number of legal issues from foreign investors. These cases are pending before several international investment tribunals and Egypt is facing claims of over USD 20 billion annually from its foreign investors. In spite of such a grim situation, there are legal arbitrations that have increased the appearance of Egypt in international arbitration forums. There are several reasons for such a situation to arise, mainly because of the governmental measures towards foreign investors and interests. This article argues that in spite of the unspecified criteria shown towards foreign investors, the Bilateral Investment Treaty's items have played a vital role in increasing Egyptian appearances.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Simon Foote

<p>This thesis addresses the problem of treaty shopping in investment treaty law. It seeks to illustrate how the problem stems from, and can in part be resolved by, the concept and definition of corporate nationality. It explores whether, and if so how and what, limits ought to be placed on the manipulation of nationality for the purpose of gaining investment treaty protection, to enable a principled basis to utilise nationality to prescribe the extent of rights and obligations in investment treaties. The importance of nationality requirements in investment treaties cannot be overstated—the definition of “investor” in any treaty defines which entities are entitled to substantive protections contained in the treaty for the benefit of states and investors alike. Entities making an investment need to know whether, and if so how, they can structure their investment to achieve protection of applicable investment treaties. Investors who have suffered damage need to know whether they are entitled to make a claim. States need to appreciate the extent of their potential obligations.  Many investment treaties define qualifying investors in a broad way that includes any entity incorporated in a contracting state. Putative investors, including those from third states, or nationals of the host state of the investment, seek to come within the relevant definition, often by insertion of an intermediary company incorporated in the desired home state into the ownership chain of the investment.  This thesis challenges the view that fulfilment of formalities set out in an investment treaty is sufficient to qualify as an investor where there is no substance behind the corporate form. To some degree, states and investment treaty tribunals have tried to abrogate treaty shopping by manipulation of corporate nationality by reference to the international law concept of genuine connection with the claimant’s state of incorporation, or by way of imposition of criteria for nationality based on the nationality of the corporate entity’s controller or proof of substantial business activity in its state of incorporation. The majority of investment treaty tribunals, however, have eschewed efforts to imply a substantive test or check on the attribution of nationality beyond literal fulfillment of nationality criteria.  This thesis promotes a purposive approach that requires fulfillment of express treaty criteria for nationality, but also subjects the claimant to a substantive economic reality check in which the inquiry is to determine the reason for existence of the corporate claimant in relation to the relevant investment. Such an approach is required by an interpretative methodology that gives equal weight to the four tenets of art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention: ordinary meaning, good faith, context and object and purpose. If a corporate entity exists primarily to procure treaty rights, then it is not a bona fide investor consistent with the object and purpose of investment treaty jurisdictional provisions, even if it complies with the ordinary meaning of the express formal nationality criteria. If, however, it meets any express criteria and has a genuine ulterior commercial reason to exist in the ownership structure of the investment, then it qualifies as an investor entitled to the protection of an investment treaty.  The approach promoted by this thesis is derived from the treaty shopping antidote crafted by municipal courts assessing the bona fides of corporate applicants for tax relief under double tax treaties. In addition, the thesis analyses municipal law regarding piercing the corporate veil, the law of diplomatic protection, and analogous jurisdictional concepts in investment treaty law including the application of the principle of abuse of right, and identifies that underlying all these areas of inquiry is the central question of the purpose, or commercial reason to exist, of the relevant corporate entity. Finally, this thesis demonstrates how a substantive approach can be applied in a principled and reasonably certain way.  The use of corporate structures by foreign investors to procure rights under favourable investment treaties (treaty shopping) threatens to undermine the legitimacy of international investment treaty arbitration. Simon Foote QC's research illustrates how the problem stems from the concept and interpretation of corporate nationality criteria at international law. It promotes a new way to distinguish bona fide foreign investors by looking to the commercial purpose of corporate entities in relation to the relevant investment. It illustrates how that approach derives from analogous concepts in international and municipal law and how it can be implemented by states and investment treaty tribunals.</p>


Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W

This chapter discusses the entry into force, exceptions, modifications, and terminations of investment treaties. While enunciating rules of international law governing foreign investors and investments, investment treaties at the same time incorporate various devices to regulate and limit the applicability of those rules and thereby allow contracting states to mediate tensions between demands of treaty partners and of internal pressure groups, such as labour unions, local manufacturers and merchants, and civic organizations. Such devices include treaty provisions on four matters: the entry into force of the treaty; treaty exceptions; treaty modifications; and treaty terminations. States employ the first two as part of the treaty negotiating process. On the other hand, states usually employ the latter two devices as a result of their unsatisfactory experience with a treaty that has entered into force.


Author(s):  
Bonnitcha Jonathan ◽  
Skovgaard Poulsen Lauge N ◽  
Waibel Michael

This chapter surveys the impact of investment treaties on decision-making at the firm and government levels. The focus is on whether investment treaties’ influence on the decisions of firms and states leads to improvements in efficiency. The first section examines the ‘hold-up’ problem, which provides the most influential and coherent microeconomic justification for the inclusion of investment protection provisions in investment treaties. The second section explores the problem of ‘fiscal illusion’ in host state decision-making, which could result in ‘over-regulation’ of foreign investment in the absence of an investment treaty. The third section considers whether investment treaties solve problems of discrimination against foreign investors, as well as the possibility that investment treaties lead to discrimination in favour of foreign investors.


Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W

This chapter traces the history and considers the purposes and consequences of the movement by states to negotiate investment treaties. In the post-colonial era of nationalizations and contract renegotiations, the economic facts of life in host countries struggled against the form of various legal commitments made to foreign investors. To change the dynamics of this struggle so as to protect the interests of their companies and investors, capital-exporting countries began a process of negotiating international investment treaties that, to the extent possible, would be: (1) complete; (2) clear and specific; (3) uncontestable; and (4) enforceable. These treaty efforts took place at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, which, though separate, tended to inform and reinforce each other. As a result of this process, a widespread treatification of international investment law took place in a relatively short time. By the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, foreign investors in many parts of the world were protected primarily by international treaties rather than as previously by customary international law alone. For all practical purposes, treaties have become the fundamental source of international law in the area of foreign investment.


Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W

This chapter outlines the general structure of investment treaties. An investment treaty is an international agreement embodied in one or more written documents by which two or more states agree to certain legal rules to govern investments undertaken by nationals of one treaty party in the territory of another treaty party. A treaty is an instrument of international law that binds the contracting states. An investment treaty usually consists of a single document. However, the parties may use an exchange of letters or separate protocols to explain, modify, or elaborate on certain treaty provisions. The chapter then studies the ten topics that make up the basic structure of most modern investment treaties.


Author(s):  
Federico Ortino

The aim of the chapter is to trace the origin and evolution of the expropriation provision in modern investment treaties. Two main findings stem from the present analysis. First, the original aim of the expropriation provision in modern investment treaties was to afford foreign investors a wide level of protection vis-à-vis a host State’s conduct that deprived the investor of the value of its investments. Second, while many investment treaty tribunals have initially adhered to this broad understanding in line with the ‘sole-effect’ doctrine, an increasing number of investment tribunals have recently adopted a more cautious approach, both restricting the notion of expropriatory effect and increasing the relevance of the public policy of the allegedly expropriatory measure (pursuant to the ‘police powers’ doctrine).


Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W

This chapter examines the investment treaty protections against expropriation, nationalization, and dispossession. Because the investment treaty movement arose during a period when many expropriations and nationalizations had taken place and states exhibited significant disagreement about the applicable international law, one of the primary goals of capital-exporting countries in promoting investment treaties was to protect their investors and investments from acts of expropriation, nationalization, and dispossession by host governments. As a result, virtually all investment treaties contain a provision concerning the expropriation or nationalization of covered investments; however, the nature of those provisions, their scope, and the limitations they place on governmental action, vary among treaties. The chapter then examines the scope of coverage of expropriation provisions as they apply to direct and indirect takings of investor property by a state. It also considers the various conditions and limitations that treaties place upon such state actions, including the obligation to pay compensation.


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