The Citation Practices of the High Court of Australia, 1905–2015

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 655-695
Author(s):  
Russell Smyth ◽  
Ingrid Nielsen

We provide an empirical study of the High Court’s citation to case law and secondary sources at decade intervals between 1905 and 2015. We document trends in the number and type of citations over time, both for the Court as a whole and for the individual Justices. We find that in each of the sample years between 1905 and 1975, the Court cited relatively few authorities and for most of this period the majority of citations were to the Court’s own previous decisions or to decisions of the English courts. However, over the last four sample years—1985, 1995, 2005 and 2015—the Court cited more authority. The Court cited an increasing proportion of its own previous decisions over this period as well as a higher proportion of authority from a more diverse range of sources, including secondary sources, largely at the expense of citations to English cases. We conclude that this reflects the emergence of a distinct Australian common law with the High Court as its final arbitrator.

Author(s):  
Barbara Havelková ◽  
Mathias Möschel

The Introduction draws together the chapters’ findings in relation to the two research questions which have animated the project. The first question asked how anti-discrimination law fares in civil law jurisdictions of Europe and how it fits into them. The Introduction notes that while anti-discrimination law is still seen as a foreign transplant and a legal irritant in many places, it does not uniformly fare poorly. Its success varies and appears to depend not only on the country, but also the area of law, the actors involved, a particular concept or ground of discrimination, and has often evolved over time. The second question asked what factors influence anti-discrimination law’s fit or lack of it. ‘Legal’ as well as ‘extra-legal’ aspects seem to favour or hinder anti-discrimination law, but as they are often not always clearly separable and distinguishable, we locate four types of factors on a spectrum. On the legal side, pre-existing legislation and case law have played a role as have institutional choices. Constitutional and legal foundations and narratives, such as the myth of ‘universalism’ in France, have also influenced the success of anti-discrimination law. Finally, the wider political and social context is discussed, noting that the individual, liberty-oriented politics of common law countries, with their greater reflection of issues of cultural recognition, might be more easily compatible with anti-discrimination law, while the more communitarian, collective approach of continental European countries, with their emphasis on dignity and social-welfare solutions to social problems, might be less so.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Viktoriya Pashorina-Nichols

<p>Pacta sunt servanda is a fundamental legal principle, which states that agreements must be kept. Thus, various wrongs, including breaches of contracts, entitle one to the most common remedy at common law: an award of damages. The basic principles that govern the assessment of contract damages are taught to students in every Law School. However, the application of those principles is not always easy because careful attention has to be paid to the individual circumstances of each case.  The conclusion that the courts must strive to achieve is compensation of claimants for the actual loss sustained, in order to place them in the same position they would have been in if the contract had been performed. This paper argues that in a recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Clark v Macourt, the claimant was put in a position superior to that she would have been in if the contract had been performed. It summarises and questions the various parts of the decision to show that the million-dollar award over compensated the claimant.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Viktoriya Pashorina-Nichols

<p>Pacta sunt servanda is a fundamental legal principle, which states that agreements must be kept. Thus, various wrongs, including breaches of contracts, entitle one to the most common remedy at common law: an award of damages. The basic principles that govern the assessment of contract damages are taught to students in every Law School. However, the application of those principles is not always easy because careful attention has to be paid to the individual circumstances of each case.  The conclusion that the courts must strive to achieve is compensation of claimants for the actual loss sustained, in order to place them in the same position they would have been in if the contract had been performed. This paper argues that in a recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Clark v Macourt, the claimant was put in a position superior to that she would have been in if the contract had been performed. It summarises and questions the various parts of the decision to show that the million-dollar award over compensated the claimant.</p>


2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul S. Davies

Both interpretation and rectification continue to pose problems. Difficulties are compounded by blurring the boundary between the two. In Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation [2016] HCA 47, the High Court of Australia overturned the decisions of the lower courts which had held that performance bonds could be interpreted in a “loose” manner in order to correct a mistake. However, the documents could be rectified in order to reflect the actual intentions of the parties. This decision should be welcomed: the mistake was more appropriately corrected through the equitable jurisdiction than at common law. Significantly, the concurring judgments of French C.J. and Kiefel J. highlight that the law of rectification now seems to be different in Australia from the law in England. It is to be hoped that the English approach will soon be revisited (see further P. Davies, “Rectification versus Interpretation” [2016] C.L.J. 62).


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-386
Author(s):  
Vicky Priskich

Abstract The International Arbitration Acts of the UK, Australia, Singapore, and Hong Kong recognize that third persons who are non-signatories to an arbitration agreement but who are ‘claiming through or under’ a party to the arbitration agreement have the status of a party.1 In the UK and Singapore that status means not only that court proceedings involving such non-signatories may be stayed in favour of arbitration but it also binds them to an award. In Hong Kong that status binds non-signatories to an award. In Australia, that status affects whether court proceedings involving non-signatories are stayed in favour of arbitration. A recent judgment by a majority of Australia’s highest appeal court, the High Court of Australia, in Rinehart v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd2 has taken a different approach to that prevailing in England as to the range of persons who are capable of ‘claiming through or under’ a party to the arbitration agreement, thereby significantly expanding the range of disputes involving non-signatories that must be referred to arbitration.3 The issue has not arisen for determination before appellate courts in Singapore or Hong Kong. Rinehart therefore represents an important development in common law jurisdictions, compelling arbitration between a signatory and non-signatory to an arbitration agreement.


2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 207-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dragomir Cosanici

AbstractThis study by Dragomir Cosanici provides a bibliometric, comparative study of the citation practices of the state supreme courts in the common law jurisdictions of Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan and Ohio, USA during a recent ten-year span (1994–2004). It focuses on the type of legal materials most frequently cited as authority, examining the importance of both primary and secondary sources. It specifically analyses the growing usage of electronic citations by the four supreme courts.


Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

Abstract Case law, amongst other sources, shows that many people in Uganda are living together as husband and wife although they are not married. Unlike legislation in other African countries such as Tanzania and Malawi, in Uganda, the pieces of legislation governing marriages are silent on the issue of presumption of marriage. Likewise, unlike in Kenya and South Africa where legislation does not provide for presumption of marriage but courts have held that such a presumption exists based on long cohabitation, Ugandan courts, the High Court, and the Court of Appeal, have held that Ugandan law does not recognise marriage based on long cohabitation (marriage by repute). However, courts will presume the existence of a marriage where a marriage ceremony took place. Since 2003, attempts to enact legislation to provide for the presumption of marriage in Uganda have not been successful. In this article, the author argues that there is still room for the Supreme Court to hold, on the basis of common law, that Ugandan law recognises the principle of presumption of marriage. This recognition would also be in line with Uganda’s international law obligation as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has called upon States Parties to CEDAW to enact legislation giving effect to de facto unions. The author relies on case law and legislation from some African countries to suggest ways in which the Supreme Court could deal with the issue of presumption of marriage.


2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-83
Author(s):  
Duncan Wallace

In PGA v The Queen, the High Court found that a legal rule ceased to exist well before many people thought it did. In Mabo v Queensland [No 2], the Court found that a legal rule came into existence well before many people thought it did. These conclusions are obviously different, and so are the reasons that led to them. But in both decisions the Court relied on the foundation of a legal rule to account for the rule's validity over time. In PGA, the rule was founded on another legal rule. In Mabo, the rule was founded on an historical fact. I explain how the Court reasoned with these foundations, and what this reasoning suggests about the nature of the common law in Australia.


2017 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Merrett

AbstractAsymmetric jurisdiction clauses are clauses which contain different provisions regarding jurisdiction for each party. They are widely used in international financial markets. However, the validity of this form of agreement has been called into doubt in several European jurisdictions. Furthermore, following Brexit, there may well be an increasing focus on alternative methods of enforcement under the Hague Convention and at common law, claims for damages and anti-suit injunctions. As well as considering recent developments in the case law and the implications of Brexit, this article will emphasize that all of these questions can only be answered after the individual promises contained in any particular agreement are properly identified and construed. Once that is done, there is no reason why the asymmetric nature of a clause should be a bar to its enforcement.


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