scholarly journals Demographics and the Politics of Capital Taxation in a Life-Cycle Economy

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 337-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Mateos-Planas
Keyword(s):  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Capital Taxation ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Cycle Economy ◽  
Voting Age ◽  
Capital Tax ◽  
Markov Equilibrium

This article studies the effects of demographics on the mix of tax rates on labor and capital. It uses a quantitative general-equilibrium, overlapping-generations model where tax rates are voted without past commitments in every period and characterized as a Markov equilibrium. In the United States, the younger voting-age population in 1990 compared to 1965 accounts for the observed decline in the relative capital tax rate between those two years. A younger population raises the net return to capital, leads voters to increase their savings, and results in a preference for lower taxes on capital. Conversely, aging might increase capital taxation. (JEL E13, H24, H25, J11)

scholarly journals Pay-as-You-Go Social Security and Educational Subsidy in an Overlapping Generations Model with Endogenous Fertility and Endogenous Retirement

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hung-Ju Chen ◽  
Koichi Miyazaki
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Social Security ◽  
Labor Productivity ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Fertility Rate ◽  
Gdp Per Capita ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Per Capita

Abstract This study analytically investigates the effects of pay-as-you-go social security and educational subsidies on the fertility rate, retirement age, and GDP per capita growth rate in an overlapping generations model, where parents invest resources toward their children’s human capital. We find that an old agent retires fully when his or her labor productivity is low and retires later when the labor productivity is high. Under the unique balanced-growth-path (BGP) equilibrium, when an old agent is still engaged in work, tax rates are neutral to the fertility rate, higher tax rates encourage him or her to retire earlier, a higher social security tax rate depresses the GDP per capita growth rate, and a higher tax rate for educational subsidies can accelerate growth. However, when an old agent fully retires, higher tax rates increase the fertility rate, a higher social security tax rate lowers the GDP per capita growth rate, and a higher tax rate for educational subsidies boosts growth. Additionally, if an old agent’s labor productivity increases, the fertility rate also increases. We also conduct numerical simulations and analyze how an old agent’s labor productivity affects the retirement age, fertility rate, and GDP per capita growth rate under the BGP equilibrium.

Fertility and labor supply of the old with pay-as-you-go pension and child allowances

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hung-Ju Chen ◽  
Koichi Miyazaki
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Fertility Rate ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
The Social ◽  
Child Allowances ◽  
The Interest Rate

Abstract We investigate the effects of pay-as-you-go pension and child allowances on fertility, labor supply of the old, and welfare. For this purpose, we analyze a small open overlapping-generations model in which fertility and an old agent’s labor supply (retirement time) are endogenized with pay-as-you-go pension and child allowances. We find that how the pay-as-you-go pension tax rate affects the fertility rate depends on whether an old agent retires. When an old agent fully retires, then the size of the interest rate and fertility rate determine the effect of the pay-as-you-go pension tax rate on the fertility rate. When an old agent works, the pay-as-you-go pension tax rate certainly reduces the fertility rate. In addition, how child allowances affect the fertility rate depends on whether an old agent works. If an old agent retires fully, then an increase in the child allowance tax rate increases the fertility rate. When an old agent works, this is not necessarily true, which suggests that an old agent’s labor status should be taken into account when we evaluate the effects of the social security system on economic variables. In addition, we examine the effect of the social security tax rates on welfare and provide numerical examples.

scholarly journals INCOME INEQUALITY, MOBILITY, AND THE WELFARE STATE: A POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 1198-1226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bossi ◽  
Gulcin Gumus
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Welfare State ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Public Programs ◽  
Transfer Payments ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Welfare State

In this paper, we set up a three-period stochastic overlapping-generations model to analyze the implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance. We model the size of two different public programs under the welfare state. We investigate bidimensional voting on the tax rates that determine the allocation of government revenues among transfer payments and old-age pensions. We show that the coalitions formed, the resulting political equilibria, and the demand for redistribution crucially depend on the level of income inequality and mobility.

A NOTE ON OPTIMAL CAPITAL TAXATION WITH PREFERENCE EXTERNALITIES

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 729-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng-Wei Chang ◽  
Ching-Chong Lai
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Income Taxes ◽  
Income Taxation ◽  
Capital Taxation ◽  
Neoclassical Growth Model ◽  
Factor Income ◽  
Status Seeking ◽  
Capital Tax ◽  
Optimal Capital ◽  
Neoclassical Growth

This paper extends the Chamley–Judd framework by introducing preference externalities in a neoclassical growth model, and finds that the optimal capital tax increases with the extent of social-status seeking or negative leisure externalities. Furthermore, this paper finds that differences in leisure externalities lead to a distinct impact on optimal factor income taxes, and hence may serve as a plausible vehicle to explain the empirical differences in factor income taxation in the United States and Europe.

scholarly journals An evaluation of the revenue side as a source of fiscal consolidation in high debt economies

2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (6) ◽  
pp. 771-788
Author(s):  
Ritwik Banerjee
Keyword(s):  
General Equilibrium ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Consumption Tax ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Revenue Generation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Labor Tax ◽  
Capital Tax ◽  
European Economies

Purpose – Unsustainable levels of debt in some European economies are causing enormous strain in the Euro area. Successful debt consolidation in high-debt economies is the single most important objective for the European policy makers. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – The author uses a dynamic general equilibrium closed economy model to compute the dynamic Laffer curves for Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain for different class of taxes. The general equilibrium effects of the interaction of labor tax, consumption tax and capital tax is demonstrated. Findings – Location of each economy on its Laffer curve suggests that there exists a scope for considerable revenue generation by raising consumption and labor tax rates but no such possibilities exist for capital tax rate. Thus revenue generation with certain tax rates as instruments, holds key to successful and sustained debt reduction. Originality/value – This to the best of knowledge is one of the first papers which looks closely at the tax revenue – tax rate panel for the major deeply indebted European economies.

Tax Harmonization and Expenditure Competition among Self-interested Governments

2004 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-52
Author(s):  
Claudia Hensberg
Keyword(s):  
Financial Incentive ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Public Input ◽  
Tax Harmonization ◽  
Capital Tax

Abstract In this paper the effect of tax harmonization on intergovernmental expenditure competition is analysed. To this end, it is assumed that self-interested governments cannot influence tax rates, since taxes are harmonized, but that they can freely choose expenditure policies and, by this, attract additional capital and broaden the assessment base of a capital tax. Hence, self-interested governments might have a financial incentive to provide for public input besides re-election oriented motivations. Since additional tax income from public input provision depends on the harmonized capital tax rate, the choice of the tax rate indirectly determines the amount of public input supplied by governments in expenditure competition.

scholarly journals The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review

2012 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Saez ◽  
Joel Slemrod ◽  
Seth H Giertz
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Empirical Estimation ◽  
Sufficient Statistic ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Taxable Income ◽  
Elasticity Of Taxable Income ◽  
Marginal Tax Rates

This paper critically surveys the large and growing literature estimating the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates using tax return data. First, we provide a theoretical framework showing under what assumptions this elasticity can be used as a sufficient statistic for efficiency and optimal tax analysis. We discuss what other parameters should be estimated when the elasticity is not a sufficient statistic. Second, we discuss conceptually the key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of the elasticity of taxable income using the example of the 1993 top individual income tax rate increase in the United States to illustrate those issues. Third, we provide a critical discussion of selected empirical analyses of the elasticity of taxable income in light of the theoretical and empirical framework we laid out. Finally, we discuss avenues for future research. (JEL H24, H31, J22)

scholarly journals Tax Competition and Asymmetric Countries

Ekonomika ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Jevcak
Keyword(s):  
Open Economy ◽  
Small Open Economy ◽  
National Income ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Public Inputs ◽  
Tax Harmonisation ◽  
Capital Tax ◽  
The Government

This paper explores the consequences of a difference in the levels of public inputs accumulated over time in a small open economy model where capital tax revenues are used exclusively for the provision of public inputs, while the government sets the capital tax rate in way to maximise its country’s national income. It is shown that in this case the optimal capital tax rate in a country is a decreasing function of its stock of accumulated public inputs. The model thus implies that capital tax harmonisation could actually be detrimental to the so-called core EU member states as it could fix their capital tax rates at an in-optimally high levels and thus hinder their ability to dampen undesirable capital out- flows.

scholarly journals The Effect of Corporate Taxation on Investment and Financial Policy: Evidence from the DPAD

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 272-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Ohrn
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Financial Policy ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Investment Financing ◽  
Point Reduction ◽  
Accelerated Depreciation ◽  
Tax Expenditure ◽  
Quasi Experimental

This study estimates the investment, financing, and payout responses to variation in a firm's effective corporate income tax rate in the United States. I exploit quasi-experimental variation created by the Domestic Production Activities Deduction, a corporate tax expenditure created in 2005. A 1 percentage point reduction in tax rates increases investment by 4.7 percent of installed capital, increases payouts by 0.3 percent of sales, and decreases debt by 5.3 percent of total assets. These estimates suggest that lower corporate tax rates and faster accelerated depreciation each stimulate a similar increase in investment, per dollar in lost revenue. (JEL D22, D25, G31, G32, H25, H32)

Capital Income Taxation, Economic Growth and Heterogeneity in the Motivation to Give

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-306
Author(s):  
Lars Kunze
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Income Taxation ◽  
Capital Income ◽  
Capital Income Taxation ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Motivation To Give ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between capital income taxation and economic growth within an overlapping generations model when individuals may bequeath wealth. The altruistic concern is modeled as a synthesis of joy-of-giving and family altruism so that individuals may derive utility from the amount of bequest itself and by providing children with a disposable income later on in life. Using this framework, it is shown that, in contrast to the existing literature, increasing the capital income tax rate may well enhance growth under operative bequests.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document