scholarly journals Competing for Loyalty: The Dynamics of Rallying Support

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (10) ◽  
pp. 2990-3005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matias Iaryczower ◽  
Santiago Oliveros
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Dynamic Problem ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Corporate Takeovers ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Public Bads

We consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group. We focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially. We show that competition reduces agents' welfare with public goods, or if and only if there are positive externalities on uncommitted agents, and increases agents' welfare with public bads. We apply the model to the study of corporate takeovers, vote buying, and exclusive deals. (JEL D42, D62, D72, D82, G34, H41)

scholarly journals Toward a More Comprehensive Typology and Theoretical Foundations of the Logic of Collective Action

2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Jongwon Choi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Analytical Frameworks ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

Current theories on the logic of collective action have two problems in common. First, with some exceptions, authors are not very careful about specifying what kind of collective action or goods they are deal with. Secondly, current theories of interest groups have not been specific about the theoretical foundations on which their arguments are standing. Given these theoretical problems, this paper has three purposes. The purposes will be elaborated in three subsequent sections. section II will investigate a more comprehensive multi-dimensional typology of collective action problems. Section III will discuss the relevance of the theory of public goods and game theory to the analysis of collective action problems. In Section IV, by picking up two representative examples, we will demonstrate the conditions under which two major analytical frameworks can be best applied.

scholarly journals French Automobiles and the Chinese Boycotts of 2008: Politics Really Does Affect Commerce

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Canhui Hong ◽  
Wei-Min Hu ◽  
James E. Prieger ◽  
Dongming Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Economic Impact ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Chinese Consumers ◽  
Beijing Olympics ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Triple Difference ◽  
Political Weapon

Abstract We explore the economic impact of boycotts of French automobiles in China during the time of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Conditions were favorable for a boycott, enabling Chinese consumers to overcome the collective action problems that can prevent boycott success and other voluntary contributions to public goods. We use brand and model level data in a difference-in-difference specification to investigate the boycotts’ effects on sales. A robust pattern of large impacts emerges: sales of French automobile brands fell 25-33 percent or more. Consumers substituted mostly toward Chinese and other Asian cars. The sales of the French models did not experience similar relative sales declines in countries other than China—triple-difference estimates point toward even larger relative loss of market share in China. Our results provide evidence that commerce can be used as an effective political weapon.

The Effect of Incentives: The Problem of Collective Action

2021 ◽  
pp. 141-165
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan ◽  
William English ◽  
John Hasnas ◽  
Peter Jaworski
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Firm Structure ◽  
Group Interest ◽  
Group Settings ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Group Members

Even if cooperating will make everyone better off, cooperation won’t happen if people lack certain kinds of knowledge and motivation. In group settings, individuals will often have incentives to promote their own interest at the expense of the group, either by exploiting others or by failing to contribute to public goods. There are two ways to overcome these “collective action” problems: (1) the incentives that individuals face can be changed so that individual and group interest no longer conflict, and/or (2) group members can embrace norms that enable them to exercise self-restraint and forego opportunities to get ahead at the expense of others. The rule of law, property rights, and proper firm structure can help overcome collective action problems. However, these same structures can also create new opportunities for rent seeking.

The Geography of Inequality: How Land Use Regulation Produces Segregation

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
JESSICA TROUNSTINE
Keyword(s):  
Land Use ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Metropolitan Area ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Local Level ◽  
The United States ◽  
Local Public Goods ◽  
Land Use Regulations ◽  
Collective Action Problems

Public goods in the United States are largely funded and delivered at the local level. Local public goods are valuable, but their production requires overcoming several collective action problems including coordinating supply and minimizing congestion, free-riding, and peer effects. Land use regulations, promulgated by local governments, allow communities to solve the collective action problems inherent in the provision of local public goods and maintenance of property values. A consequence of these efforts is residential segregation between cities along racial lines. I provide evidence that more stringent land use regulations are supported by whiter communities and that they preserve racial homogeneity. First, I show that cities that were whiter than their metropolitan area in 1970 are more likely to have restrictive land use patterns in 2006. Then, relying on Federal Fair Housing Act lawsuits to generate changes in land use policy, I show that restrictive land use helps to explain metropolitan area segregation patterns over time. Finally, I draw on precinct level initiative elections from several California cities to show that whiter neighborhoods are more supportive of restricting development. These results strongly suggest that even facially race-neutral land use policies have contributed to racial segregation.

scholarly journals Inequality, institutions, and cooperation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Markussen ◽  
Smriti Sharma ◽  
Saurabh Singhal ◽  
Finn Tarp
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Indirect Costs ◽  
Local Institutions ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Public Goods Experiment ◽  
Voluntary Cooperation

We examine the effects of randomly introduced economic inequality on voluntary cooperation, and whether this relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1,300 participants across rural Vietnam. Our results show that inequality adversely affects aggregate contributions, and this is on account of high endowment individuals contributing a significantly smaller share than those with low endowments. This negative effect of inequality on cooperation is exacerbated in high corruption environments. We find that corruption leads to more pessimistic beliefs about others’ contributions in heterogeneous groups, and this is an important mechanism explaining our results. In doing so, we highlight the indirect costs of corruption that are understudied in the literature. These findings have implications for public policies aimed at resolving local collective action problems.

scholarly journals Localized prosocial preferences, public goods, and common-pool resources

2018 ◽  
Vol 116 (12) ◽  
pp. 5305-5310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Tilman ◽  
Avinash K. Dixit ◽  
Simon A. Levin
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Concave Function ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Public Inputs ◽  
The Social ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Individual Contributions ◽  
Public Bads

The presence of prosocial preferences is thought to reduce significantly the difficulty of solving societal collective action problems such as providing public goods (or reducing public bads). However, prosociality is often limited to members of an in-group. We present a general theoretical model where society is split into subgroups and people care more about the welfare of others in their own subgroup than they do about those in out-groups. Individual contributions to the public good spill over and benefit members in each group to different degrees. We then consider special cases of our general model under which we can examine the consequences of localized prosociality for the economic outcomes of society as a whole. We ask to what extent prosociality closes the welfare gap between the Nash equilibrium without prosociality and the social optimum. The answer depends on whether private and public inputs are good or poor substitutes in producing final output. Critically, the degree to which this welfare gap closes is a concave function of the level of prosociality in the case of poor substitutes, so even low levels of prosociality can lead to social welfare near the social optimum.

Environmental Public Goods Not Securable by Markets or Networks

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 26-41
Author(s):  
John J. Davenport
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Environmental Problems ◽  
Civic Organizations ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Environmental Public Goods ◽  
Civil Society Networks ◽  
Roger Scruton

Roger Scruton and others argue that market-based approaches and voluntary civic organizations can solve many environmental problems. The author argues in response that there are significant limitations to quota systems and similar market fixes, while NGOs and civil society “networks” are not effective in overcoming certain kinds of collective action problems. Even when they work to some extent, network-based solutions such as certification schemes or charity ownership of lands may also cause new problems, such as trends towards excessive concentrations of power, unhealthy dependencies, and lack of choice about which groups act as guardians of our interests.

scholarly journals Adding Emergence and Spatiality to a Public Bad Game for Studying Dynamics in Socio-Ecological Systems (Part I): The Design of Musa-Game for Integrative Analysis of Collective Action in Banana Disease Management

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (16) ◽  
pp. 9370
Author(s):  
Julissa Alexandra Galarza-Villamar ◽  
Mariette McCampbell ◽  
Cees Leeuwis ◽  
Francesco Cecchi
Keyword(s):  
Disease Management ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Ecological Systems ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
Contextual Understanding ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Human Decision ◽  
Individual Decisions ◽  
Public Bads ◽  
And Control

Human decision-making plays a critical and challenging role in the prevention and control of public bads within socio-ecological systems. Farmers daily confront dilemmas regarding public bad management, such as infectious diseases in their crops. Their decisions interplay with multiple factors and may create the risk conditions in which a public bad can occur (e.g., a disease outbreak). This article presents an experimental board game method (DySE) and its contextualized version (Musa-game) to study the effect of individual and collective human actions on creating or preventing a public bad. The DySE method and the Musa-game add emergence and spatiality (both attributes of SES) to the study of public bads and collective action problems. This methodological proposal allows us to build a contextual understanding of how individual and collective actions of various entities lead to typical system outcomes, i.e., conditions that are (un)favourable to pathogens, and individual decisions about infectious disease management. To conceptualize our method, we used the case of Banana Xanthomonas Wilt disease in Rwanda. This research is published as a diptych. Part I (this article) covers the conceptualization and design of Musa-game. Part II presents empirical findings from testing Musa-game with farmers in Rwanda and recommendations for using the method.

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