scholarly journals Dense Orbits of the Bayesian Updating Group Action

Author(s):  
Ziv Hellman ◽  
Yehuda John Levy

We study dynamic properties of the group action on the simplex that is induced by Bayesian updating. We show that, generically, the orbits are dense in the simplex, although one must make use of the entire group, hence departing from straightforward Bayesian updating. We demonstrate also the necessity of the genericity of the signalling structure, a relationship to descriptive set theoretical concepts, and applications thereof to repeated games of incomplete information, as well a strengthening concerning the group action on itself.

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (12) ◽  
pp. 3817-3835
Author(s):  
Takuo Sugaya ◽  
Alexander Wolitzky

We study anonymous repeated games where players may be “commitment types” who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a “pairwise dominant” action, this action is almost always taken. This implies that cooperation is impossible in the repeated prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. We also bound equilibrium payoffs for general games. Our bound implies that industry profits converge to zero in linear-demand Cournot oligopoly as the number of firms increases. (JEL C72, C73, D83)


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