Religious Epistemology and the Problem of Public Justification

Author(s):  
Martin Breul

SummaryIn this paper I argue that the debate on the legitimacy of using religious arguments in public discourse displays a one-dimensional understanding of the epistemic structure of religious beliefs. This holds true even for the most recent and most advanced approaches such as Andrew March’s innovative typology of religious arguments. Hence, my first aim in this paper is to provide an analysis of the epistemic structure of religious beliefs. I suggest that religious convictions have two main components: they have a cognitive-propositional dimension (belief) as well as a regulative-expressive dimension (faith). Therefore, they may be intersubjectively accessible, but not mutually acceptable. My second aim in this paper is to show that mutual acceptability is an adequate criterion for political legitimacy. However, although the demands of public reason require mutual acceptability, religious convictions ought not to be privatized as they offer essential input for public discourse beyond public justification. Thus, it is necessary to insist on the mutual acceptability of reasons in public justifications, but this does not imply that religion is a private matter.

Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti

This chapter critically examines which arguments for free speech may be consistent with Rawls’s political liberalism, in order to establish whether there are good reasons, within political liberalism, for rejecting the legal implementation of the duty of civility. Among the various arguments for freedom of speech, the chapter argues, only those from democracy and political legitimacy seem to justify Rawls’s opposition to the legal enforcement of the duty of civility. However, the chapter concludes, since Rawls’s own conception of political legitimacy is not merely procedural but grounded in the ideas of public justification and public reason, political liberalism is in principle consistent with some restrictions on free speech, including those which would result from the legal enforcement of the duty of civility.


Author(s):  
Christie Hartley

This chapter discusses the concern that exclusive accounts of public reason threaten or undermine the integrity of some religiously oriented citizens in democratic societies. It discusses various notions of integrity that might be claimed to ground such a concern. It is argued that purely formal accounts of integrity that do not distinguish between the integrity of reasonable and unreasonable persons, as specified within political liberalism, cannot underwrite integrity challenges that should concern political liberals. It is further argued that if the inquiry is limited to conceptions of integrity that distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable persons, the supposed burdens persons of faith face are not burdens different from those that all citizens face equally. It is claimed the concern is best understood as a challenge to the account of public justification and the account of public reason as a moral ideal.


Author(s):  
Christie Hartley

This chapter develops the idea of public reason based on the shared reasons account of public justification. It is argued that the moral foundation for political liberalism delimits a narrow scope for the idea of public reason, such that public reasons are required only for matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. It is also argued that where public reason applies, persons as citizens have a moral duty to never appeal to their comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public reasoning. Hence, an exclusive account of public reason is vindicated. Finally, we respond to various potential objections to our view, such as the claim that the shared reasons view requires identical reasoning and the claim that public reason is interderminate or inconclusive.


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 776-804 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blain Neufeld

AbstractJohn Rawls claims that public reasoning is the reasoning of ‘equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power’. Drawing upon an amended version of Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intentions, I flesh out this claim by developing the ‘civic people’ account of public reason. Citizens realize ‘full’ political autonomy as members of a civic people. Full political autonomy, though, cannot be realised by citizens in societies governed by a ‘constrained proceduralist’ account of democratic self-government, or the ‘convergence’ account of public justification formulated recently by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier.


2018 ◽  
pp. 24-62
Author(s):  
Benjamin R. Hertzberg

This chapter criticizes the ideal of public reason, showing that even when it is specified in several plausible ways, it does not provide citizens with sufficient guidance in evaluating religious politics. Instead, the ideal must be placed within a larger, way-of-life conception of democracy that considers religion’s roles in citizens’ civic lives. The chapter develops a minimal conception of public reason and analyses two criticisms of it: that public reason is a culturally protestant political approach that ignores crucial aspects of religion and that public reason violates religious citizens’ integrity. It then assesses two predominant responses to the second criticism: restricting the domain of public reason norms and adopting the convergence conception of public justification. Both responses demonstrate public reason’s inability to offer citizens sufficient guidance in evaluating religion’s political influence.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135-155
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan

Public reason liberalism is a normative theory meant to adjudicate citizens’ conflicting beliefs about the right and the good. However, it rests upon controversial and likely mistaken empirical claims about voter psychology and voter knowledge. In political science, there are two major paradigms—populism and realism—about the relationship between voters’ beliefs and political outcomes. Realism holds that most citizens lack the kinds of beliefs and attitudes which public reason liberals believe are normatively significant. If so, then most citizens lack the kinds of ideological disputes which public reason liberalism is supposed to adjudicate. Worse, most citizens lack the kinds of normatively significantly beliefs upon which public justification must rest.


2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald F. Gaus

In this essay I sketch a philosophical argument for classical liberalism based on the requirements of public reason. I argue that we can develop a philosophical liberalism that, unlike so much recent philosophy, takes existing social facts and mores seriously while, at the same time, retaining the critical edge characteristic of the liberal tradition. I argue that once we develop such an account, we are led toward a vindication of “old” (qua classical) liberal morality—what Benjamin Constant called the “liberties of the moderns.” A core thesis of the paper is that a regime of individual rights is crucial to the project of public justification because it disperses moral authority to individuals thus mitigating what I call the “burdens of justification.”


2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Lecce

According to one recently influential version of liberalism, law and public policy in a democracy should be justified independently of the controversial ethical or religious beliefs that divide citizens, because political membership is coercive, involuntary and profoundly influential to our overall well-being. For children, however, the parent—child relationship shares these three salient features of the political domain: it is also necessarily coercive, involuntary and profoundly influential. In this article, I examine the case for extending the ideal of public reason to parental conduct in connection with religious upbringing. After distinguishing several senses in which the personal is political, and several modes of applying political principles to personal conduct, I reject the proposed extension, and conclude that liberalism is ultimately compatible with `fundamentalist' upbringings.


2009 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Rosenbaum

Richard Rorty has suggested that religion is a conversation-stopper.1 Jeffrey Stout has questioned this claim, gently chiding Rorty for his animus toward increasing assertiveness on the part of religiously committed individuals in their address of public issues.2 Stout concludes that “conversation is the very thing that is not stopped when religious premises are introduced in a political argument.”3 He is convinced that Rorty is overly sensitive on this matter and believes, with Nicholas Wolterstorff and others, that religious people in a pluralistic democracy have not only the right but also the responsibility to share their convictions and the reasoning that leads to their opinions on vital moral and social issues. Stout quotes Wolterstorff as follows: It belongs to the religious convictions of a good many religious people in our society that they ought to base their decisions concerning fundamental issues of justice on their religious convictions. They do not view as an option whether or not to do so. It is their conviction that they ought to strive for wholeness, integrity, integration in their lives: that they ought to allow the Word of God, the teachings of the Torah, the command and example of Jesus, or whatever, to shape their existence as a whole, including, then, their social and political existence. Their religion is not, for them, about something other than their social and political existence; it is also about their social and political existence. Accordingly, to require of them that they not base their decisions and discussions concerning political issues on their religion is to infringe, inequitably, on the free exercise of their religion.4 In what follows, I revisit Stout's question, “is religion a conversation-stopper?” and explain why he believes that Rorty is inappropriately skeptical regarding the role of religion in public life. I then show why Rorty is in fact correct to be skeptical about bringing religious views into discussions of significant public issues.5 Stout, along with Wolterstorff and others, is overly optimistic, and his critique of Rorty reveals his undue optimism. I explain why current perspectives on religion justify Rorty's skepticism about bringing it into public discourse. I also suggest a different perspective on religions that might enable the sort of optimism Stout embraces. The change of perspective I suggest involves taking our religious views not as justified or warranted by documents, sources, traditions, and revelations but rather as embedded in or deriving from those documents, sources, traditions, and revelations. The latter way of understanding our religious views opens them to intellectual strategies of genealogy, or to explanatory strategies that contextualize them within particular traditions of culture and history. I conclude this essay with two relevant points. The first is that neither justifying nor explaining the sources of one's religious views, the strategies roughly of justifying religious beliefs and providing genealogies of them—tools for “deconstructing” them as some would have it—can claim proper priority in our religious lives. Explaining the sources of our commitments is as trenchantly definitive of those commitments as is providing dialectical justification for them. (William James discerns and exploits this fact about our religious views throughout his work.6) My second concluding point is that Stout departs significantly, in ways that adversely affect his views, from the constructive intellectual stances of the classical pragmatists, among whom I include primarily William James and John Dewey; Rorty, although many dislike his views on religion, is a better representative of classical pragmatism than is Stout.


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