scholarly journals THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND DRUG-TESTING IN SPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA: COULD THE NEW ZEALAND CASE OF CROPP V JUDICIAL COMMITTEE PROVIDE SOME GUIDANCE?

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Wilké
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
South African ◽  
Drug Testing ◽  
Right To Privacy ◽  
The Right To Privacy ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right

This article examines the right to privacy of athletes who are required to submit to drug tests. In South Africa, the right to privacy of an athlete with regard to drugtesting has not been challenged in the courts. However, the courts in New Zealand have had an opportunity to examine the right to privacy of an athlete in terms of drugtesting in sport. Therefore, the article discusses whether the decision in the NewZealand case of Cropp v Judicial Committee may provide some guidance to South African courts in the adjudication of whether the infringement and the limitation on the right to privacy in the context of drug-testing in sport can be reasonable and justified and concludes that such infringement may be reasonable and justified if a court is to consider a limitation of the right to privacy in terms of section 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 as well as consent and safety.

The Drug-Testing Controversy

1993 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Jolyon West ◽  
Deborah L. Ackerman
Keyword(s):  
Drug Use ◽  
Drug Screening ◽  
Drug Testing ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Right To Privacy ◽  
Testing Procedures ◽  
The Right To Privacy ◽  
Legal Challenges ◽  
The Right

Professional and societal debate regarding drug taking and drug-use problems occurs in cycles. In recent years a number of contentious issues have developed about the testing of urine, blood, saliva, and breath for evidence of drug use. Substances evaluated include alcohol, steroids, stimulants, sedatives, opiates, hallucinogens, and a variety of other chemicals both legal and illegal. Legal issues have been raised concerning the validity of testing procedures used and the reliability of evidence obtained, especially with preemployment drug screening. Other controversies center on the right to privacy versus the needs of society, and a variety of related topics. These issues and suggestions for maximizing the effectiveness of drug testing programs while minimizing legal challenges are discussed.

scholarly journals The Right to Privacy and Private Detective Activities in Lithuania

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Mindaugas Bilius
Keyword(s):  
Personal Data ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Private Life ◽  
Right To Privacy ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
The Right To Privacy ◽  
Private Detective ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right

ABSTRACT Private detectives have been providing their services in Lithuania for about a decade; however, only now has the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania started to discuss whether it is expedient and necessary to regulate the activities of private detectives by means of a separate law. One of the goals of a separate legal regulation of private detective activities is the protection of human rights, particularly the right to privacy. This article examines the provisions of national and international legislative acts related to the private life of a person, and assesses the opportunities of a private detective to provide private detective services without prejudice to the provisions of applicable legislative acts. The article concludes that a private detective is not an authorized (public) authority and there is no possibility to assess in each case whether the interests of a person using the services of private detectives are more important than those of other persons, which would allow for violating their rights to private life. The limits of an individual’s right to privacy can only be narrowed by a particular person, giving consent to making public the details of his/her private life. It is the only opportunity for a private detective to gather information related to the private life of a citizen. Currently applicable legislative acts in Lithuania do not provide for opportunities for private subjects to collect personal data without that person’s consent. This right is granted only to public authorities and with the court’s permission

scholarly journals Raamwerkwetgewing ter Verwesenliking van die Reg op Toegang tot Voldoende Voedsel

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 228
Author(s):  
Anél Terblanche ◽  
Gerrit Pienaar
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Food Security ◽  
South African ◽  
The South ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right ◽  
Human Rights Based Approach ◽  
Right Of Access ◽  
Sufficient Food

Various South African government reports list food security as a development priority. Despite this prioritisation and despite the fact that South Africa is currently food self-sufficient, ongoing food shortages remain a daily reality for approximately 35 percent of the South African population. The government's commitment to food security to date of writing this contribution manifests in related policies, strategies, programmes and sectoral legislation with the focus on food production, distribution, safety and assistance. A paradigm shift in the international food security debate was encouraged during 2009, namely to base food security initiatives on the right to sufficient food. During a 2011 visit to South Africa, the Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food of the United Nations, accordingly confirmed that a human rights-based approach to food security is necessary in the South African legal and policy framework in order to address the huge disparities in terms of food security (especially concerning geography, gender and race). A human rights-based approach to food security will add dimensions of dignity, transparency, accountability, participation and empowerment to food security initiatives. The achievement of food security is further seen as the realisation of existing rights, notably the right of access to sufficient food. The right of access to sufficient food, as entrenched in section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 will accordingly play a central role within a human rights-based approach to food security. Section 27(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 qualifies section 27(1)(b) by requiring the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of the section 27(1) rights. The South African government's commitment to food security, as already mentioned, currently manifests in related policies, strategies and programmes, which initiatives will qualify as other measures as referred to in section 27(2) mentioned above. This contribution, however, aims to elucidate the constitutional duty to take reasonable legislative measures as required by section 27(2) within the wider context of food security. This contribution is more specifically confined to the ways in which a human rights-based approach to food security can be accommodated in a proposed framework law as a national legislative measures. Several underlying and foundational themes are addressed in this contribution, amongst others: (a) the relationship between food security and the right of access to sufficient food; (b) food security as a developmental goal; and (c) the increasing trend to apply a human rights-based approach to development initiatives in general, but also to food security.

scholarly journals Warrantless Search and Seizures by the South African Police Service: Weighing up the Right to Privacy versus the Prevention of Crime

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Windell Nortje
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Search And Seizure ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Right To Privacy ◽  
The Right To Privacy ◽  
Reasonable Suspicion ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Search Warrant ◽  
Prevention Of Crime ◽  
The Right

The constitutional right to privacy is enshrined in section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. It is premised on the notion that all persons should be protected from intrusions on their privacy by any person or institution. The Constitutional Court has also, on numerous occasions, held that the right to privacy is bolstered by its connection with the right to human dignity. It is undeniable that every person's right to privacy should be protected. However, a person's right to privacy is violated when police officials conduct warrantless search and seizure operations. Generally section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for warrantless search and seizure operations when a police official has a reasonable suspicion that a search warrant will be issued to him and that a delay in obtaining such a warrant would defeat the object of the search. Warrantless searches are important for the prevention of crime, but recent case law has suggested that there has been a progressive shift towards protecting the right to privacy of the individual subjected to warrantless searches, since there are a number of laws besides section 22 that regulate warrantless searches and which have been declared to be constitutionally invalid. This article seeks to demonstrate that the current regulatory framework for warrantless searches should be reviewed in order to protect the legitimacy of the police as well as the dignity and privacy of the citizens of South Africa.

scholarly journals The Right to Just Administrative Action in the Context of Suspending the Payment of Disputed Tax

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Silke De Lange ◽  
Danielle Van Wyk
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
South African ◽  
Tax Administration ◽  
Research Approach ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right ◽  
Relevant Factors ◽  
Discretionary Powers

Section 164(3) of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (hereafter TAA) provides a senior South African Revenue Service official (hereafter, respectively, SARS and senior SARS official) with discretionary powers to suspend the payment of disputed tax or a portion thereof, having regard to relevant factors, if the taxpayer intends to dispute the liability to pay such tax. Exercising a discretion in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA constitutes administrative action. Section 33(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter Constitution) grants everyone the right to just administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair and the Promotion of Administrative Action Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter PAJA) was promulgated to give effect to this right. The objective of this article is to apply the right to just administrative action to the manner in which the discretion in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA is exercised. This is achieved by adopting an explanatory research approach and performing a literature review of the discretion process in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA and the constitutional obligations in terms of section 33 of the Constitution as given effect to in PAJA. As the discretion exercised by the senior SARS official is influenced directly by the right to just administrative action, it should be exercised in a lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair manner to ensure compliance with the Constitution and the PAJA. For the discretion to be exercised in a lawful manner, the senior SARS official must at least be authorised to exercise the discretion in terms of the TAA and comply with the procedures and conditions stated in section 164(3) of the TAA. For the decision to be considered reasonable, the decision must be, at the minimum, rational and proportional, and to ensure that the discretion is exercised in a procedurally fair manner, SARS should comply with at least the relevant compulsory elements in terms of section 3(2)(b) of PAJA. A decision in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA which fails to meet the requirements of lawfulness, reasonableness and/or procedural fairness will be subject to review on several grounds listed in section 6(2) of PAJA.     

scholarly journals The Regulations relating to Foodstuffs for Infants and Young Children (R 991): A Formula for the Promotion of Breastfeeding or Censorship of Commercial Speech?

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 295
Author(s):  
Lize Mills
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
South Africa ◽  
Young Children ◽  
South African ◽  
Commercial Speech ◽  
Department Of Health ◽  
Infant Formulae ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right ◽  
Advertising And Promotion

The regulation of commercial speech in the interests of public health is an issue which recently has become the topic of numerous debates. Two examples of such governmental regulation are the subjects of discussion in this article, namely the prohibition on the advertising and promotion of tobacco products, as well as the proposed prohibition on the advertising and promotion of infant formulae and other foods and products marketed as being suitable for infants or young children. The article seek to evaluate the recently proposed regulations published in terms of the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act in the light of the reasoning by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the British American Tobacco South Africa (Pty) Limited v Minister of Health 463/2011) [2012] ZASCA 107 (20 June 2012) decision, and in particular in terms of the section 36 test of reasonableness and proportionality found in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. It argues that, although the South African Department of Health must be applauded for its attempt at improving public health in the country, some of the provisions of the proposed regulations are not constitutionally sound. It will be contended that, despite the fact that the promotion of breastfeeding is a laudable goal, the introduction only of measures which restrict the right to advertise these types of products will not necessarily achieve this objective.

scholarly journals Personal Data Protection in New Zealand: Lessons for South Africa?

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
A Roos
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
South African ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Right To Privacy ◽  
Personal Data Protection ◽  
Eu Directive ◽  
The Eu

In 1995 the European Union adopted a Directive on data protection. Article 25 of this Directive compels all EU member countries to adopt data protection legislation and to prevent the transfer of personal data to non-EU member countries (“third countries”) that do not provide an adequate level of data protection. Article 25 results in the Directive having extra-territorial effect and exerting an influence in countries outside the EU. Like South Africa, New Zealand is a “third” country in terms of the EU Directive on data protection. New Zealand recognised the need for data protection and adopted a data protection Act over 15 years ago. The focus of this article is on the data protection provisions in New Zealand law with a view to establishing whether South Africa can learn any lessons from them. In general, it can be said that although New Zealand law does not expressly recognise a right to privacy, it has a data protection regime that functions well and that goes a long way to providing adequate data protection as required by the EU Directive on data protection. Nevertheless, the EU has not made a finding to that effect as yet. The New Zealand data protection act requires a couple of amendments before New Zealand might be adjudged ‘adequate’. South Africa’s protection of the right to privacy and identity is better developed and more extensive than that of New Zealand. Privacy is recognised and protected in the law of delict and by the South African Constitution. Despite South Africa’s apparently high regard for the individual’s right to privacy and identity and our well-developed common and constitutional law of privacy, South Africa does not meet the adequacy requirement of the EU Directive, because we do not have a data protection Act. This means that South African participants in the information technology arena are at a constant disadvantage. It is argued that South Africa should follow New Zealand’s example and adopt a data protection law as soon as possible.

scholarly journals The Right to Strike and Replacement Labour: South African Practice Viewed from an International Law Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Stefan Van Eck ◽  
Tungamirai Kujinga
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
International Law ◽  
South African ◽  
Labour Law ◽  
International Labour Organisation ◽  
Labour Relations ◽  
Essential Services ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Labour Legislation ◽  
The Right

South Africa is a member of the International Labour Organisation (hereafter the ILO), an establishment that sets international labour law standards through its conventions, recommendations and expert supervisory committees. Also, South African courts have an obligation to interpret labour provisions in accordance with international law and customs. This paper examines whether by way of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 (hereafter the LRA) the current regulation of both the right to strike and the use of replacement labour during strikes falls within the ambits of internationally and constitutionally acceptable labour norms. Strike action constitutes a temporary and concerted withdrawal of work. On the other hand, replacement labour maintains production and undermines the effect of the withdrawal of labour. Consequently, the ILO views the appointment of strike-breakers during legal strikes in non-essential services as a violation of the right to organise and collective bargaining, and in a number of countries replacement labour is prohibited. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 enshrines every worker's right to strike and the LRA gives effect to this right. However, the foundation of this right is ostensibly brought into question by the LRA in as far as it permits employers to make use of replacement labour during strike action. This article investigates whether replacement labour undermines the right to strike in South Africa and considers to what extent labour legislation may be misaligned with international norms. In conclusion the research makes findings and proposes alternatives that may be considered to resolve this seemingly skewed situation.    

scholarly journals Defending the Absurd: The Iconoclast's Guide to Section 47(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 1827
Author(s):  
Haneen McCreath ◽  
Raymond Koen
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
South African ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Civil Litigation ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Core Value ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access

This contribution was intended as a defence of section 25(1) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. However, the Supreme Court Act was repealed in August 2013 and replaced by the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, and in the process section 25(1) of the former gave way to section 47(1) of the latter. Both sections concern the doctrine of leave to sue judges in South Africa. Both prescribe that any civil litigation against a judge requires the consent of the court out of which such litigation is to be launched. Both apply to civil suits against judges for damage caused by either their judicial or their non-judicial conduct.Although section 25(1) had been one of the more inconspicuous sections of the Supreme Court Act, it was contested on occasion. Both curial and extra-curial challenges to section 25(1) assailed its constitutionality, alleging essentially that its provisions violated the right of access to courts enshrined in section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and that such violation did not meet the limitation criteria contained in section 36. It may be anticipated with considerable confidence, given its legal continuity with section 25(1), that any serious assault upon section 47(1) of the Superior Courts Act also will focus upon its relationship to section 34 of the Constitution.This contribution is a pre-emptive defence of section 47(1) of the Superior Courts Act and, by extrapolation, a belated justification of section 25(1) of the Supreme Court Act. An attempt will be made to demonstrate, contrary to conventional wisdom, that section 47(1) does not limit section 34 and passes constitutionalmuster at the first level of enquiry, thereby obviating the need for advancing to the second level of enquiry contained in section 36 of the Constitution.The jurisprudential crux of section 47(1) of the Superior Courts Act is embedded in the nature of the judicial office and its core value of judicial impartiality. The procedural immunity which the section affords South African judges is a mechanism for sparing them the nuisance of having to deal with frivolous litigation, either as defendant or as adjudicator. Every specious suit against a judge, per definitionem, represents an incursion into judicial impartiality by urging that the court give credence to a claim which does not qualify for curial adjudication. In this regard, the doctrine of leave to sue seeks to ensure that judges do not have to adjudicate claims which resort beyond the compass of their judicial capacity. It is a doctrine which operates to protect and advance the unimpeachable principle of judicial impartiality.

scholarly journals A CALL FOR A DIFFERENCE IN TREATMENT BETWEEN CHILD AND ADULT OFFENDERS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PAROLE SYSTEM: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
I Gueorguieva
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Conditional Release ◽  
Correctional Services ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Parole System ◽  
The Right ◽  
And Control ◽  
Good Behaviour

Internationally, parole is recognised and accepted as a means of the conditional release of a sentenced offender from a correctional centre into the community, before the expiration of the judicially imposed sentence of such offender. The functions of the placement on parole of the offender, which associate with the offender, include the rehabilitation of the offender and his reintegration into the community, as well as his restitution (e.g. in the form of symbolic restitution or community service). In Correctional Services authorities, parole acts occur to relieve prison overcrowding, encourage good behaviour within correctional facilities and to save costs related to imprisonment without negating the benefits of continued supervision and control.5 In South Africa, parole is predominantly governed by the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (as amended) or, more particularly chapter IV (dealing with sentenced offenders), chapter VI (community corrections) and chapter VII (release from correctional centre and placement under correctional supervision and on day parole and parole). The provisions of chapter IV came into operation on 31 July 2004, whilst those of chapters V and VI came into operation on 1 October 2004.6 In addition, the provisions of the Correctional Services B-Order, Sub-Order 1, Incarceration Administration (hereinafter referred to as the Parole Manual) go a long way in clarifying and expanding on provisions in the Correctional Services Act, as well as indicating the practice and policy of the various functionaries involved in the parole system. Section 28(1)(g) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution), on the other hand, provides that a child has the right not to be detained except as a measure of last resort and then only for the shortest appropriate period. Section 28(2) further provides that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. The question can then be raised: what effect do the above provisions have on the parole consideration of child offenders? Additionally, one can ask whether there is sufficient justification for a difference in parole treatment between child and adult offenders.

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