Article 16: The Right to Protection of Privacy

This chapter provides a brief overview of article 16 of the UN Convention on the rights of the child and of its legislative history as outlined in the Travaux Préparatoires. It outlines the principle threats to children’s privacy today and summarizes the substantive content of Article 16, particularly in relation to the General Principles of child rights in Articles 2, 3, 6, and 12, as well as the nexus between the right to privacy and several other rights of children under the Convention as well as other international human rights instruments. It then puts forward four main attributes of the child’s right to privacy as aspects of the right which State Parties should monitor as a means of measuring the effective implementation of Article 16. The essential attributes of Article 16 and the child’s right to privacy are State protection against: (1) interference with privacy; (2) interference with family, home or correspondence; (3) unlawful attacks upon honour and reputation; and (4) protection of the law against unlawful interference or attacks.

The mother’s right to privacy in infant abandonment cases

Met inagneming van die hoë getal babas wat in Suid-Afrika onder ongekontroleerde omstandighede deur hul moeders verlaat en dus wees gelaat word, is die voorstel van nuwe wetgewing om voorsiening vir vondelingluike en veilige hawens vir babas daar te stel ’n positiewe stap in die regte rigting. Die outeur sien egter ’n paar hindernisse op dié weg. Een van hierdie hindernisse is die potensiële inbreuk op die ma se reg op privaatheid. In die gebruik van ’n veilige metode van babaverlating behoort ’n ma se identiteit beskerm te word soos by die gebruik van ’n vondelingluik. Laasgenoemde is tipies ’n ingeboude vak, laai of kas in ’n buitemuur van ’n inrigting soos ’n klooster of tehuis vir ongehude moeders waar ’n ma haar baba anoniem kan plaas. Sodra die klap na die vondelingluik gesluit word, ontvang die beheerders daarvan ’n sein en kan die agtergelate baba daar afgehaal en veilig versorg word. In dié opsig funksioneer dit soos wanneer ’n baba by ’n goedgekeurde veilige hawe deur die moeder afgegee word en waar sy haar baba oorhandig aan die betrokkenes by so ’n hospitaal, polisiestasie of brandweerstasie. Die baba se versorging word verseker deurdat die kind nie onder ’n spreekwoordelike doringbos langs die pad gelaat word nie. Die moeder se identiteit behoort egter desgewens doelbewus beskerm te word sodat sy anoniem bly. Met hierdie moontlike nuwe wetgewing om onveilige babaverlating te bekamp, is een van die motiverende faktore die waarborg van die vertroulikheid van persoonlike inligting van die moeder van die kind. Indien die baba daarenteen onseremonieel bloot weggegooi word, behoort die moeder geen aanspraak op beskerming van haar identiteit as krimineel te hê nie. Dan behoort sy vir haar kriminele optrede vervolg te word. Sonder hierdie waarborg dat gebruikmaking van ’n veilige vondelingluik of ander veilige babahawe die moeder vrywaar van kriminele vervolging wat gemeenregtelik aan die misdaad van kinderverwaarlosing gekoppel word, is dit onwaarskynlik dat ’n moeder met ’n ongewenste baba hierdie opsie sal oorweeg omdat sy steeds aan vervolging blootgestel sal wees. Dan sal hierdie wetgewing die beoogde doel mis en nutteloos wees. Sodanige waarborg gee vir die moeder die vertroue dat sy nie opgespoor sal word nie en ook dat sy nie strafregtelik aanspreeklik gehou sal word vir die strafregtelike misdaad van kinderverlating en/of -verwaarlosing nie. Statutêre beskerming van die moeder se privaatheid in dié omstandighede hou egter die implikasie in dat inbreuk gemaak word op die kind se reg op kennis van sy/haar herkoms. In hierdie artikel word die potensiële regverdiging vir die beklemtoning van die moeder se reg op haar privaatheid ondersoek in die lig van die kind se mededingende reg op kennis van sy/haar herkoms. Die grondwet se beperkingsklousule is as ’n maatstaf gebruik om te bepaal of ’n beperking van die moeder se reg op privaatheid redelik en regverdigbaar sou wees in ’n oop en demokratiese samelewing gebaseer op menswaardigheid, gelykheid en vryheid. Die outeur bevind dat beide mededingende aspekte deel van die inhoudsbevoegdhede van privaatheid vorm en die doel om die moeder se reg op privaatheid te beperk minder belangrik is as die wettige doel wat die reg in hierdie konteks dra, naamlik om onveilige babaverlating te beperk. Laastens is met inagneming van die Wet op die Beskerming van Persoonlike Inligting 4 van 2013 ondersoek of die beskerming van die moeder se persoonlike inligting voldoende beklemtoon word.

Privacy of European Citizens in the Face of the Development of New Data- Driven Business Models

The main objective of the paper is to identify the imbalance between the right to privacy and the business objectives of entities creating new Data-Driven Business Models (DDBMs) of consumers (EU citizens). Information about the consumer and their characteristics has nowadays become a service or market commodity thanks to which new economic processes, based on the use of advanced data processing technologies, are created. In digital space, new types of DDBM are established, which provide entrepreneurs with added value, based on the mass use of the consumer’s data collected often without their knowledge, on the margins of legality. This paper analyzes the impact of the development of DDBMs on selected privacy areas: personal data, the right to be forgotten, confidentiality of communications, one’s image and identity. In each of these areas, situations are identified that indicate a progressive re-evaluation of citizens’ privacy rights. The authors suggest that disruption of the balance between the right to privacy and business objectives may lead to unambiguous consequences, not only for the consumer (EU citizen), but also for the business entities.

Prawo do prywatności w dobie sztucznej inteligencji

Privacy in the era of artificial intelligence is the ability to exercise control over your private life, including information about yourself and your family. Robust privacy laws are essential to building and maintaining trust in a digital world. It is extremely important to ensure a balance between proper protection of private life and supporting the development of new technologies and innovation. The article presents what privacy is in the era of artificial intelligence, what threats to privacy result from the development of technology, how the right to privacy is guaranteed and protected (both by international standards and Polish legal regulations). The author also assesses the legal regulations regarding the guarantee of the right to privacy in the AI world.

Granice ingerencji w prawo do prywatności w procesie zwalczania przestępczości oraz zapobiegania jej skutkom

In their article, Erwin Ryter and Justyna Ryter make an attempt to answer the following questions: What may be the farthest limit of tolerance towards public authorities’ interference with a person’s right to privacy in the context of fight against crime as well as the performance of necessary and purposeful procedural actions? Can both the procedural objective and the fact of the violation of the right to privacy of the suspect justify direct or indirect interference with the privacy of persons from the suspect’s social environment, even if that interference is a side effect of actions taken against the offender? The authors of this article also raise the issue of privacy violations in relation to various forms of monitoring of persons who are of interest to the authorities conducting the proceedings. In particular, these proceedings may involve keeping various types of registers containing the data of offender, using classified eavesdropping on them, observing their whereabouts, and disclosing their personal data.

How is Political Privacy Different from Personal Privacy? An Argument from Democratic Governance

In this paper I discuss the political value of the right to privacy. The classical accounts of privacy do not differentiate between privacy as the right of a citizen against other citizens vs. the right to privacy as the right against the state or the government. I shall argue that this distinction should be made, since the new context of the privacy debate has surpassed the historical frames in which the intelligence methods used by governments were comparable to those available to individuals. I also present cases in which political privacy serves as an instrument of protecting important collective agendas exceeding the context of personal privacy. I argue that due to its function, political privacy should be considered a necessary element of democratic governance with the rule of law, imposing legal bounds on governments’ discretionary actions.

Warrantless search and seizure by SARS: a constitutional invasion of taxpayers’ privacy? – Part Two

Sec. 63 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (TAA) grants officials of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) access to taxpayers’ private and confidential information by, first, searching a taxpayer’s person and premises without a warrant and, secondly, permitting the seizure of taxpayers’ possessions and communications. Part One of this article (see Journal for Juridical Science 2021(1)) argued that the TAA is a “law of general application” as envisaged by the so-called “limitation clause” contained in sec. 36(1) of the Constitution, 1996 and that, in terms of the threshold stage of analysis prescribed by this provision, the exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 63(1) and (4) limits a taxpayer’s constitutional right to privacy as entrenched in sec. 14 of the Constitution. In this Part Two of the article, it will be hypothesised that, although the search and seizure powers in sec. 63(1) and (4) of the TAA are not models of drafting with absolute clarity, they ought, in terms of the second stage of enquiry that is triggered by the findings in Part One, nevertheless to pass muster under sec. 36(1) of the Constitution, because of the justifiability of the limitation imposed on the right to privacy by these provisions.