scholarly journals The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in a Post-Brexit EU: The Case of Social Europe

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-78
Author(s):  
Paul Copeland

This article assesses the political and power dynamics of the Ordinarily Legislative Procedure (OLP) in social Europe and the likely impact of the UK’s departure in the field for future integration. It provides a detailed analysis of the OLP in social Europe during two recent periods of integration in the field—the first Barroso Commission (2004–2009) and the Juncker Commission (2014–2019). It finds the dynamics of the OLP have shifted from intergovernmental deadlock during the Barroso Commission to the characteristics of a new intergovernmental core state power during the Juncker Commission, even though the policy area is not a core state power <em>per se</em>. Despite the use of qualified majority voting policy agreements can only be achieved when there is near unanimity support in the Council, the Commission remains a neutral broker, and the Parliament shifts its position to that of the Council. As a result, continued opposition to integration in social Europe by Northern and Eastern Members means the removal of UK political agency will have only a marginal impact on the slow and piecemeal approach to integration in the field.

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-508
Author(s):  
Robert Böttner

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced general and special passerelle or bridging clauses into primary law. They can be used to alter voting arrangements from unanimity to qualified majority in the Council or from a special to the ordinary legislative procedure. This is to enable a shift to more supranational decision-making without the need for a full-fledged treaty revision. The European Parliament called on the European Council and the Council to make use of the passerelle clauses, also to involve Parliament as a co-legislator under the ordinary legislative procedure. The former Commission had started a discussion on the use of the passerelle clauses in four policy areas and it appears that the incumbent Commission President has endorsed this ambitious project. This article aims to explore the potential and the shortcomings of the bridging clauses as part of the unused potential of the Lisbon Treaty and discusses the enhanced cooperation procedure as a possible alternative.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
Michela Giordano ◽  
Antonio Piga

The ongoing Pan-European integration process has profoundly influenced the nature of European law and its development, demanding a review of &ldquo;the ways of how language [&hellip;] is materialized&rdquo; (Gibov&aacute;, 2009, p. 192). EU multilingualism is thus becoming an intricate concept since &ldquo;EU translation is [&hellip;] becoming the language of Europe&rdquo; (Gibov&aacute;, 2009, p. 192) encompassing a supranational view of the world conveyed in EU-wide legislation. Very much in line with this assumption, and taking into account the teaching experience in Specialised Translation Masters&rsquo; courses training would-be professional translators, this study examines a corpus of European Parliament Regulations on immigration. In order to understand whether dissimilarities and/or congruencies occur between the EU working language, i.e., English, and the Italian versions, the metadiscourse framework by Hyland (2005), comprising both interactive and interactional features, is used as the point of departure for the analysis of parallel texts. The Regulations produced by EU institutions and conveyed and transmitted both in English as a &ldquo;procedural language&rdquo; (Wagner, Bech, &amp; Martίnez, 2012) as well as in Italian have been scrutinized both quantitatively and qualitatively, in order to draw precious pedagogical implications for translation studies and professional practice for future qualified and trained translators.


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-15
Author(s):  
Mihaela Pătrăuș ◽  
Darius-Dennis Pătrăuș

The Lisbon Treaty in order to strengthen the EU's capacity to decide, to act and to ensure the legitimacy of decisions taken at the same time, reformed the decision-making process of the EU, particularly by changing the legislative procedures in force.Among the novelties of the Lisbon Treaty, we must mention the passerelle clauses, which according to the ordinary legislative procedure will be generalized, under certain conditions, in areas which were initially outside its scope.The treaty nominates two types of passerelle clauses: the general passerelle clause which applies to all European policies and the enabling of this clause will be authorized by a decision of the European Council, acting unanimously; the passerelle clauses specific to certain European policies (MFF, Common Security and Defence Policy, judicial cooperation regarding the family rights- this specific clause is the only one explaining which national parliaments keep their right to oppose; cooperation is strengthened in the areas governed by unanimity or by a special legislative procedure, social affairs, environmental ).The flexibility introduced through a significant number of passerelle clauses in the Lisbon Treaty allows adjustment of the EU quickly and efficiently, depending on punctual developments, without neglecting the guarantees on the sovereignty of member states.


2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212110364
Author(s):  
Adam Kirpsza

The article explores factors affecting the duration of the co-decision procedure (currently the ordinary legislative procedure), the main procedure for adopting legislation in the European Union. Drawing from rational choice institutionalism, it expects the speed of co-decision to be determined by three attributes: the impatience of legislators, issue linkage and the characteristics of Council and European Parliament negotiators ( relais actors). The hypotheses are tested using survival analysis on a dataset of 599 controversial legislative acts submitted and enacted under co-decision between 1999 and 2009. The results show that co-decision proposals are decided faster when they are urgent, negotiated prior to the European Parliament elections and concluded through single proposal logrolls. By contrast, multi-proposal packages and the ideological distance between relais actors prolong decision-making. Overall, the article contributes to the literature by showing that the impatience of legislators, package deals and the properties of negotiators are relevant drivers of co-decision duration.


IG ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-131
Author(s):  
Miriam Hartlapp

Design and adoption of common social policy is conditional. Limited competencies, institutional and organizational heterogeneity among member states, and ideological-programmatic majorities in the institutions of the European Union (EU) have led to far fewer new legal instruments in recent decades. One of the key challenges is the unanimity requirement in the Council, enshrined in the Treaties in areas of great member state sovereignty. In 2019 the Commission proposed to allow a transition to qualified majority voting. This paper discusses what the transition entails in legal and procedural terms and highlights three key advantages it holds. To this aim it provides an overview of the policy areas and instruments that the Commission would like to transfer to qualified majority voting. It outlines how the potential that majority voting offers for EU social policy could be exploited better with more ambitious initiatives and discusses differentiated integration as an alternative.


Author(s):  
Leo Flynn

Article 162 EC Implementing regulations relating to the European Regional Development Fund shall be taken by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Tomkin

Article 52 EC In order to achieve the liberalisation of a specific service, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall issue directives.


Author(s):  
Leo Flynn

Without prejudice to the powers of the European Central Bank, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down the measures necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency. Such measures shall be adopted after consultation of the European Central Bank.


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