Normative Transformation and the War on Terrorism

Pratt investigates the potential erosion of prohibiting assassination, torture, and mercenarism during the US's War on Terrorism. In examining the emergence and history of the US's targeted killing programme, detention and interrogation programme, and employment of armed contractors in warzones, he proposes that a 'normative transformation' has occurred, which has changed the meaning and content of these prohibitions, even though they still exist. Drawing on pragmatist philosophy, practice theory, and relational sociology, this book develops a new theory of normativity and institutional change, and offers new data about the decisions and activities of security practitioners. It is both a critical and constructive addition to the current literature on norm change, and addresses enduring debates about the role of culture and ethical judgement in the use of force. It will appeal to students and scholars of foreign and defence policy, international relations theory, international security, social theory, and American politics.

13. The institutions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy:

This chapter examines the institutional arrangements in the European Union’s (EU’s) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The chapter first charts the historical development of this policy, with foreign policy cooperation being one of the last policy areas to emerge at the EU level. Thus, many of the institutions operating in this area have only been recently established, including the High Representative, the European External Action Service, and many of the administrative bodies supporting the implementation of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, which comprises the EU’s civilian and military operations. The chapter then analyses the main institutional actors involved in the CFSP, focusing on their ability to shape the decision-making and implementation of this policy. The following sections also examine the five dimensions of EU institutional politics and how these play out in this particular area, highlighting the key challenges the EU faces in becoming a fully fledged international actor.

Joint Military Forces of East-Central Europe in the Light of Selected Political Concepts of the Polish Émigré Milieu

This article attempts to analyse the creation of common armed forces in East-Central Europe on the basis of selected integration concepts of the Polish émigré circles. They considered the notion of consolidating the potentials of countries sharing similar historical experiences as well as a sense of being threatened and protecting similar fundamental values to be part of a larger process of providing the Old Continent with guarantees of security and stable development. From the perspective of international relations at that time, however, none of the concepts of a common security and defence policy could have achieved success, although it could have been considered as one of the alternatives for the development of the process of continental integration, especially if it had been linked to the replenishment of the deficient assets in the potentials of other actors of international relations close to East-Central Europe in terms of development and culture.

Actually or Potentially Within Reach: The Place of China in New Zealand’s Grand Strategy 1965-1972

<p>In 1965 New Zealand was an active member of alliances designed to contain the People’s Republic of China in South East Asia. Late the previous year, the Defence Council had warned Cabinet that New Zealand could be at war with China and/or Indonesia in six months. Less than seven years later New Zealand recognised China, as Britain and the US military presences were exiting from South East Asia. These events bookend a radical reshaping of New Zealand’s defence policies and its attitude towards China. The existing scholarship on New Zealand’s Cold War defence policies has underemphasised the role of China in New Zealand’s grand strategy and the scholarship on Sino-New Zealand relations has also largely ignored defence policy. This thesis uses recently released files from the Ministry of Defence to provide new insight into the construction of China as a threat during the mid-1960s and the challenges faced in meeting that perceived threat. New Zealand’s Forward Defence policy was one designed to contain China and Beijing-supported revolutionary groups in South East Asia. This strategy was predicated on active British or American support for containment. SEATO and ANZAM provided the basis of New Zealand war planning and day-to-day operations in Asia respectively. With the British decision to withdraw from South East Asia and the American quagmire in Vietnam, New Zealand had to reassess its position in South East Asia as containment of China was no longer thought possible. The need for a containment strategy was based upon a conceptualisation of China as a growing and hostile power. This view saw China as eventually developing the means to dominate South East Asia and threaten Australasia directly as Japan had done in 1942. This perception of China changed with the emergence of the Cultural Revolution. New Zealand officials watched from Hong Kong as violence and mass political disorder challenged established sources of authority. They took the view that Mao was in direct command of the revolution and was placing limits on it. The revolution destroyed the notion that China was a growing power bent on external expansion. As Mao moved to dampen the revolution, Beijing moved to re-establish its foreign policy and improve its links with the outside world. Both the means and ends of New Zealand’s grand strategy changed at the same time. New Zealand and its great power allies abandoned the containment project just as views on China shifted. From the end of the 1960s, New Zealand’s Forward Defence efforts ceased to be focused on the containment of China and moved to achieving much more limited goals. New security arrangements were developed to replace the AMDA, ANZAM, and SEATO pacts. The Five Power Defence Arrangements would provide the basis of New Zealand’s defence commitment to South East Asia with only limited assistance from Britain and without China as a significant threat. It is in this context that New Zealand made the decision to recognise China. New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake long maintained the view that the PRC should enter the United Nations and be recognised by New Zealand, provided the position of Taiwan was preserved. Once the effort to keep Taiwan in the UN was lost, New Zealand moved slowly toward recognition. However, it would take the election of the Third Labour Government for recognition to occur. This move was part of an international trend towards official relations with Beijing, but for New Zealand, the shift was greater as Wellington had moved from seeing China as a growing military threat to a state with which New Zealand could have an official dialogue.</p>

Actually or Potentially Within Reach: The Place of China in New Zealand’s Grand Strategy 1965-1972

<p>In 1965 New Zealand was an active member of alliances designed to contain the People’s Republic of China in South East Asia. Late the previous year, the Defence Council had warned Cabinet that New Zealand could be at war with China and/or Indonesia in six months. Less than seven years later New Zealand recognised China, as Britain and the US military presences were exiting from South East Asia. These events bookend a radical reshaping of New Zealand’s defence policies and its attitude towards China. The existing scholarship on New Zealand’s Cold War defence policies has underemphasised the role of China in New Zealand’s grand strategy and the scholarship on Sino-New Zealand relations has also largely ignored defence policy. This thesis uses recently released files from the Ministry of Defence to provide new insight into the construction of China as a threat during the mid-1960s and the challenges faced in meeting that perceived threat. New Zealand’s Forward Defence policy was one designed to contain China and Beijing-supported revolutionary groups in South East Asia. This strategy was predicated on active British or American support for containment. SEATO and ANZAM provided the basis of New Zealand war planning and day-to-day operations in Asia respectively. With the British decision to withdraw from South East Asia and the American quagmire in Vietnam, New Zealand had to reassess its position in South East Asia as containment of China was no longer thought possible. The need for a containment strategy was based upon a conceptualisation of China as a growing and hostile power. This view saw China as eventually developing the means to dominate South East Asia and threaten Australasia directly as Japan had done in 1942. This perception of China changed with the emergence of the Cultural Revolution. New Zealand officials watched from Hong Kong as violence and mass political disorder challenged established sources of authority. They took the view that Mao was in direct command of the revolution and was placing limits on it. The revolution destroyed the notion that China was a growing power bent on external expansion. As Mao moved to dampen the revolution, Beijing moved to re-establish its foreign policy and improve its links with the outside world. Both the means and ends of New Zealand’s grand strategy changed at the same time. New Zealand and its great power allies abandoned the containment project just as views on China shifted. From the end of the 1960s, New Zealand’s Forward Defence efforts ceased to be focused on the containment of China and moved to achieving much more limited goals. New security arrangements were developed to replace the AMDA, ANZAM, and SEATO pacts. The Five Power Defence Arrangements would provide the basis of New Zealand’s defence commitment to South East Asia with only limited assistance from Britain and without China as a significant threat. It is in this context that New Zealand made the decision to recognise China. New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake long maintained the view that the PRC should enter the United Nations and be recognised by New Zealand, provided the position of Taiwan was preserved. Once the effort to keep Taiwan in the UN was lost, New Zealand moved slowly toward recognition. However, it would take the election of the Third Labour Government for recognition to occur. This move was part of an international trend towards official relations with Beijing, but for New Zealand, the shift was greater as Wellington had moved from seeing China as a growing military threat to a state with which New Zealand could have an official dialogue.</p>

Towards American Dependence: New Zealand's Developing Politico-Military Relations with the United States of America, 1919-1942

<p>The purpose of this study is to describe and explain a crucial transition in New Zealand's defence policy the outcome of which was that, instead of relying on the United Kingdom (and in particular the Royal Navy) for her Pacific security, New Zealand began to rely on the military and naval power of the United States in the Western Pacific. The study therefore focuses on New Zealand's developing politico-military relations with the United States in the context of the informal and then formal Anglo-American alliance between 1919 and 1942. There are three parts. The first investigates the events which led up to New Zealand's abrupt reorientation in 1940 from relying on Britain for her Pacific security to relying on the United States. In the course of this, British and American defence planning and co-operation for a possible war in the Pacific between 1919 and 1939 are examined in some detail. The second part deals with New Zealand's efforts to secure an American naval shield in the course of British and American negotiations to develop a combined British-Dutch-American defence against Japan between 1940 and 1942. The final part goes into the reasons for the change of defence policy and concludes that: 1. The fundamental cause was the British failure in 1919 and the immediately following years to challenge Japan for naval supremacy in the Western Pacific by establishing a Far Eastern Fleet. It was a consequence of this that in June 1940 Britain tried to get the United States to assume a major strategic responsibility in the Western Pacific by undertaking to dispatch an American fleet to Singapore if Japan joined in the war whch had already broken out with Germany and Italy. 2. Australia and New Zealand, accepting the British grand strategy, prepared their local defences between October 1940 and March 1941 on the assumption that America would keep in step and send a fleet to Singapore. 3. Despite the failure of Britain's grand strategy between June 1940 and March 1941, America did assume strategic responsibility, particularly for the naval defence of New Zealand, in March 1941. In turn New Zealand, unlike Britain and Australia, consistently tried to meet the American point of view regarding a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. This was part of her continuing effort to secure an American naval shield in the event of war with Japan. 4. Britain and America were unable to agree on a combined British-Dutch-American defence plan before Japan entered the war in December 1941. This delayed the final realization of New Zealand's goal, pursued since October 1940, of gaining an American naval shield. The establishment of the ANZAC unified Pacific command area in February 1942 saw this goal at long last attained.</p>

The Defence of New Zealand: the Formulation of Defence Policy in New Zealand

<p>The research examines the processes by which defence policy has been formed in New Zealand and draws links between structure, process and outcome. The structure of the unified Ministry of Defence as it operated between 1970 and 1989 is examined in detail as are the processes by which declaratory policy is formulated and finance allocated to support policy. The effect of restructuring of the central Ministry (to separate the predominantly civilian 'policy setting' area from the uniformed 'operational' area) in 1990 is considered and the conclusion is drawn that types of outcomes will not change significantly as a result of the restructuring. As part of the research, case studies from a range of issue areas are examined. The broad issue areas used are: policy formulation in times of change, the operational use of the armed forces and equipment procurement. Case studies include the events leading up to the effective demise of ANZUS, the maintenance of troops in South East Asia, decisions to deploy troops in support of foreign policy goals and a variety of equipment decisions. Declared policy and financial allocations to support declared policy are considered side by side with the outcomes revealed by the case studies. The thesis concludes that the defence policy formulation process is flawed because of the structure of the organisation and the closed nature of the process. The organisation is overly hierarchical with too many decision levels and has not completely adapted to the changing roles which have been required by differing definitions of defence policy. A number of methods of improving processes are suggested.</p>

Towards American Dependence: New Zealand's Developing Politico-Military Relations with the United States of America, 1919-1942

<p>The purpose of this study is to describe and explain a crucial transition in New Zealand's defence policy the outcome of which was that, instead of relying on the United Kingdom (and in particular the Royal Navy) for her Pacific security, New Zealand began to rely on the military and naval power of the United States in the Western Pacific. The study therefore focuses on New Zealand's developing politico-military relations with the United States in the context of the informal and then formal Anglo-American alliance between 1919 and 1942. There are three parts. The first investigates the events which led up to New Zealand's abrupt reorientation in 1940 from relying on Britain for her Pacific security to relying on the United States. In the course of this, British and American defence planning and co-operation for a possible war in the Pacific between 1919 and 1939 are examined in some detail. The second part deals with New Zealand's efforts to secure an American naval shield in the course of British and American negotiations to develop a combined British-Dutch-American defence against Japan between 1940 and 1942. The final part goes into the reasons for the change of defence policy and concludes that: 1. The fundamental cause was the British failure in 1919 and the immediately following years to challenge Japan for naval supremacy in the Western Pacific by establishing a Far Eastern Fleet. It was a consequence of this that in June 1940 Britain tried to get the United States to assume a major strategic responsibility in the Western Pacific by undertaking to dispatch an American fleet to Singapore if Japan joined in the war whch had already broken out with Germany and Italy. 2. Australia and New Zealand, accepting the British grand strategy, prepared their local defences between October 1940 and March 1941 on the assumption that America would keep in step and send a fleet to Singapore. 3. Despite the failure of Britain's grand strategy between June 1940 and March 1941, America did assume strategic responsibility, particularly for the naval defence of New Zealand, in March 1941. In turn New Zealand, unlike Britain and Australia, consistently tried to meet the American point of view regarding a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. This was part of her continuing effort to secure an American naval shield in the event of war with Japan. 4. Britain and America were unable to agree on a combined British-Dutch-American defence plan before Japan entered the war in December 1941. This delayed the final realization of New Zealand's goal, pursued since October 1940, of gaining an American naval shield. The establishment of the ANZAC unified Pacific command area in February 1942 saw this goal at long last attained.</p>