Special legislative procedure in EU law: areas of regulation and specifics of interinstitutional cooperation

The article is devoted to the issue of cooperation between the institutions of the European Union in the process of adopting legal acts within the framework of a special legislative procedure. Authors analyzed the scope of application of special legislative procedure and ordinary legislative procedure in the EU. It was revealed that the adoption of acts in accordance with one or another type of legislative procedure reflects the dual nature of the European Union, which contains both supranational and interstate principles of legal regulation of various spheres of public relations. The main types of special legislative procedure (consultation, approval) are considered, within the framework of which, in practice, there is intense inter-institutional interaction in the process of developing the final text of the draft act, including through informal consultations and other procedures not directly enshrined in the EU primary law. Although the Council continues to dominate in most cases of the use of special legislative procedure, Parliament nevertheless has relatively wide opportunities to influence the position of the Council. De facto, the expansion of the Parliaments powers within the framework of a special legislative procedure is facilitated by both the position of the EU Court, expressed in a number of decisions on specific cases, and the increased degree of Parliaments influence on the activities of the Commission (which, as a general rule, has the right to initiate legislation), enshrined in the provisions of the constituent agreements.

Time is of the essence: Explaining the duration of European Union lawmaking under the co-decision procedure

The article explores factors affecting the duration of the co-decision procedure (currently the ordinary legislative procedure), the main procedure for adopting legislation in the European Union. Drawing from rational choice institutionalism, it expects the speed of co-decision to be determined by three attributes: the impatience of legislators, issue linkage and the characteristics of Council and European Parliament negotiators ( relais actors). The hypotheses are tested using survival analysis on a dataset of 599 controversial legislative acts submitted and enacted under co-decision between 1999 and 2009. The results show that co-decision proposals are decided faster when they are urgent, negotiated prior to the European Parliament elections and concluded through single proposal logrolls. By contrast, multi-proposal packages and the ideological distance between relais actors prolong decision-making. Overall, the article contributes to the literature by showing that the impatience of legislators, package deals and the properties of negotiators are relevant drivers of co-decision duration.

For Farmers or the Environment? The European Parliament in the 2013 CAP Reform

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was the last policy field to be placed under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure and its 2013 reform was the first to be decided under this rule. This article analyses how rule changes following the Lisbon Treaty have shaped policy outcomes related to ‘greening,’ i.e., making agricultural policy more environmentally friendly. Measuring the policy ambitions of amendments during the different phases of the legislative process (the processing phase within the Parliament and the negotiating phase during trilogues), we find that the European Parliament weakened the Commission’s greening proposals—but did so to support an alternative greening agenda built on different policy instruments. This means that rule change has altered the power balance between the institutions, making the Commission more dependent on the European Parliament. In the 2013 reform, this new balance of power came at the cost of greening the CAP.

“Acting in Accordance with the Ordinary Legislative Procedure…”: Metadiscourse in EU Regulations on Immigration

The ongoing Pan-European integration process has profoundly influenced the nature of European law and its development, demanding a review of “the ways of how language […] is materialized” (Gibová, 2009, p. 192). EU multilingualism is thus becoming an intricate concept since “EU translation is […] becoming the language of Europe” (Gibová, 2009, p. 192) encompassing a supranational view of the world conveyed in EU-wide legislation. Very much in line with this assumption, and taking into account the teaching experience in Specialised Translation Masters’ courses training would-be professional translators, this study examines a corpus of European Parliament Regulations on immigration. In order to understand whether dissimilarities and/or congruencies occur between the EU working language, i.e., English, and the Italian versions, the metadiscourse framework by Hyland (2005), comprising both interactive and interactional features, is used as the point of departure for the analysis of parallel texts. The Regulations produced by EU institutions and conveyed and transmitted both in English as a “procedural language” (Wagner, Bech, & Martίnez, 2012) as well as in Italian have been scrutinized both quantitatively and qualitatively, in order to draw precious pedagogical implications for translation studies and professional practice for future qualified and trained translators.

Energy Transition in the European Union and its Member States: Interpreting Federal Competence Allocation in the Light of the Paris Agreement

Energy transition in the European Union (EU) and its Member States involves questions of federalism, which are subject to various perspectives. The distribution of powers cannot be properly understood using classical legal methodology alone because Articles 192 to 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contain too many ambiguous political compromises. On the one hand, Article 192(1) TFEU (on the environment) and Article 194(1) and (2)(1) TFEU (on energy) enable EU legislation on energy transition through the ordinary legislative procedure, including majority voting in the European Parliament and the Council. On the other hand, there are significant textual limits for EU action in neighbouring provisions with a ‘sovereignty exception’ for the Member States in both Article 192(2) and Article 194(2)(2) TFEU. This article argues that, in the light of the Paris Agreement, the allocation of competences between the EU and its Member States should, in case of doubt, be understood in such a way that effective climate protection becomes possible. Because under Article 191(1) TFEU the EU is to promote measures at the international level to combat climate change, such an international law-friendly interpretation is part of a legitimate teleological approach. Economic theories of federalism and innovation research in the social sciences help us to understand which aspects of economic or innovation theory can promote effectiveness in this respect. It is necessary to interpret the distribution of competences in a dynamic way, thereby slightly shifting the limits of interpretation.

The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in a Post-Brexit EU: The Case of Social Europe

This article assesses the political and power dynamics of the Ordinarily Legislative Procedure (OLP) in social Europe and the likely impact of the UK’s departure in the field for future integration. It provides a detailed analysis of the OLP in social Europe during two recent periods of integration in the field—the first Barroso Commission (2004–2009) and the Juncker Commission (2014–2019). It finds the dynamics of the OLP have shifted from intergovernmental deadlock during the Barroso Commission to the characteristics of a new intergovernmental core state power during the Juncker Commission, even though the policy area is not a core state power <em>per se</em>. Despite the use of qualified majority voting policy agreements can only be achieved when there is near unanimity support in the Council, the Commission remains a neutral broker, and the Parliament shifts its position to that of the Council. As a result, continued opposition to integration in social Europe by Northern and Eastern Members means the removal of UK political agency will have only a marginal impact on the slow and piecemeal approach to integration in the field.

2. Union Legislation

This chapter examines how the European Union institutions cooperate in the creation of European legislation. Unlike many national legal orders, the EU Treaties expressly distinguish two types of legislative procedures: an ordinary legislative procedure and special legislative procedures. According to the ordinary legislative procedure, the European Parliament and the Council act as co-legislators with symmetric procedural rights. European legislation is here seen as the product of a ‘joint adoption’ by both institutions. Meanwhile, the defining characteristic of the special legislative procedures is that they abandon the institutional equality between the Parliament and the Council. The chapter then looks at the principle of subsidiarity—an EU constitutional principle that was designed to prevent the EU legislator from exercising its competences where the Member States would be able to achieve the desirable social aim themselves. It also considers the procedure for the conclusion of international agreements.