scholarly journals Optimal pricing and complex analysis with carbon emission reduction preference in an apparel supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Zongxian Wang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Complex Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Global Bifurcation ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Better Than

Abstract In this paper, we study the supply chain competition models that consider consumers' low-carbon consumption preferences. By constructing the supply chain of manufacturers and retailers with different market positions, two game types, decentralized decision making and centralized decision making are proposed, and the static and dynamic game methods are combined respectively for research. Although research has found that centralized decision making is always better than decentralized decision making under the static game mode, when considering the long-term dynamic evolutionary game, the average profit of decentralized decision making may be better than the average profit of centralized decision making. Moreover, there are complex dynamic characteristics under dynamic games. In order to fully understand the nature of the dynamic game systems, we discussed the stability, local bifurcation, and global bifurcation of these dynamic systems. It is found that although dynamic game systems may lose stability with changes in parameters, they are better than static game results in some cases, this is beneficial to decision-makers and has practical management significance.

Advertising cooperation of dual-channel low-carbon supply chain based on cost-sharing

Kybernetes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1169-1195
Author(s):  
Chao Yu ◽  
Chuanxu Wang ◽  
Suyong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Influence Coefficient ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Product ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Advertising Effort

Purpose This paper aims to analyze the impact of the cost coefficient of product emission reduction, coefficient of low-carbon product advertising effort cost, and sharing ratio of low-carbon product advertising effort cost on the profit of a dual-channel supply chain. After determining the best model and relevant influencing factors, the paper puts forward corresponding management inspirations and suggestions. Design/methodology/approach The paper opts for an exploratory study using Stackelberg game theory to construct a centralized decision-making (MC mode), a low carbon product advertising effort cost free sharing decentralized decision-making (SD model) and a low carbon product advertising effort cost sharing decentralized decision-making (JD model) game model. Through using optimization methods to get the equilibrium solution, the relevant management suggestions are obtained by comparison analysis. Findings The paper shows that the JD model is better than the SD model in terms of the profits of the manufacturer, retailer and supply chain, and the improvement of Pareto is realized. The proportion of cost sharing of low carbon product advertising effort is positively related to the wholesale price and direct influence coefficient of low carbon product advertising effort on channel, while negatively related to the retail price and the cross influence coefficient of low carbon product advertising effort on alternative channels. Under the JD model, the manufacturer can reduce advertising costs through improving the efficiency and pertinence of direct channel advertising and urging the retailer to do a better job in sales management to improve gross margin and require the retailer to increase advertising efficiency and pertinence of retail channel to reduce advertising costs of retail channel and other ways to increase their profits. The retailer can make use of its advantages closer with consumers to improve the efficiency and pertinence of advertising in the retail channel to raise the influence coefficient of advertising and reduce the advertising cost in the retail channel. Originality/value The innovations of this paper are listed as follows: First, it has considered advertising investment from both the manufacturer and the retailer simultaneously. Second, it has considered a low-carbon background to investigate cooperative advertising decision for low-carbon products. Third, it has considered the decision on the level of product emission reduction and the level of low-carbon product advertising effort investment simultaneously.

scholarly journals Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Bingquan Liu ◽  
Xuran Chang ◽  
Boyang Nie ◽  
Yue Wang ◽  
Lingqi Meng
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

As carbon emissions are increasing due to the development of economy, low-carbon supply chain plays an important role in carbon emissions reduction and the dual-channel supply chain has become a hit because online shopping is developing rapidly. Therefore, this paper builds a Stackelberg game model led by the manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain to examine the reaction of the government under centralized or decentralized decisions-making structures with different low-carbon strategies. The result shows that the government can achieve higher profits by taking incentive or punitive measures for centralized decision-making supply chain no matter they invest in emissions reduction or not. Moreover, for decentralized decision-making mode, increasing low-carbon subsidies for retailers can achieve a win-win result between the supply chain and the government; and, finally, channel competition is good for improving the supply chain and social benefits. Therefore, the government is responsible for taking reasonable subsidy policies, formulate industry’s low-carbon standards, and properly guide competition between supply chain members to achieve higher profits.

scholarly journals Supply-Chain Pricing and Coordination for New Energy Vehicles Considering Heterogeneity in Consumers’ Low Carbon Preference

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bengang Gong ◽  
Xuan Xia ◽  
Jinshi Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Green Consumers ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
The Impact ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

Given consumers’ willingness to pay different prices for new energy vehicles (NEVs) and traditional vehicles, we construct a utility model of ordinary and green consumers. We establish pricing game models for centralized and decentralized decisions in an NEV’s supply chain in order to study the impact of changes in consumers’ low carbon preference heterogeneity on supply chain pricing and member profit. The results show that consumers’ low carbon preferences and the ratio of green consumers increases with the ex-factory and selling prices of NEVs. An increase in the percentage of green consumers under centralized decision-making will reduce the total profit of the supply chain. Manufacturers’ profits under decentralized decision-making are greater than the dealers’ profits, and the sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision-making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision-making. We design a revenue-sharing contract to eliminate the double marginal effect.

Network effect in shared supply chain platform value co-creation behavior in evolutionary game1

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Zou Xiaohong ◽  
Chen Jinlong ◽  
Gao Shuanping
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Network Effect ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
The Cost

The shared supply chain model has provided new ideas for solving contradictions between supply and demand for large-scale standardized production by manufacturers and personalized demands of consumers. On the basis of a platform network effect perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of value co-creation behavior for a shared supply chain platform and manufacturers, analyzes their evolutionary stable strategies, and uses numerical simulation analysis to further verify the model. The results revealed that the boundary condition for manufacturers to participate in value co-creation on a shared supply chain platform is that the net production cost of the manufacturers’ participation in the platform value co-creation must be less than that of nonparticipation. In addition, the boundary condition for the shared supply chain platform to actively participate in value co-creation is that the cost of the shared supply chain platform for active participation in value co-creation must be less than that of passive participation. Moreover, value co-creation behavior on the shared supply chain platform is a dynamic game interaction process between players with different benefit perceptions. Finally, the costs and benefits generated by the network effect can affect value co-creation on shared supply chain platforms.

Operation decision of logistics service supply chain: considering interruption probability in emergencies

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangsheng Zhang ◽  
Xiao Wang ◽  
Zhiqing Meng ◽  
Qirui Zhang ◽  
Kexin Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Social Reputation ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

PurposeTo remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approachRegarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.FindingsThe results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/valueFirst, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

scholarly journals Financing and pricing strategies of construction supply chain under capital constraint

2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09004
Author(s):  
Yuxin Wen ◽  
Linyi Wu ◽  
Fengmin Yao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Distribution Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Internal Financing ◽  
Decision Making Model

Affected by factors such as cost, the financial constraints faced by the supply chain are becoming more and more severe. This paper constructs a financing and pricing decision-making model for the construction supply chain under capital constraints, and uses Stackelberg game theory to analyze and obtain the best financing and pricing strategy for the construction supply chain under the internal and external financing modes. The study found that when centralized decision-making is adopted, there is a profit distribution model that makes the profits obtained by construction developers and contractors greater than the profits obtained in decentralized decision-making; the internal financing model of the construction supply chain is better than external financing, and can enable the construction supply chain get higher profits.

scholarly journals Capacity Allocation and Compensation in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Uncertain Environment

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Jiaquan Yang ◽  
Xumei Zhang ◽  
Yating Huang ◽  
Jiafu Su ◽  
Sang-Bing Tsai ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Direct Selling ◽  
Channel Conflict ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Capacity Uncertainty ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

The dual-channel supply chain is widely adopted by main manufacturers, potentially incurring channel conflicts between the traditional retail channel which is owned by the independent retailer and the online channel which is directly managed by the manufacturer. The purpose of this paper is to deal with the scenario where channel conflicts may arise under production capacity uncertainty, when the manufacturer tends to privilege the direct selling channel over the retail selling channel. To achieve the goal, this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, studies the scenario where the manufacturer satisfies the direct selling channel first in the presence of capacity uncertainty, employs the decision optimization and the backward induction method to find the optimal inventory decision in the direct selling channel and the optimal order quantity decision making in the retail selling channel, and designs a compensation mechanism aiming to coordinate the channel conflict in the decentralized decision-making process. Results show that the optimal decisions aiming to maximize the expected profit of each supply chain member are not able to maximize the expected profit of entire dual-channel supply chain. However, when the manufacturer compensates the retailer’s profit loss based on the unsatisfied order and, in the meantime, adjusts the wholesale price to prevent the retailer which obtains the compensation from increasing order significantly, the compensation mechanism can coordinate the decision of each supply chain member, mitigate the channel conflict, maximize the expected profit of entire dual-channel supply chain, and achieve the Pareto improvement of supply chain members’ expected profit in the decentralized decision-making process.

scholarly journals Diverse Schemes of Cost Pooling for Carbon- Reduction Outsourcing in Low-Carbon Supply Chains

Energies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 3013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinpeng Wang ◽  
Longfei He ◽  
Daozhi Zhao ◽  
Michele Lundy
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Efficiency ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Reduction ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
External Expert ◽  
Reduction Efficiency ◽  
Important Means ◽  
Better Than

Among responses to governmental regulations for curbing carbon emissions, outsourcing carbon reduction to a specialized third-party is an important means to satisfy a variety of carbon-emission restraints. In this situation, however, designing efficient contracts for emission reducing while retaining appropriate supply-chain profit is a substantial but challenging problem. We therefore refine this from practice and consider a low-carbon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to analyze in which conditions the system should outsource its carbon reduction efforts to an external expert firm under the assumption that consumers with a sense of social responsibility prefer low carbon products. In the decarbonization expert firm embedded supply chain, we examine the respective impacts of three cost-pooling schemes for emission reduction on supply chain performances. We find that the manufacturer-undertaking contract is the worst in terms of profit and carbon reduction level among the contracts being studied, while the retailer-undertaking contract yields the best outcome in terms of the profit and performs well in carbon reduction when the contractor has cost efficiency in carbon reduction, which is even better than the joint-undertaking contract in carbon reduction when the contractor is inefficient. The study shows the diversity of contracts on outsourcing carbon reduction significantly impacts the supply chain profitability, carbon reduction efficiency and sustainability of operations.

scholarly journals The More Supply Chain Control Power, the Better? A Comparison among Four Kinds of Cooperation Models

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Liu ◽  
Shuqing Wang ◽  
Donglei Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
The Other ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Optimal Value ◽  
Total Profit

This paper introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into existing supply chain coordination models and explores the impacts of control power on the profits of manufacturer, retailer, and the overall supply chain under four modes of decision-making, including the decentralized decision-making dominated by manufacturer, the decentralized decision-making dominated by retailer, centralized decision-making, and Nash negotiation decision-making. Some significant conclusions are obtained. Firstly, supply chain control power does have great impact on the supply chain profits. The profit of the whole supply chain with centralized decision-making is higher than those of the other three modes, while the overall profit of supply chain with decentralized decision-making is superior to the profit when retailer and manufacturer dominate the supply chain together. Secondly, with decentralized decision-making, for manufacturer and retailer, it is beneficial to gain the control powers of the supply chain; however, control power has an optimal value, not the bigger, the better. Thirdly, under certain circumstances, order quantity will increase and the wholesale price will decrease when control power is transferred from manufacturer to retailer. In this case, the total profit of supply chain dominated by retailer will be greater than that dominated by manufacturer.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document