A Game Theoretic Analysis of Cryptocurrency Market for Sustainable Development of Smart Cities

Cryptocurrency was first began to use in 2009 and features technology such as blockchain that is used in the development of smart cities. Game theory play an important role when designing secure economic system such as Bitcoin. In this paper, we study a dynamic game model of brand advertising in continuous time with the finite time horizon. The total payoff or profit of players or firms is discounted over time and the rate at which the firms attract the customers from its rival, called attraction rate, is taken from the economic theory of contest. As a novelty of our game model, the attraction rate of a firm depends on both: player’s or firm’s advertising effort and the advertising effort of players or firm’s rivalry. We solve the game for Stackelberg equilibrium (with the leader and follower differing by information and/or the sequence of choosing strategies) as well as for Nash equilibrium. Further, we graphically compare the results obtained for the Stackelberg and the Nash equilibrium. Surprisingly, we have obtained that if the revenue per unit of market share is equal for Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium then the results for Nash player 1 overlaps with the leader and the results for Nash player 2 overlaps with follower. Finally, we present the application of our dynamic game model in the cryptocurrency market where two firms compete with each other for the cryptocurrency market share.

Implications of Advertising Lag on the Dynamic Optimal Decisions in an O2O Supply Chain

The advertising lag effect and the reference quality effect are intrinsic properties of the market that influence supply chain performance. In this paper, we use the differential game theory considering the above two effects under an O2O (online to offline) environment. We investigate how these two effects impact supply chain performance. By the extended maximum principle, the optimal analytical solutions of the decision variables in two different game scenarios are obtained, i.e., with and without advertising cooperation. We conclude that the optimal wholesale price (advertising effort level, product quality level, and retail price) increases or decreases exponentially to its steady state, which depends on whether the initial goodwill is lower than the static goodwill or not. The analysis shows that the advertising lag effect has a negative impact on the supply chain, while the reference quality effect is positive. The vertical advertising cooperation strategy is effective in facilitating the channel performance. From a comparison analysis, we obtain that the manufacturer concentrates more effort on quality improvement if the advertising lag time is larger or if consumers are more sensitive to quality, and the manufacturer pays more attention to advertising relative to quality improvements with a higher advertising cost sharing ratio.

Inter-organizational contract control of advertising strategies in the supply chain

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Advertising has a crucial impact on a product's goodwill. To further improve a product's goodwill and make more profit, member firms in the supply chain use various contracts to coordinate the channel. Considering the dynamic effect of advertising, this paper studies a two-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The two members focus on maximizing their profits through advertising and pricing strategies under two types of contracts: the wholesale price contract and the consignment contract. The Stackelberg differential game is introduced, and the optimal advertising effort, wholesale and retail pricing strategies in the two situations are studied. Numerical examples and sensitivity analyses are conducted to explore the models further. The results show that the retailer's revenue proportion and the product's goodwill according to consumers significantly affect the strategies and the contract choice of the partner firms in the supply chain. A proportion of too high or too low revenue may lead to a contract selection conflict between the two partner firms. However, when consumers care more about the product's goodwill, this contract selection conflict can be weakened.</p>

Product bundling and advertising strategy for a duopoly supply chain: a power-balance perspective

The paper studies product bundling in a duopoly supply chain network under the influence of different power-balance structures, bundling decisions and advertising efforts on total supply chain profit. Mathematical models comprising two manufacturers and a single retailer are developed to capture the impact of bundling policy and advertisement strategy under three power-balance structures, namely Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash. Following game theory models and numerical examples, the study found that the total profit of the supply chain is undifferentiated under the manufacturer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash case in the manufacturer bundling and retailer bundling strategies. However, total supply chain profit under manufacturer bundling strongly dominates under retailer bundling in Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash, and remains valid under multiple settings of market size, price elasticity and advertising elasticity. It is also found that manufacturer bundling is significantly affected by advertising effort compared to retailer bundling. The study contributes to the literature interfacing supply chain and marketing by studying bundling policy and advertising strategy simultaneously for homogenous products, under various power-balance structures and price competition.

REPRESENTASI WANITA SEBELUM DAN SESUDAH GERAKAN FEMVERTISING DALAM IKLAN PERAWATAN TUBUH

Representasi gender dalam iklan adalah bentuk manifestasi budaya dari siklus ideologi dalam masyarakat. Sejauh ini, keberadaan iklan telah terbukti menjadi media yang berpengaruh terhadap penggunaan bahasa, gambar dan kontruksi representasi untuk meyakinkan audiens dengan membentuk realitas dalam mempengaruhi keputusan pembelian. Beberapa tahun terakhir, istilah femvertising muncul sebagai upaya periklanan untuk menarik konsumen wanita. Secara visual maupun retoris, pesan-pesan iklan yang dibingkai dalam femvertising mempromosikan kesetaraan gender dan hak-hak wanita. Gerakan Feminisme gelombang ketiga yang berkembang saat ini, menciptakan perspektif baru milenial feminis dengan menganggap bahwa feminisme adalah bentuk kebebasan memilih dalam semua aspek kehidupan, baik kesehatan, karier, pernikahan hingga selera pribadi dalam penampilan. Membandingkan iklan dari tahun 1980-an dan 1990-an dengan iklan yang diterbitkan 5 tahun terakhir ini, akan menyajikan konteks tentang bagaimana pergeseran sosial mempengaruhi kontruksi iklan dan persepsi konsumen terhadap merek. Melalui analisis visual kualitatif, studi ini akan mengindentifikasi bagaimana kampanye iklan dikontruksi sebelum dan sesudah gerakan femvertising melalui pesan feminisme demi membangun ketertartarikan audiens perempuan. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa iklan-iklan perawatan tubuh sering menampilkan isu yang serupa, yaitu tentang nilai-nilai kepribadian dan kecantikan. Pergeseran nilai kecantikan dan kepribadian dalam domain yang lebih luas telah menyokong perubahan perspektif sosial terhadap perempuan menuju kesadaran feminisme.Gender representation in advertising is a form of cultural manifestation of an ideological cycle in society. So far, the existence of advertisements has proved to be a media that affects the use of language, images and representation in order to convince the audience by shaping reality in influencing purchasing decisions. In recent years, the term femvertising emerged as an advertising effort to attract female consumers. Visually or rhetorically, the ad messages framed in a femvertising promote gender equality and women's rights. The third Wave feminism movement that develops today, creates a new perspective of feminist millennials by assuming that feminism is a form of freedom of choosing in all aspects of life, whether health, career, marriage to personal tastes in appearance. Comparing ads from the 1980's and 1990's with ads published in the last 5 years, will present a context on how social shifts affect ad construction and consumer perception of the brand. Through qualitative visual analysis, this study will identify how the advertising campaign was constructed before and after the femvertising movement through feminism messages in order to build a female audience's alignment. The results of this study show that the advertising of body care often displays similar issues, namely about the values of personality and beauty. The shifting value of beauty and personality in the wider domain has supported the change of social perspective on women toward the consciousness of feminism.

Dynamic Evolution, Synchronization and Multistability in an Advertising Game Model with Homogeneous Products and Spillover Effect

Advertising competition among firms may give rise to very complex dynamical behaviors. In this article, under the assumption of spillover effects, a two-stage dynamical Cournot game of advertising competition between two firms, which produce homogeneous products, is developed. Then, the local stability of the equilibrium points is discussed, and stability conditions of the equilibrium points are obtained. In order to reveal the complex dynamical behaviors of the model, both analytical and numerical methods are employed. The research results show that the two coordinate axes and the diagonal of the system are invariant manifolds, and one can obtain the dynamical behaviors on the invariant manifolds by analyzing the Logistic map. In addition, it is found that the advertising efforts of these two firms may be synchronized, even if the system is in a chaotic state. Multistability is another topic of focus. It is found that not only two attractors but also three attractors can coexist in the phase space, and contact bifurcation can also occur during the evolution of the attracting basins. Finally, the impact of corporate advertising efforts on corporate profits is analyzed. It is found that too much advertising effort is harmful to the firms, and a firm with low adjustment speed can even earn more when the system is chaotic.

Modelling Subsidy as a Cooperative Advertising Channel Coordination Mechanism

This work considers the use of subsidy as channel coordination strategy in vertical cooperative advertising in which the manufacturer is the Stackelberg game leader and the retailer is the follower. While the retailer is directly involved in advertising, the manufacturer is indirectly involved through the provision of subsidy to aid the retailer in advertising the product. The work models the demand function using a multiplicative advertising-price-demand function, and obtains the players’ prices, the retail advertising effort, the manufacturer’s subsidy rate and the payoffs. The work observes that with increasing subsidy, the manufacturer’s price margin increases while that of the retailer reduces and eventual becomes zero with total subsidy. However, the manufacturer should not totally subsidise retail advertising since it would be counterproductive for him, while at the same time would lead to very large retail payoff. Thus with appropriate subsidy strategy, the prices and the payoffs, and eventually the entire channel can be coordinated. Keywords: Channel coordination, Vertical cooperative advertising, Stackelberg game, Advertising price-demand function, Subsidy rate.

Research on Advertising and Quality of Paid Apps, Considering the Effects of Reference Price and Goodwill

Considering users’ perceptions can help managers develop more accurate business strategies. Utilizing optimal control theory, this paper takes the reference price and goodwill of paid App as the state variables to analyze the paid App’s optimal product quality and the platform’s optimal advertising effort with the revenue-sharing contract in the decentralized and integrated systems, respectively. Results show that: (1) The higher the users’ loyalty, the higher the reference price, while for the users who lack loyalty, the impact of reference price can be ignored. (2) When the revenue-sharing rate is equal to or more than 2/3, the paid App is unwilling to bear any advertising costs for the platform. (3) We propose a bilateral subsidy agreement to coordinate the decentralized system smoothly and implement the optimal objective of the integrated system. (4) Importantly, under some mild conditions, we prove that the platform and paid App can both benefit from the agreement.