The Single Rulebook and the European Banking Authority

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valia Babis
Keyword(s):  
European Banking Authority ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Single Rulebook

scholarly journals Does the New European Banking Regulation discourage Earnings Management?

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Di Martino ◽  
Grazia Dicuonzo ◽  
Graziana Galeone ◽  
Vittorio Dell'Atti
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Minimum Capital ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Single Rulebook

In the recent past, the financial crisis has shown important lacks in the EU regulation relating to the banking sector, making the introduction of a unified regulatory framework necessary. Since June 2009 the European Council has recommended a “Single Rulebook”, that is a unique and harmonizing discipline applicable to all financial institutions in the Single Market, become effective on January 2014. This prudential discipline requires much more minimum capital, liquidity and information transparency and it defines format and minimum standards of contents.The aim of this research is to investigate the relation between the new mandatory disclosure and earnings management policies in banking sector realized through Loan Loss Provisions (LLP), the component of income statement mainly subject to manipulations, especially in form of earnings smoothing. Because the new integrated regulatory framework requires a more transparent disclosure, we expected that accruals manipulation (basically LLP) could be discouraged. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 116 listed European banks over the period prior (2011-2012-2013) and after (2014-2015-2016) the effective date of the Single Rulebook. The evidence confirm our hypothesis suggesting that this banking reform discourages earnings manipulation and improves earnings quality, making financial reporting more useful for investors. The results are important to the regulatory institutions (such as European Union and European Central Bank) supporting more stringent discipline introduced by Basel III.

scholarly journals The regulation of crypto-assets in the EU – investment and payment tokens under the radar

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-342
Author(s):  
Valeria Ferrari
Keyword(s):  
Eu Law ◽  
Electronic Money ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
European Institutions ◽  
European Banking Authority ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Payment Services ◽  
Legal Frameworks ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Regulatory Intervention

Based on the guidelines issued by the European Securities and Market Authority and by the European Banking Authority, the article deals with the legal qualification of blockchain-based crypto-assets under EU law. Focusing on crypto-assets that function as a) investment instruments (that is, investment tokens) and as b) electronic money (that is, payment tokens), the work outlines shortages and drawbacks in the applicability and enforcement of existing EU legal frameworks regulating investment activities and payment services. With such analysis, the article seeks to inform the ongoing debate within European institutions on the need of regulatory intervention in this area, and it points out pressing questions to be tackled by further research.

scholarly journals Multilevel regulatory governance: Establishing bank-regulator relationships at the European Banking Authority

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Coen ◽  
John-Paul Salter
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Multilevel System ◽  
Regulatory Governance ◽  
European Central ◽  
European Banking Authority ◽  
European Banking ◽  
New System ◽  
The Eu

AbstractFollowing the 2007–9 financial crisis, the EU strengthened its institutional apparatus for bank regulation, creating a trio of sectoral bodies, including the European Banking Authority (EBA). Various aspects of this new system have been studied, but to date, little is known about how banks engage with their new supranational regulator. We argue that such engagement fosters an interdependence between banks and regulators, thus contributing to the efficiency and robustness of the overall regulatory regime; but also that it is contingent on the regulator exhibiting the qualities of credibility, legitimacy, and transparency. These qualities are grounded in the domestic regulatory governance literature, but we suggest that they are rendered problematic by the complexities of the EU's multilevel system and, in particular, the overlap in competences between the EBA and the European Central Bank. We examine the EBA in the light of these criteria and find that banks’ engagement remains pitched towards established national regulators and the EU's legislative arena. This poses concerns for the efficacy of agency governance in the EU's regulatory regime for banking.

scholarly journals The European Banking Union: will it be Sufficient to Avert Another Debt Crisis in Europe?

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Alexander Spence
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crises ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
The Past ◽  
Single Resolution Mechanism ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Single Rulebook

<p>The rationales for the creation of the European Banking Union (“EBU”), what its objectives are and the main pillars of support for such a scheme, are worthy of investigation.  This article means to critically discuss the various elements of the EBU and determine whether the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, the main pillars underpinning the structure, are robust enough to avert another debt crisis in Europe. At the EBU’s heart lies the Single Rulebook (“SR”), which aims to counter the risk of fragmentation and nationalist tendencies. This inward looking trend became apparent in the recent financial crises, and contributed greatly to them. In an effort to avoid repeating the divisive and disjointed mistakes of the past, the SR is instead looking to provide unity and harmonisation across all participating member states. </p>

scholarly journals Stress Tests By The European Banking Authority: The Immunity Of Italian Cooperative Banks

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
pp. 873-886
Author(s):  
Andrea Quintiliani
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Stress Tests ◽  
Critical Elements ◽  
Risk Return ◽  
European Banking Authority ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Cooperative Banks ◽  
The Empirical Analysis ◽  
Quantitative Nature

Purpose. The objectives of the paper are two-fold. The first objective of the research is formulated with the intent to analyze the existence or not of a possible “European Banking Authority (EBA) effect” on the credit offer of local banks compared with national banks subject to the requests of capital from European Authority. The second research objective aims to understand what are the conditions that allow to develop a model of a local bank capable of supporting SMEs, with a suitable risk-return profile. Methodology. This paper presents an empirical comparative analysis between Cooperative Credit Banks (BCCs) and Italian banking groups. Findings. The empirical analysis shows how the financial then real crisis has not induced BCCs to restrict credit to firms. In particular, the BCCs not included in stress exercises, show, unlike national banks, a substantial “independence” of credit trend from the advices of the Authority. The survey evidences have however highlighted some critical elements that are reflected inevitably on the local bank’s risk-return profile. Research Limitations. The quantitative nature of the empirical analysis must be followed by a qualitative analysis in order to strengthen the validity of the results. Implications. This work will be useful to stimulate the debate on the studies of local banks and their anti-cyclic role in favor of the SMEs. Originality. The work affects an aspect which has hitherto been little studied.

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