scholarly journals Does the New European Banking Regulation discourage Earnings Management?

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Di Martino ◽  
Grazia Dicuonzo ◽  
Graziana Galeone ◽  
Vittorio Dell'Atti
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Minimum Capital ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Single Rulebook

In the recent past, the financial crisis has shown important lacks in the EU regulation relating to the banking sector, making the introduction of a unified regulatory framework necessary. Since June 2009 the European Council has recommended a “Single Rulebook”, that is a unique and harmonizing discipline applicable to all financial institutions in the Single Market, become effective on January 2014. This prudential discipline requires much more minimum capital, liquidity and information transparency and it defines format and minimum standards of contents.The aim of this research is to investigate the relation between the new mandatory disclosure and earnings management policies in banking sector realized through Loan Loss Provisions (LLP), the component of income statement mainly subject to manipulations, especially in form of earnings smoothing. Because the new integrated regulatory framework requires a more transparent disclosure, we expected that accruals manipulation (basically LLP) could be discouraged. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 116 listed European banks over the period prior (2011-2012-2013) and after (2014-2015-2016) the effective date of the Single Rulebook. The evidence confirm our hypothesis suggesting that this banking reform discourages earnings manipulation and improves earnings quality, making financial reporting more useful for investors. The results are important to the regulatory institutions (such as European Union and European Central Bank) supporting more stringent discipline introduced by Basel III.

Earnings management and equity incentives: evidence from the European banking industry

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Alhadab ◽  
Bassam Al-Own
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
European Banking ◽  
European Banks

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of equity incentives on earnings management that occurs via the use of loan loss provisions by using a sample of 204 bank-year observations over the period 2006-2011. Design/methodology/approach The authors use the data of 39 European banks to test the main hypothesis. Several valuation models and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for executives’ compensation and the determinant factors of loan loss provisions. Findings The empirical results reveal that earnings management that occurs via discretionary loan loss provisions is associated with equity incentives in the banking industry. In particular, European banks’ executives with high equity incentives are found to manage reported earnings upwards by reducing loan loss provisions. The results therefore show that income-increasing earnings management via discretionary loan loss provisions is widely practised by the executives of European banks and that this is partly motivated by executives’ compensation. Practical implications The findings of this paper present important implications for regulators in the European Union, who should take further steps to reform the regulatory environment to monitor and mitigate the earnings management practices that occur via the manipulation of loan loss provisions. Earnings management practices do not just negatively affect subsequent performance but are also found to lead to firms’ failure. Thus, regulators should take the necessary reforms to protect the wealth of stakeholders (investors, creditors, etc.). Originality/value This study provides the first evidence on the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the European banking industry. The study sheds more light on an issue of great interest to a broad audience that does not receive much attention in the prior research, thus opening new avenues for future research.

Earnings management and evolution of the banking regulation

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 150-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarra Hamza Elleuch ◽  
Nelia Boulila Taktak
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Mixed Model ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Qualitative Approaches ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Imf

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the earnings management practices of Tunisian banks after the publication of the first International Monetary Fund (IMF) report (2002) over the period 1998-2007. Design/methodology/approach – The study relies on a mixed model that combines both the quantitative and qualitative approaches. First of all, we use the quantitative method to measure the discretionary loan loss provisions based on the model of Cornett et al. (2009), and then we validate the quantitative findings by using the interview approach. Findings – Since 2005, Tunisian banks have resorted less and less to accounting earnings management through the loan loss provisions, but conversely, real earnings management has been revealed instead by the sale of investment securities and the use of debt collection agencies. Despite the IMF recommendations, Tunisian banks continue to manage their earnings by changing only their strategies. Practical implications – The findings of this study show that the regulation cannot avoid earnings management. Even if the regulation limits the discretion of the manager, the latter finds new alternatives to manipulate the earnings. Originality/value – This is the first study that analyses the impact of the IMF recommendations on earnings management in an emerging economy.

The determinants of bank profitability: empirical evidence from European banking sector

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa Menicucci ◽  
Guido Paolucci
Keyword(s):  
Banking Sector ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Bank Profitability ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
European Banking ◽  
European Banks

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between bank-specific characteristics and profitability in European banking sector to find the role of internal factors in achieving high profitability. Design/methodology/approach A regression analysis is built on an unbalanced panel data set comprising 175 observations of 35 top European banks over the period 2009-2013. To this end, the empirical data are collected from Bankscope and a comprehensive set of internal characteristics is examined. Findings All the determinant variables included in the model have statistically significant impacts on European banks’ profitability. However, the effects are not uniform across profitability measures. Regression findings reveal that size and capital ratio are significant company-level determinants of bank profitability in Europe, while higher loan loss provisions result in lower profitability levels. Findings also suggest that banks with higher deposits and loans ratio tend to be more profitable but the effects on profitability are statistically insignificant in some cases. Practical implications This study has considerable policy implications, as the performance of the European banking sector depends on its efficiency, profitability and competitiveness. In view of these findings, some suggestions may be functional for bank regulatory authorities to intensify and sustain robustness and stability of the banking sector. Originality/value The results provide interesting insights into the characteristics and practices of profitable banks in Europe. Few econometric studies have empirically explored the determinants of bank profitability in Europe so far, even though similar studies have been conducted in several developed countries. Therefore, this paper tries to close an important gap in the existing literature improving the understanding of bank profitability in Europe.

scholarly journals Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions, Earnings Management and Capital Management in Banks

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. 144
Author(s):  
Amina Zgarni ◽  
Hassouna Fedhila
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Financial Scandals

The two past decades have been marked by a multitude of financial scandals (the Enron failure, WorldCom. etc.) mainly caused by the practices of earning management that have challenged the financial reporting quality disclosed. The purpose of this research is to study the determinants of discretionary loan loss provisions in banks. To achieve this objective, we selected a sample of the main Tunisian banks over the period from 2001 to 2014. The estimation results shows that the banks are opting for earnings management practices through the discretionary loan loss provisions in order to align with international standards, in particular with respect to regulatory capital. In opposition, we found a non-significant relationship between earnings before taxes and provisions and discretionary provisions.

scholarly journals Banking sector earnings management using loan loss provisions in the Fintech era

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peterson K. Ozili
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Income Smoothing ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Eu Countries ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Show Evidence ◽  
Second Wave

PurposeThis paper analyzes banking sector earnings management using loan loss provisions (LLPs) in the Fintech era.Design/methodology/approachRegression methodology was used to examine earnings management in the Fintech era.FindingsThe findings show evidence for bank income smoothing using LLPs. There is greater income smoothing in the second-wave Fintech era compared to the first-wave Fintech era, and the presence of strong institutions did not lower income smoothing in the second-wave era. Bank income smoothing is also greater in (1) Bank of International Settlement (BIS) and EU countries than in non-EU countries and G7 countries, (2) well-capitalized banking sectors and (3) during economic booms in the second-wave Fintech era.Practical implicationsThe competition for loans and deposits by banks and Fintech lenders in the second-wave Fintech era created additional incentives for banks to engage in income smoothing to report competitive and stable earnings.Originality/valueThe study uses a unique approach to detect country-level earnings management in the banking sector. Also, this study extends the bank earnings management literature by introducing the Fintech era as a determinant of the extent of bank earnings management.

Risk Assessment and Earning Management in Banking of Indonesia: Corporate Governance Mechanisms

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 01-07
Author(s):  
Trinandari Prasetya Nugrahanti
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Objective - The aim of this study to investigate the impact of risk assessment using the risk inherent and quality implementation of quality risk management in the operational activities of banking operations to earnings management practices through loss loan provisions and examine whether the mechanism of corporate government bank covering structure of corporate governance and quality of corporate governance can reduce the impact increase in earnings management in Banking sector of Indonesian. Methodology/Technique - We used data pooled from 2012 through 2014. By exploring the purposive sampling method, the 36 banking listed on the Stock Exchange Indonesian were selected as a sample of this study. A panel data multivariate regression methodology is used. Findings - The result of this study that (1) risk assessment strengthens the decrease in the earning management implementation after the adoption of IFRS in IAS 39; (2) corporate governance mechanisms can weaken the decrease in the earnings management practices through loan loss provisions. The final conclusions are IFRS in IAS No. 39 and Basel II Accord generally evidence to improve in bank's financial report quality. Novelty - This study could not find an empirical evidence on the impact of corporate government mechanisms covering structure of corporate governance and quality of corporate governance can reduce the increase in earnings management in banking sector of Indonesian Type of Paper - Empirical Keywords: Risk Assessment, Corporate Governance, Earnings Management, Loan Loss Provisions.

scholarly journals Discretionary loan loss provision in the Moroccan banking sector: The role of governance mechanisms

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-208
Author(s):  
Yousra El Mokrani ◽  
◽  
Issam El Idrissi ◽  
Youssef Alami ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Purpose: The present paper aims to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management extent in the Moroccan banking sector. Research methodology: This research investigates the relationship between listed banks' governance mechanisms and earnings management in the CSE over the period 2017-2020. This study relies on a two-step quantitative approach, which consists firstly of estimating discretionary loan loss provisions to measure EM, then presenting the association between banks’ governance mechanisms and discretionary loan loss provisions. Results: The findings indicate that board size, gender diversity, audit committee’s independence, and state ownership constraint EM practices among the Moroccan listed banks. While other governance mechanisms, such as institutional ownership and board activity, seem to have no significant effect on restraining managers’ discretionary behavior. Limitations: Many qualitative and quantitative factors could influence discretionary loan loss provisions and not only the used variables in this research. Contribution: This research reveals the need to maintain the vigilant supervision of the regulatory framework to limit these opportunistic practices in the local banking industry. Also, our study has important implications for establishing a new set of governance requirements such as board diversity in Morocco.

An Empirical Analysis of Auditor Independence in the Banking Industry

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 2011-2046 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kiridaran Kanagaretnam ◽  
Gopal V. Krishnan ◽  
Gerald J. Lobo
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Small Banks

ABSTRACT: We examine auditor independence in the banking industry by analyzing the relation between fees paid to auditors and the extent of earnings management through loan loss provisions (LLP). We also examine whether this relation differs across large banks whose managements are required under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act to evaluate internal control over financial reporting and whose auditors must attest to the effectiveness of such internal controls, and small banks that are not subject to those requirements. We find that unexpected auditor fees are unrelated to earnings management for large banks. For small banks, we find greater earnings management via under-provisioning of LLP by banks that pay higher unexpected total and nonaudit fees to the auditor. These results suggest that auditor fee dependence on the audit client is associated with earnings management via abnormal LLP and is a potential threat to auditor independence for small banks. Our findings are relevant to policymakers contemplating new regulations in light of the recent banking crisis.

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