Inadmissibility of a Document Tendered and Rejected: Any Exception? A Working Paper on the Exceptions to the Law Guiding the Admissibility of Documentary Evidence in Nigeria

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Amire
Keyword(s):  
Documentary Evidence ◽  
Working Paper ◽  
The Law

The leges municipales as a Means of Legal and Social Romanization of the Provinces of the Roman Empire

2020 ◽  
pp. 315-331
Author(s):  
Werner Eck
Keyword(s):  
Roman Empire ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
Second Century ◽  
Southern Spain ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
Legal Regulations ◽  
Documentary Evidence ◽  
General Phenomenon ◽  
The West ◽  
The Law

Sections of the leges municipales from at least forty different cities in Southern Spain have survived to us. These laws, understood as a powerful instrument by which Roman legal regulations were introduced into the provinces, are usually connected with Baetica. As a result it is too easy to overlook the fact that corresponding leges were issued wherever Roman or Latin cities were founded, and continued to be issued long after the Flavian era, the time to which most of the surviving fragments date. Documentary evidence has now made clear that leges municipales are a general phenomenon which continued to play a role in the second and third centuries CE. Fragments of city laws are known not only in the province of Alpes Maritimae, but also in Noricum (Lauriacum), Moesia superior (Ratiaria), and in Troesmis (Moesia inferior). The law for Troesmis is especially important because, in contrast to the laws from Baetica, it was issued for a Roman and not a Latin municipium. This demonstrates that specific Roman legal regulations, which were issued in Augustan times exclusively for Roman citizens, were still of relevance in the second century and also must have been used in the province of Moesia inferior. This material indicates that people had to obey Roman legal regulations more or less everywhere in nearly all provinces of the West. The leges municipales were thus one of the decisive means by which Roman law spread in the provinces—more so than has previously been realized—and could even be the basis for daily life.

2. The language of the law of evidence

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Glover
Keyword(s):  
Circumstantial Evidence ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Documentary Evidence ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Hearsay Evidence

This chapter discusses the following: the basic terminology of the law of evidence and the often inconsistent use of these terms; the terminology of the qualities of evidence, including the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence; hearsay evidence; documentary evidence (both primary and secondary); real evidence, including material objects, demeanour, appearance, and views of the locus in quo; the terminology of the form of evidence (oral, documentary and real evidence); the terminology of facts to be proved; facts in issue; facts forming part of the res gestae; facts relevant to facts in issue; standards of comparison; and the terminology of admissibility and weight.

Ostraka and the Law of Ostracism—Some Possibilities and Assumptions

1959 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 69-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. R. Hands
Keyword(s):  
Final Decision ◽  
Documentary Evidence ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Law

In his History of the Athenian Constitution (Oxford, 1952, pp. 159 ff.) Mr. Hignett rejected Aristotle's attribution of the law of ostracism to Kleisthenes and this rejection met with approval from R. J. Hopper in a review of his book in JHS lxxvi (1956) 141. In preferring a later date for the law, Androtion's date—or what is supposed to be Androtion's date, for without the full context of Harpokration's quotation we cannot be sure that the τότε πρῶτον of that passage is so precise in its reference as to imply a date significantly later than Aristotle's—Mr. Hignett relies mainly on the well-established argument (which he imagines may well have been Androtion's also) that ‘the authors of such a law cannot have intended to let it remain a dead letter … it must have been passed not long before its first application’ (p. 164). Indeed, this must be regarded as his only decisive (so intended) argument, for, as far as sources are concerned, he states ‘the Atthidographers … had no documentary evidence for the date of the law’ and ‘the different dates given by different writers are all due to conjecture’ (p. 160). Here he has the agreement of Jacoby, who says in FGH iii(b) (1954) 121 ‘there was as little documentary evidence for the introduction of ostracism as for the Seisachtheia’ (i.e. none at all), but the latter's conclusion is more cautious—‘our tradition does not allow of making a final decision between the dates of Androtion and Aristotle’ (p. 124).Our purpose in this paper is, first, to re-examine the historical (and even merely logical) possibilities in this question and to suggest that the more cautious conclusion is the proper one in the light of these possibilities; and, secondly, to review certain other conclusions, based on archaeological as well as literary evidence, arrived at by recent writers regarding the actual history of the institution, in order to see whether some of these too would not need to be more cautiously stated if all the possibilities were taken into account.

10. Documentary and real evidence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Keane ◽  
Paul McKeown
Keyword(s):  
Material Objects ◽  
Documentary Evidence ◽  
Oral Testimony ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
The Law

This chapter discusses the law on documentary evidence and real evidence. It addresses the following key issues: Where a party to litigation wishes to adduce in evidence a statement contained in a document, (a) should it be open to proof by production of a copy of the document and, if so, (b) in what circumstances and subject to what safeguards? Where a party to litigation wishes to admit a document in evidence, (a) should he be required to establish that it was written, signed, or attested by the person by whom it purports to be written, signed, or attested and, if so, (b) how should these matters be established? When should material objects be admissible in evidence and why do they need to be accompanied by oral testimony? When, and subject to what safeguards, should a court inspect a place or object out of court?

Actuarial Assessment of Damages

1968 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. H. Prevett
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Personal Injury ◽  
Fatal Accident ◽  
Actuarial Assessment ◽  
Working Paper ◽  
Personal Injury Litigation ◽  
Actuarial Approach ◽  
The Law ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Law Commission

The purpose of this paper is to provide an opportunity for discussion within our profession of ‘the use of an actuarial approach and actuarial evidence’ in the assessment of damages arising out of personal injury and fatal accident litigation. The need for such a paper was intimated in the pages of our Journal by William Phillips in his Review of Principles of the Law of Damages by Professor Harry Street. Since the publication of what Phillips described as ‘from the actuarial point of view…the most important legal textbook which has been published in the last 50 years’ the employment of actuaries in this field has been widely discussed within the legal profession. The most important recent development has been the inclusion of personal injury litigation as Item VI of the first programme of the Law Commission set up by the Law Commission Act, 1965. The words quoted in the first sentence above are taken from the list of ‘Questions for Examination’ under (b) of Item VI, ‘Assessment of Damages’. The current examination being conducted by the Law Commission makes this a particularly appropriate time for a sessional meeting on this subject. The writer has had the advantage of a sight of a preliminary Working Paper prepared by the Law Commission and will be quoting certain extracts from that paper below. It must however be stressed that the Working Paper is a preliminary one which attempts to do no more than canvass views: it in no way sets out the conclusions of the Law Commission on the matters discussed.

Negligence and Ignorance

Philosophy ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 53 (205) ◽  
pp. 293-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. D. Woozley
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
The Other ◽  
Working Paper ◽  
Positive Sense ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Criminal Charges ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Commission

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and to relate to each other two topics: (a) the admissibility of ignorance and mistake of fact as defences against negligence in crime; and (b) the inadmissibility of ignorance and mistake of law as defences against criminal charges. I am in (a) not concerned at all with torts negligence, only with criminal offences (whether common law or statutory) which can be committed negligently, where negligence suffices for liability, as in the law of homicide. This produces an untidy classification of elements, one or other of which is needed to provide the required mens rea (the exception of strict liability offences is here ignored): intention ( = purpose or aim), knowledge (or belief), recklessness and negligence. It is untidy, because the last does not belong on the same list as the other three, each of which can appropriately be called a state of mind in what we might say to be a positive sense, for each of them includes some degree of awareness of and/or attitude to relevant facts. If negligence is to be called (partly) a state of mind, it is so in a very stretched and negative way: to be told that a person was not attending to, thinking of or noticing something that he should have been is to be given some information, of a negative sort, about his state of mind, but it tells us very little, for it eliminates only one of an unlimited range of states of mind (in the positive sense). His not attending, noticing, etc., is equally compatible with his daydreaming (not attending to or noticing anything) and with his concentrating hard on something else. If negligence requires inadvertence, as is commonly maintained, then there was a state of mind which the agent should have been in but was not; if, as I would argue, it does not require inadvertence, then there was a state of mind which the agent should have been in, and maybe he was not in it, maybe he was in it. (In the present state of English law most offences of criminal negligence do require inadvertence, the notable exceptions being traffic offences such as careless driving. On the other hand, the proposal in the Law Commission Working Paper, No. 31 (1970) would not require it; the definition runs, ‘a person is negligent if he fails to exercise such care, skill or foresight as a reasonable man in his situation would exercise’. However, that is only a proposal; at present advertent negligence is rare in criminal law, although common in torts.) On this view, the questions are (1) whether his performance fell below scratch, (2) what are to be the excusing conditions for such a performance, and (3) if the answer to (1) is yes, whether his performance was covered by the excusing conditions.

scholarly journals Qāḍīs communicating: legal change and the law of documentary evidence

Al-Qanṭara ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wael B. Hallaq
Keyword(s):  
Documentary Evidence ◽  
Legal Change ◽  
The Law

El estudio de dos formularios notariales del siglo vii/xiii, uno sirio y el otro andalusí, muestra que el discurso sobre las modalidades de comunicación escrita preceptuadas para los jueces (kitāb al-qāḍi ilà al-qāḍi) refleja una estrecha relación entre la doctrina y la realidad de la práctica legal. Uno de los aspectos de esta relación es el cambio que tuvo que experimentar la doctrina discursiva bajo la presión de las prácticas judiciales cotidianas.

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