scholarly journals Qāḍīs communicating: legal change and the law of documentary evidence

Al-Qanṭara ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wael B. Hallaq
Keyword(s):  
Documentary Evidence ◽  
Legal Change ◽  
The Law

El estudio de dos formularios notariales del siglo vii/xiii, uno sirio y el otro andalusí, muestra que el discurso sobre las modalidades de comunicación escrita preceptuadas para los jueces (kitāb al-qāḍi ilà al-qāḍi) refleja una estrecha relación entre la doctrina y la realidad de la práctica legal. Uno de los aspectos de esta relación es el cambio que tuvo que experimentar la doctrina discursiva bajo la presión de las prácticas judiciales cotidianas.

The leges municipales as a Means of Legal and Social Romanization of the Provinces of the Roman Empire

2020 ◽  
pp. 315-331
Author(s):  
Werner Eck
Keyword(s):  
Roman Empire ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
Second Century ◽  
Southern Spain ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
Legal Regulations ◽  
Documentary Evidence ◽  
General Phenomenon ◽  
The West ◽  
The Law

Sections of the leges municipales from at least forty different cities in Southern Spain have survived to us. These laws, understood as a powerful instrument by which Roman legal regulations were introduced into the provinces, are usually connected with Baetica. As a result it is too easy to overlook the fact that corresponding leges were issued wherever Roman or Latin cities were founded, and continued to be issued long after the Flavian era, the time to which most of the surviving fragments date. Documentary evidence has now made clear that leges municipales are a general phenomenon which continued to play a role in the second and third centuries CE. Fragments of city laws are known not only in the province of Alpes Maritimae, but also in Noricum (Lauriacum), Moesia superior (Ratiaria), and in Troesmis (Moesia inferior). The law for Troesmis is especially important because, in contrast to the laws from Baetica, it was issued for a Roman and not a Latin municipium. This demonstrates that specific Roman legal regulations, which were issued in Augustan times exclusively for Roman citizens, were still of relevance in the second century and also must have been used in the province of Moesia inferior. This material indicates that people had to obey Roman legal regulations more or less everywhere in nearly all provinces of the West. The leges municipales were thus one of the decisive means by which Roman law spread in the provinces—more so than has previously been realized—and could even be the basis for daily life.

Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change

2021 ◽  
pp. 297-302
Author(s):  
Marc Galanter
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Change ◽  
System P ◽  
The Law ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Do So ◽  
The Way

This article proposes some conjectures about the way in which the basic architecture of the legal system creates and limits the possibilities of using the system as a means of redistributive change. Specifically, the question is under what conditions litigation can be redistributive, taking litigation in the broadest sense of the presentation of claims to be decided by courts. Because of differences in their size, differences in the state of the law, and differences in their resources, some of the actors in society have many occasions to utilize the courts; others do so only rarely. One can divide these actors into those claimants who have only occasional recourse to the courts (one-shotters) and repeat players who are engaged in many similar litigations over time. The article then looks at alternatives to the official litigation system.

2. The language of the law of evidence

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Glover
Keyword(s):  
Circumstantial Evidence ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Documentary Evidence ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Hearsay Evidence

This chapter discusses the following: the basic terminology of the law of evidence and the often inconsistent use of these terms; the terminology of the qualities of evidence, including the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence; hearsay evidence; documentary evidence (both primary and secondary); real evidence, including material objects, demeanour, appearance, and views of the locus in quo; the terminology of the form of evidence (oral, documentary and real evidence); the terminology of facts to be proved; facts in issue; facts forming part of the res gestae; facts relevant to facts in issue; standards of comparison; and the terminology of admissibility and weight.

Regulation

2020 ◽  
pp. 372-381
Author(s):  
Lawrence Gostin
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Change ◽  
The Face ◽  
Public Health Officials ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Impact

The objectives of this chapter are to help you understand: the impact of legislation, regulations, and litigation on the public’s health; the powers, duties, and restraints imposed by the law on public health officials; the potential of legal change to improve the public’s health; the role of international law and institutions in securing public health in the face of increasing globalization.

Is the ‘Mere Equity’ to Rescind a Legal Power? Unpacking Hohfeld’s Concept of ‘Volitional Control’

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Reilly
Keyword(s):  
Legal Change ◽  
Volitional Control ◽  
Legal Power ◽  
The Law

Abstract Private lawyers owe a particular debt of gratitude to Hohfeld, given their widespread use of his scheme. An example is equitable rescission, where the entitlement to rescind a voidable transfer is now widely understood to be a Hohfeldian legal power. Yet, though scholars have been quick to use Hohfeld’s concept of legal power, they have given little sustained thought to what he meant by ‘volitional control’ and how we might identify it within the law. The result is that certain areas of law have been mislabelled as ‘power conferring’, most notably equitable rescission. This article seeks to unpack Hohfeld’s concept of ‘volitional control’ as terminological shorthand for the coincidence of two distinct elements: (i) the power holder’s normative intention to effect the relevant legal change; and (ii) her decision to effect that change as exhibited in power-exercising conduct. By these lights, the rescinding claimant does not have a legal power to rescind.

LEGAL RIGHTS AND WOMEN'S AUTONOMY: CAN FAMILY LAW REFORM IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES AVOID THE CONTRADICTIONS OF VICTORIAN DOMESTICITY?

Hawwa ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-54
Author(s):  
Danaya Wright
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Women's Rights ◽  
Family Law ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Women’S Rights ◽  
Legal Change ◽  
Women’S Autonomy ◽  
Women's Autonomy ◽  
Muslim Countries ◽  
The Law

AbstractIn early- and mid-nineteenth century England, numerous law reformers targeted the law of coverture. Under this law married women lost custody of children, lost any property they brought, could not make a will or enter into a contract once they married, and they could not seek a divorce if their marriage broke down under the doctrine that husband and wife were a single unit before the law. The discourse of the reform debates, however, presented women as either violent and intemperate, and thus requiring the chains of coverture to keep them from bringing down the pillars of civil society. Or, they were seen as victims in sore need of the law's protection from violent and intemperate men. At no time were they viewed as legal agents, capable of exercising rights responsibly or as rational actors, who could be entrusted with the care and control of raising children single-handedly. But as the law changed to accommodate demands for women's rights, it is clear that women did not destroy civil society, nor have they attained equal power and autonomy with men. Thus, in looking at the reforms, and the forces that inhibited the reforms in Victorian England, we can begin to think more critically about how law reforms occur, how men and women are situated, and how barriers to equality frustrate legal change. With that history, I believe we are better situated to understand the demands for change in family law and women's rights in Muslim countries. Much of the rhetoric is ironically familiar. And I argue that knowledge of the pitfalls that threatened legal change in the Anglo-American west can help us avoid them in law reform arenas across the Muslim world. Of course, it is not simply that by learning our history we can hope not to repeat it. Rather, by understanding the complex interplay of reformist arguments and conservative pressures, we are better able to see beneath the rhetoric to the power structures inhibiting women's autonomy that lurk beneath the surface.

Ostraka and the Law of Ostracism—Some Possibilities and Assumptions

1959 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 69-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. R. Hands
Keyword(s):  
Final Decision ◽  
Documentary Evidence ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Law

In his History of the Athenian Constitution (Oxford, 1952, pp. 159 ff.) Mr. Hignett rejected Aristotle's attribution of the law of ostracism to Kleisthenes and this rejection met with approval from R. J. Hopper in a review of his book in JHS lxxvi (1956) 141. In preferring a later date for the law, Androtion's date—or what is supposed to be Androtion's date, for without the full context of Harpokration's quotation we cannot be sure that the τότε πρῶτον of that passage is so precise in its reference as to imply a date significantly later than Aristotle's—Mr. Hignett relies mainly on the well-established argument (which he imagines may well have been Androtion's also) that ‘the authors of such a law cannot have intended to let it remain a dead letter … it must have been passed not long before its first application’ (p. 164). Indeed, this must be regarded as his only decisive (so intended) argument, for, as far as sources are concerned, he states ‘the Atthidographers … had no documentary evidence for the date of the law’ and ‘the different dates given by different writers are all due to conjecture’ (p. 160). Here he has the agreement of Jacoby, who says in FGH iii(b) (1954) 121 ‘there was as little documentary evidence for the introduction of ostracism as for the Seisachtheia’ (i.e. none at all), but the latter's conclusion is more cautious—‘our tradition does not allow of making a final decision between the dates of Androtion and Aristotle’ (p. 124).Our purpose in this paper is, first, to re-examine the historical (and even merely logical) possibilities in this question and to suggest that the more cautious conclusion is the proper one in the light of these possibilities; and, secondly, to review certain other conclusions, based on archaeological as well as literary evidence, arrived at by recent writers regarding the actual history of the institution, in order to see whether some of these too would not need to be more cautiously stated if all the possibilities were taken into account.

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