scholarly journals Privatization in economic theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maja Drakic
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Mass Scale ◽  
Equilibrium Models ◽  
Dominant Form ◽  
Private Property Rights

In reality privatization has never occurred according to the handbook rules of ordinary market transactions. Not even in advanced market economies can privatization transactions be described by the Walrasian or Arrowian, or Leontiefian equilibrium models, or by the equilibrium models of the game theory. In these economies transactions of privatization take place in a fairly organic way ? which means that those are driven by the dominance of private property rights and in a market economy. But despite this fact Western privatization also some peculiar features as compared to ordinary company takeovers, since the state as the seller may pursue non ? economic goals. Changes in the dominant form of property change positions and status of many individuals and groups in the society. That?s why privatization can even less be explained by ordinary market mechanisms in transition countries where privatizing state-owned property have happened in a mass scale and where markets and private property rights weren't established at the time process of privatization began. In this paper I?ll discuss and analyze the phenomenon of privatization in context of different economic theories arguing that empirical results go in favor of the public choice theory (Buchanan, 1978), theory of "economic constitution" (Brennan and Buchanan 1985), (Buchanan and Tullock, 1989), and theory of "collective action" (Olson, 1982). These theories argues that transition from one economic system into another, for example transition from collectivistic, socialistic system into capitalism and free market economy with dominant private property, will not happen through isolated changes of only few economic institutions, no matter how deep that changes would be. In other words privatization can not give results if it's not followed by comprehensive change of economic system because privatized companied wouldn't be able to operate in old environment.

scholarly journals Tropical Deforestation: Can Property Rights Stem the Tide?

SURG Journal ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-54
Author(s):  
Daniel Bayley
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Tropical Forests ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Tropical Deforestation ◽  
Private Ownership ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Effective Form ◽  
Tropical Forest Management ◽  
Market Environmentalism

In this report the property right structures surrounding tropical forest management are analyzed with a specific case study presented on tropical forests in Honduras. In order to adequately understand the set of property rights in place surrounding tropical forests, the applicable sets of property rights are laid out and explained (private, common, state, and open access). It is argued that the current property rights regimes in place surrounding tropical forests are inadequate and are the issue leading to high levels of deforestation. Conflicts and controversies surrounding the issue are presented for a counterargument and separate view of the issue. It was found that the current property rights regime in Honduras is inadequate for effective resource management as it lacks enforceability along with structure and is the prominent issue surrounding tropical deforestation. Private property rights were the most effective form of property rights found for maintaining natural resources, and it is therefore recommended that private ownership be instilled upon tropical forests to reduce the rate of deforestation. Free Market Environmentalism (FME) is offered as a solution to the current methodology for the management of tropical forests, as it advocates for private ownership and an enforceable set of rights. Therefore, it is recommended that a private property rights regime following the FME methodology replace existing state property rights in order to stem the tide of tropical deforestation.

Property Rights

2019 ◽  
pp. 611-614
Author(s):  
Thomas Apolte
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Resource Acquisition ◽  
Economic Competition ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Distribution Of Wealth

Creation of ownership structures under private law as well as market liberalization can be seen as central to transformation. This chapter examines how private property rights, among others, encourage economic efficiency, strengthen economic competition, make businesses subject to the discipline of the market, and create a capital market. The emergence and development of a property rights structure at a given point in time is always also the result of a conflictual history. One of the advantages of a developed market economy is that conflictual resource acquisition lies in the past and has ceased to play a significant role in the recognition of the existing distribution of wealth. It is astonishing how little conflict was caused by post-socialist privatization.

scholarly journals Resolving Douglass C. North's ‘puzzle’ concerning China's household responsibility system

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Simon Deakin ◽  
Gaofeng Meng
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Poverty Reduction ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
State Intervention ◽  
Dominant Form ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Polycentric Governance ◽  
Collective Actors ◽  
Responsibility System

Abstract This paper considers Douglass C. North's ‘puzzle’ concerning China's household responsibility system (HRS) and offers a possible solution. China's HRS, which has evolved over the past four decades to become its dominant form of rural land ownership, has stimulated spectacular economic growth and poverty reduction; however, it is based on a type of ownership which is far removed from the property rights regime which North regarded as essential. Two features of the HRS merit attention. The first is ‘split ownership’: this refers to the allocation of different aspects of ownership, including rights of access, use, management, exclusion and alienation, to a range of individual and collective actors with interests in the land in question. The second is polycentric governance: rules governing land use are derived in part from community-level action and in part from state intervention. We argue that in explaining the functioning of the HRS we need to move beyond the narrow conception of legally enforced private property rights on which North relied. We should instead embrace understandings of ownership as an emergent, diverse and complex institution, of the kind emphasized by A.M. Honoré's legal theory of ownership and Elinor Ostrom's theories of the common-pool resource and polycentric governance.

The Economic and Political Liberalization of Socialism: The Fundamental Problem of Property Rights

1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
David L. Weimer
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Political Liberalization ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Political Experience ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Neoclassical Economic Theory

All our previous political experience, and especially, of course, the experience of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, offers little hope that democracy can coexist with the centralized allocation of economic resources. Indeed, simple observation suggests that a market economy with private property rights is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the existence of a democratic political regime. And this accords fully with the political theory of liberalism, which emphasizes that private rights, both civil and economic, be protected and secure. At the same time, our previous experience also indicates that market economies are more successful than centrally planned economies not only in producing, but also in distributing, both private and collective goods. This economic experienee is supported by neoclassical economic theory, which treats clearly defined and secure rights to private property as essential to a market economy.

The Ethics of Privatization

1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Lehmann
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Current System ◽  
Public Lands ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Collective Management ◽  
Public Land Management ◽  
The Cost

Insofar as arguments for privatization can be read as appealing to general ethical conceptions, they acquire greater depth and, perhaps, respectability. The argument from productivity suggests a rule-form of preference utilitarianism: by changing institutions (in this case, by substituting private property rights for collective management of public lands), we’ll promote people’s welfare by enabling them better to satisfy their desires. But we can also glimpse in the recommended institution of private property rights a more Kantian commitment: where I can acquire what’s yours only with your willing consent (and generally in exchange for something of mine you value more), I can’t treat you simply as a means, at least in certain respects. However, in my view, such appeals do little to advance the argument for privatization; on the contrary, they reveal weaknesses in it. The property rights recommended by privatization advocates provide for individual freedom but not for its wise use. They do not help people to treat humanity in their own persons as an end or to form desires worth satisfying. There is an opening here for arguing that privatization is a bad idea, not because the current system, despite appearances, is relatively efficient or the cost of dismantling it is too great, but because what we’d get is inferior in a more basic sense to what we now have. Public land management promises greater protection of our natural and cultural heritage than the market—at least if we can resist the seductive suggestion that it be marketized, i.e., that we aim to allocate the resources of public lands as would an ideal market. Furthermore, the opportunity to define and defend values in public debate rather than simply buying what we happen to prefer (and can afford) is one we should, in our own interests, preserve. It is primarily on such grounds that I oppose privatizing public lands. To get this argument off the ground, we must allow that what I’m interested in can differ from what’s in my interest. I shall spend much of this chapter meeting objections to such a distinction and arguing that the free market can’t be expected to help people take an interest in what’s in their interest.

The Market Economy

2020 ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Kevin Vallier
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Real World ◽  
Essential Role ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Political Trust ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
The Right

The market economy can create trust for the right reasons. Markets and property rights promote social and political trust in the real world by creating social cohesion through exchange and generating economic growth. Markets also arise from private property rights, which are publicly justified based on the essential role private property rights play in protecting individual rights and the rights of associations. This includes private property rights in capital, that is, productive property, which means that a broadly market-based economy will be a central feature in any society that maintains high levels of social and political trust in the right ways.

Property in the Kibbutz: Old and New

2018 ◽  
pp. 58-78
Author(s):  
Abraham Bell ◽  
Gideon Parchomovsky ◽  
Benjamin Weitz
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Unique Property ◽  
Free Market Economy ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
System P ◽  
Legal Challenges ◽  
Property Regime ◽  
Israeli Kibbutz

In this chapter, we discuss the unique property norms that emerged within the Israeli kibbutz and the challenges to which they gave rise. Originally, the prevailing property regime in kibbutzim reflected a deep commitment to socialist ideology. All property was owned by the collective and individual members only held licences or permits to use kibbutz property. With time, as Israeli society has moved towards a free market economy and following a series of financial crises, most kibbutzim have abandoned the strict ban on private property and have gradually gravitated towards a system of private property rights. This transition has given rise to intricate legal challenges. It forced kibbutzim to adopt a system of allocating private property rights to their members in assets and has required Israeli courts to grapple with unique property arrangements that existed solely within kibbutzim and effectuate them within the formal legal system.

Environmental Impacts of Enhanced Private Property Rights

2002 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-381
Author(s):  
Ross McKitrick ◽  
Timothy Shufelt
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Data Base ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Transition Economies ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
International Data

There has been concern in western countries over whether strong private property rights empower polluters to the detriment of other citizens. This debate is now playing out in transition economies and developing countries, where the process of moving to a market economy involves strengthening property rights. We review the conflicting arguments and test them using a new international data base. After controlling for income, education and political factors we find that cross-sectional differences in property rights regimes explain some international differences in pollution rates, but changes in property rights laws within a country do not seem to affect emissions.

scholarly journals Institutional Setup in Market Economy and Islamic Property Rights

2018 ◽  
Vol III (I) ◽  
pp. 12-20
Author(s):  
Noor Fatima ◽  
Muhammad Zubair ◽  
Zubair Sarfaraz
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Property Right ◽  
Base System ◽  
Distribution Of Wealth ◽  
Islamic Economic

This paper argues that there is an ever-growing demand to correlate between Islam and Economics. Property-right and ownership is the basic concept of the modern economic structure of a liberal economic system. A property right is well explained in Islam and that also an essential element for the market economy, this paper discusses the Islamic perspective of property rights and how far it is complementary with the market economy. Since property rights of Islam are central to the structure of the economic system, Islam also emphasizes on economically good life depends on free trade. Free trade demands a recognized system of property rights, as a market base system demands a healthy competition of commodities, which ultimately needs private property rights for the protection of capital of producers and owners. The distribution of wealth is the main argument of the Islamic Economic System, which helps states in the fair distribution of resources.

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