Justice as Fairness: For Groups?

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Homogeneous State ◽  
Dominant Form ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Indigenous Groups ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Almost All

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.

Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation

1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gauthier
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Semantic Representation ◽  
New Venture ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Historical Antecedents

(1) In his recent paper, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” John Rawls makes use of a footnote to disown what to many readers must have seemed one of the most striking and original underlying ideas of his theory of justice, that it “is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice.” That Rawls should issue this disclaimer indicates, at least in my view, that he has a much clearer understanding of his theory, and its relationship to rational choice than he did at the time that he wrote A Theory of Justice. As I note in Morals by Agreement (pp.4–5), Rawls does not show that principles of justice are principles of rational choice. Hence, in appropriating the idea, I can claim diat I am undertaking a pioneering enterprise. No doubt Thomas Hobbes would have undertaken it had the resources of the theory of rational choice been at his disposal, but I do not intend to pursue counterfactuals in a search for historical antecedents. Moral theory as rational choice theory is, I claim, a new venture.

scholarly journals JOHN RAWLS: CONCEPÇÃO DE COOPERAÇÃO EQUITATIVA

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 84-99
Author(s):  
Viturino Ribeiro da Silva
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Space ◽  
Social Inequalities ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Social ◽  
Close Relationship ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

A cooperação equitativa é um conceito central da filosofia de John Rawls e possui uma estreita relação com as noções de racionalidade, razoabilidade e tolerância. Portanto, faz-se necessário ressaltar que tais temas são fundamentais para uma adequada compreensão da teoria rawlsiana de justiça. Rawls elege a justiça como virtude primária e princípio norteador na construção da sua teoria. Em virtude disso, a preocupação de Rawls é a resolução das desigualdades sociais que ocorrem nos sistemas políticos democráticos. A noção de justiça como equidade faz-se indispensável frente à necessidade de eleger a liberdade enquanto preocupação com o justo equilíbrio e ao “consenso nas sociedades plurais”. É a partir da concepção de cooperação equitativa que Rawls tenta resolver o impasse contemporâneo da convivência de diferentes doutrinas abrangentes razoáveis sejam elas, religiosas, filosóficas ou morais. Dessa forma, a teoria rawlsiana de justiça tem como proposta a “coexistência pacifica” ante essa pluralidade de doutrinas compreensivas. Assim posto, a justiça como equidade, pode plausivelmente, ser a forma mais viável de coexistência pacífica que agrupamentos sociais poderiam seguir ou se pautar. Sob essa ótica, acredita-se que a noção de cooperação equitativa rawlsiana será uma via de justiça que enfatiza os direitos individuais sem desmerecer aquilo que é próprio do coletivo. Abstract: Fair cooperation is a central concept of J. Rawls´s philosophy and keeps a close relationship with the the notions of rationality, reasonability, and tolerance. Thus it is important to claim that these notions are necessary for a correct comprehension of rawlsian theory of justice. Rawls claims justice as the primary virtue and main principle of his theory. The aim of Rawls is to solve the social inequalities that occur in democratic political systems. The concept of justice as fairness is essential before the need of electing the liberty as concerning to the just balance and to the “consensus in the plural societies”. By starting from the conception of fair cooperation Rawls tries to solve the contemporary problem of different comprehensive doctrines sharing the same political and social space, no matter they are religious, philosophical or moral ones. The rawlsian theory of justice claims to propose as “pacific cohabitation” among that plurality of comprehensive doctrines. In this way, justice as fairness may plausibility be the most viable form of pacific cohabitation that social groups can follow or be ruled. Under this perspective, we believe that the rawlsian concept of fair cooperation will be a way of justice that focus on individual rights without deprive the significance of collective. Keywords: Rawls, fair cooperation, original position, rationality, reasonability. 

Intergenerational Cooperation and the Social Contract

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Heath
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Intergenerational Justice ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Mutual Advantage ◽  
Contractual Approach ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Intergenerational Cooperation

John Rawls made the enormously influential suggestion that society can be conceived of as a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage,” governed by a “theory of justice,” which is a set of principles that specify an acceptable division of the “benefits and burdens of cooperation.” It follows, however, that if there are no opportunities for mutually advantageous cooperation in a particular domain of social interaction, then these interactions cannot be governed by principles of justice. Certain commentators have argued that this analysis precludes the application of Rawlsian-style contract theory to questions of intergenerational justice, on the grounds that there can be no reciprocity between non-contemporaneous generations, and thus no possibility of intergenerational cooperation. Yet despite having become influential in the literature, this claim is incorrect, being based upon an overly narrow, direct conception of reciprocity. Many systems of cooperation, both in nature and in human society, are based on indirect reciprocity, where the individual from whom a benefit is received need not be the same as the individual to whom a benefit is provided. Once the possibility of indirect reciprocity is taken into account, one can see that there is no obstacle to the development of systems of intergenerational cooperation. The analysis of such systems provides the foundation for a contractual approach to questions of intergenerational justice.

POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND TRUTH

Legal Theory ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jody S. Kraus
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Every theory of justice requires a first-order theory specifying principles of justice, and a second-order view explaining why those principles constitute the correct principles of justice. According to John Rawls, political liberalism is committed to the two principles of justice specified in its first-order theory, “justice as fairness.” Justice as fairness, according to Rawls, in turn presupposes the second-order view that justice is a political conception. A political conception of justice treats the principles derived from the fundamental ideas in the public political culture as the correct principles of justice. Political liberalism, however, nowhere offers a defense of the view that justice is a political conception. Indeed, it even strives to avoid the admission that it presupposes that justice is a political conception by stating only that it uses a political conception of justice, while allowing that justice might not actually be a political conception. As to the truth of its second-order presupposition, political liberalism chooses to remain agnostic. Rawls claims that political liberalism has no choice at all. To do otherwise, he argues, would lead to an internal contradiction.

scholarly journals Diskursus Mengenai Keadilan Sosial: Kajian Teori Keadilan dalam Liberalisme Locke, Persamaan Marx, dan 'Justice as Fairness' Rawls

MELINTAS ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 309
Author(s):  
Alfensius Alwino
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Abstract Theory ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Political Studies ◽  
History Of ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Through the history of philosophy, the theme of justice has become a very important topic. Thinkers of the theories such as utilitarianism, intuitionism, eudaimonism, perfectionism, liberalism, communitarianism, and socialism have discussed the theme. As French philosopher Alain Badiou has pointed out, the central of political studies from the time of Plato to the present day is justice. The question is what is justice? For John Rawls, justice is the supreme virtue of human. In <em>A Theory of Justice</em>, Rawls asserts that justice is the first priority in social institutions, as is truth in the system of thought. A theory, however elegant and economical, must be rejected or revised if it is not true, so the laws and institutions, however efficient and neat, must be reformed or removed if it is unfair. Rawls criticizes the theory of justice in Lockean liberalism and Marxian socialism. Both theories of justice are very strong colouring the landscape of debate on the roots of thinking about justice. For Rawls, liberalism that accentuates basic freedoms can create inequality between people who have better abilities with less fortunate people. Similarly, socialism which accentuates equality ignores basic freedoms. The two theories of justice are considered ideological in the sense that there are hidden interests behind the jargons of freedom and equality. Rawls then develops an abstract theory of justice, in which the participants depart from a veil of ignorance, so that they are free of any interest and ambition. Here they might build a cooperative contract in a society governed by the principles of justice.

Rawls and the Contract Theory of Civil Disobedience*

1977 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 1-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. W. Sumner
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Contract Theory ◽  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Critical Attention ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Way

Since its appearance in 1971, John Rawls’ A Theory of justice has attracted much critical attention. Most of this attention has inevitably centred on the two principles of justice for institutions and on their derivation from the original position. This paper will examine a part of the system which has not yet received such close scrutiny — Rawls’ theory of political obligation in general and civil disobedience in particular. My main aim is to understand this theory, since there are crucial respects in which it is undeveloped. But I shall also along the way comment on its possibilities; these comments will for the most part take the form of comparisons with its utilitarian rival.In what follows I shall not confine myself to the material in Rawls’ book, but rather use the appearance of the book as an opportunity to review the development of the theory of political obligation since “Justice as Fairness”. When one surveys the period bounded by that initial paper and by the book, certain patterns form.

The State’s Role in Ensuring Fair Income Distribution in Vietnam Today: Some Issues from the Theory of Justice as Fairness by John Rawls

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-195
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Stability ◽  
Social Equality ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Analysis And Synthesis ◽  
Economic Philosophy ◽  
The Relationship

Fairness in income distribution is a factor that both motivates employees and contributes to maintaining social stability. In Vietnam, fair income distribution has been studied from various perspectives. In this article, through the analysis and synthesis of related documents and evidence, and from the perspective of economic philosophy, the author applies John Rawls’s Theory of Justice as Fairness to analyze some issues arising from the implementation of the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution from 1986 to present. These are unifying the perception of fairness in income distribution; solving the relationship between economic efficiency and social equality; ensuring benefits for the least-privileged people in society; and controlling income. On that basis, the author makes some recommendations to enhance the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution in Vietnam. Received 11thNovember 2019; Revised 10thApril 2020; Accepted 20th April 2020

Aristotle, Kant and Rawls on Moral Motivation in a Just Society

1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven M. DeLue
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Self Esteem ◽  
Mutual Respect ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Standards Of Conduct ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Just Society

John Rawls considers his Theory of Justice to be in the Kantian tradition. Generally there seems to be agreement among Rawls' critics that at least with respect to the procedural formulation of the principles of justice, it is difficult to call Rawls' position Kantian. In this article I will argue that Rawls' Kantianism is best understood as providing a motive source for acting upon known just standards of conduct. In this regard Rawls can be read as synthesizing aspects of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Kant's moral reasoning to provide the rationale to explain why an individual who knows what is morally correct conduct in a given situation, makes such knowledge the source of his action. Demonstrating the Aristotelean roots of Rawls' Kantianism with respect to the problem of motivation for just conduct helps one understand how Kant's moral theory can be viewed in Rawls' words not as a “morality of austere command but … [as] … an ethic of mutual respect and self esteem” (1971, p. 251). Secondly, this view of Kant provides the basis for understanding the anti-corporatist aspect of Rawls' political theory that my reading of Rawls makes necessary.

Philosophers-Citizens

In Our Name ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Beerbohm
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Life Of The Mind ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Ideal

This chapter challenges an account of citizenship that treats us as political philosophers or perennial deliberators and instead proposes the model of the philosopher-citizen who exhibits a computationally intense life of the mind. It first describes the ideal of the philosopher-citizen before considering how a theory of justice is to be employed by well-intentioned citizens by taking into account the views of John Rawls. It argues that the model of the philosopher-citizens tends to be monistic, collapsing the diversity of moral achievements that citizens can make in a democracy, and that this ideal should be separated from an account of the citizen's decision-making obligations. The chapter also examines the principles for citizens and for representatives in the context of Justice as Fairness and concludes by outlining the essential assumptions of a nonideal democratic theory.

O Liberalismo em John Rawls e a Resposta aos Comunitaristas

2007 ◽  
Vol 15 (30) ◽  
pp. 61-82
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira ◽  
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice

The aim of this article is to characterize the John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness developed in A Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism (1993), Replay to Habermas (1995) and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), with a view to identifying the convergent points between deontological conception with teleological characteristics and identify a substantive conception of justice, not purely procedural, which is universalist albeit not transcendental, making possible an approach between communitarian and liberal ethical theories.

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