Constructive Empiricism Versus Scientific Realism

1982 ◽  
Vol 32 (128) ◽  
pp. 262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Musgrave ◽  
Bas C. van Fraassen
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Constructive Empiricism

scholarly journals Realism, empiricism and causal inquiry in International Relations: What is at stake?

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 562-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam R C Humphreys
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen ◽  
Causal Mechanisms ◽  
Everyday World

Discussions of causal inquiry in International Relations are increasingly framed in terms of a contrast between rival philosophical positions, each with a putative methodological corollary — empiricism is associated with a search for patterns of covariation, while scientific realism is associated with a search for causal mechanisms. Scientific realism is, on this basis, claimed to open up avenues of causal inquiry that are unavailable to empiricists. This is misleading. Empiricism appears inferior only if its reformulation by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Bas van Fraassen, is ignored. I therefore develop a fuller account than has previously been provided in International Relations of Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ and how it differs from scientific realism. In light of that, I consider what is at stake in calls for the reconstitution of causal inquiry along scientific realist, rather than empiricist, lines. I argue that scientific realists have failed to make a compelling case that what matters is whether researchers are realists. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism differ only on narrow epistemological and metaphysical grounds that carry no clear implications for the conduct of causal inquiry. Yet, insofar as Van Fraassen has reformed empiricism to meet the scientific realist challenge, this has created a striking disjunction between mainstream practices of causal inquiry in International Relations and the vision of scientific practice that scientific realists and contemporary empiricists share, especially regarding the significance of regularities observed in everyday world politics. Although scientific realist calls for a philosophical revolution in International Relations are overstated, this disjunction demands further consideration.

Scientific Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 251-253
Author(s):  
Heikki Patomäki
Keyword(s):  
Interwar Period ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
True Story ◽  
The Social ◽  
The World ◽  
The Status

This chapter addresses scientific realism. After the heyday of empiricism in the interwar period and its immediate aftermath, many critical reactions to empiricism seemed to suggest scientific realism. It was widely agreed that scientific theories make references to things that cannot be directly observed (or at least seen), and thus emerged the issue of the status of non-observables. As scientific realism became increasingly dominant, new philosophical stances such as Bas C. van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism were often defined in opposition to it. Van Fraassen understands scientific realism as a claim that science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. More in line with established forms of scientific realism, Ilkka Niiniluoto talks about verisimilitude, or truth-likeness. This concept is supposed to avoid the consequences of claiming to have access to the truth itself. The chapter then considers how the social sciences seem to pose difficulties for scientific realism.

Why There are No Ready-Made Phenomena: What Philosophers of Science Should Learn From Kant

2008 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michela Massimi
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
The Way

The debate on scientific realism has raged among philosophers of science for decades. The scientific realist's claim that science aims to give us a literally true description of the way things are, has come under severe scrutiny and attack by Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. All science aims at is to save the observable phenomena, according to van Fraassen. Scientific realists have faced since a main sceptical challenge: the burden is on them to prove that the entities postulated by our scientific theories are real and that science is still in the ‘truth’ business.

Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-191
Author(s):  
Alexander A. Pechenkin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Empirical Adequacy ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Interpretation Of Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
The Real ◽  
Real Existence ◽  
Ensemble Interpretation

Two conceptions of the contemporary philosophy of science are taken under consideration: scientific realism and constructive empiricism. Scientific realism presupposes 1) the conception of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality, 2) the real existence of entities postulated by a theory. The constructive empiricism puts forward the idea of empirical adequacy: science aims to give us the theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of the theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. To compare methodological resources of these two positions in the philosophy of science the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is involved. As a methodological realization of scientific realism the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics is taken under consideration. K.Popper’s version

scholarly journals Formulational vs. Epistemological Debates Concerning Scientific Realism

Dialogue ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 479-496
Author(s):  
Seungbae Park
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Sufficient Evidence ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Epistemological Debate

ABSTRACTA formulational debate is a debate over whether certain definitions of scientific realism and antirealism are useful. By contrast, an epistemological debate is a debate over whether we have sufficient evidence for scientific realism and antirealism, defined in a certain manner. I argue that Hilary Putnam's definitions of scientific realism and antirealism are more useful than Bas van Fraassen's definitions of scientific realism and constructive empiricism because Putnam's definitions can generate both formulational and epistemological debates, whereas van Fraassen's can generate only formulational debates.

Scientific Realism, Constructive Empiricism, and Structuralism

2007 ◽  
pp. 66-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Ladyman ◽  
Don Ross ◽  
David Spurrett ◽  
John Collier
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Constructive Empiricism

Scientific Realism vs. Constructive Empiricism

The Monist ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 336-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Gutting ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Constructive Empiricism

Kant's Cognitive Semantics, Newton's Rule Four of Philosophy and Scientific Realism

2011 ◽  
Vol 32 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 27-49
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Westphal
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Gravitational Force ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
Original Version ◽  
Cognitive Semantics ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason

Kant'sCritique of Pure Reasoncontains an original and powerful semantics of singular cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science. Here I argue that Kant's semantics directly and strongly supports Newton's Rule 4 of (natural) Philosophy in ways which support Newton's realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton's Rule 4 of Philosophy and its role in Newton's justification of realism about gravitational force (§II). Next I briefly summarize Kant's semantics of singular cognitive reference (§III). I then show that the key point of Kant's cognitive semantics is embedded in and strongly supports Newton's Rule 4, and that it rules out not only Cartesian physics (perHarper) but also Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification generally (§IV). Finally, I argue that Kant's semantics reveals a key defect in the original version of Bas van Fraassen's anti-realist ‘Constructive Empiricism’, and in many common objections to realism (§V). Fortunately, Kant's semantics of singular cognitive reference stands independently of his Transcendental Idealism; nothing I argue in this paper depends at all upon that doctrine.In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. (Newton 1999: 796)

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