The spectrum of metametaphysics

Scientific realism is typically associated with metaphysics. One current incarnation of such an association concerns the requirement of a metaphysical characterization of the entities one is being a realist about. This is sometimes called “Chakravartty’s Challenge”, and codifies the claim that without a metaphysical characterization, one does not have a clear picture of the realistic commitments one is engaged with. The required connection between metaphysics and science naturally raises the question of whether such a demand is appropriately fulfilled, and how metaphysics engages with science in order to produce what is called “scientific metaphysics”. Here, we map some of the options available in the literature, generating a conceptual spectrum according to how each view approximates science and metaphysics. This is done with the purpose of enlightening the current debate on the possibility of epistemic warrant that science could grant to such a metaphysics, and how different positions differently address the thorny issue concerning such a warrant.

Linguistic Scaffolding and Scientific Realism

The various “small metaphysics” puzzles that this book surveys suggest their proper resolutions requires an expanded appreciation of the strategic underpinnings of fruitful descriptive endeavor. In doing so, philosophical analysis should study linguistic adaptation in the same naturalistic spirit as a biologist investigates the environmental adaptations of a particular animal or plant. Doing so effectively requires attending to shaping considerations that arise from a wide variety of sources, including the issues of computational complexity that supply multiscalar tactics with their significant advantages. For various reasons that ultimately trace to the theory T thinking that this book rejects, the philosophical notion of “scientific realism” has become unhappily aligned with various simplistic assumptions with respect to effective word/world alignment. Our conceptions of scientific and linguistic possibility have suffered greatly as a result.

Deconstructing the Phantom: Duhem and the Scientific Realism Debate

For many decades, Duhem has been considered a paradigmatic instrumentalist, and while some commentators have argued against classifying him in this way, it still seems prevalent as an interpretation of his philosophy of science. Yet such a construal bears scant resemblance to the views presented in his own works—so little, indeed, that it might be said to constitute no more than a mere phantom with respect to his actual thought. In this article, we aim to deconstruct this phantom, tracing the sources of the misconceptions surrounding his ideas and pinpointing the sources and/or causes of its proliferation. We subsequently point out and discuss those elements of his philosophy that, taken together, support the view of him as a scientific realist of a sophisticated kind. Finally, we defend our own interpretation of his thought against suggestions to the effect that it is oriented towards neither instrumentalism nor scientific realism.