Neo-Pyrrhonism, Empiricism, and Scientific Activity

Pyrrhonism involves the inability to defend claims about the unobservable world, or, more generally, about what is really going on beyond the phenomena (SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, 1994). As a result, the Pyrrhonist is not engaged in developing a philosophical doctrine, at least in the sense of defending a view about the underlying features of reality. The issue then arises as to whether the Pyrrhonist also has something positive to say about our knowledge of the world, while still keeping Pyrrhonism. In this paper, I develop a positive neo-Pyrrhonist attitude, indicating that we can use this attitude to make sense of important aspects of science and empirical knowledge. To do that, I explore the connection between this revived form of Pyrrhonism and contemporary versions of empiricism, in particular constructive empiricism (VAN FRAASSEN, 1980, 1989, 2002, 2008). Although constructive empiricism is not a form of skepticism, there are important elements in common between constructive empiricism and Pyrrhonism. The resulting form of Pyrrhonism suggests that there is something right about the original stance articulated by Sextus Empiricus, and that suitably formulated it provides an insightful approach to think about empirical knowledge (PORCHAT PEREIRA, 2006, for the original inspiration behind neoPyrrhonism).

Scientific Realism

This chapter addresses scientific realism. After the heyday of empiricism in the interwar period and its immediate aftermath, many critical reactions to empiricism seemed to suggest scientific realism. It was widely agreed that scientific theories make references to things that cannot be directly observed (or at least seen), and thus emerged the issue of the status of non-observables. As scientific realism became increasingly dominant, new philosophical stances such as Bas C. van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism were often defined in opposition to it. Van Fraassen understands scientific realism as a claim that science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. More in line with established forms of scientific realism, Ilkka Niiniluoto talks about verisimilitude, or truth-likeness. This concept is supposed to avoid the consequences of claiming to have access to the truth itself. The chapter then considers how the social sciences seem to pose difficulties for scientific realism.

The Field of Relational Sociology

I offer a qualitative sketch and a brief empirical analysis of relational sociology as a scientific field. The field consists of scholarly communication that adheres to the label “relational sociology”, articulating and elaborating the idea that the social world is structured in relations. Within this general orientation, very different versions of relational sociology exist. These rest on diverging conceptions of the key term “social relations” and on different epistemological approaches (pragmatism, critical realism, constructive empiricism). These patterns are reconstructed by way of correspondence analyses of co-citation patterns of authors in the chapters of The Palgrave Handbook of Relational Sociology. Contemporary self-proclaimed relational sociologists (Crossley, Dépelteau, Donati, Emirbayer) here co-feature with sociological classics rebranded under the label as key references in the field. The major division reflects a separation between authors working on the theoretical reflection of network research, on the one hand, and those focusing on the theoretical formulation of a social world made of relations, on the other hand. This second tendency then bifurcates into pragmatism-inspired authors and critical realists.

Formulational vs. Epistemological Debates Concerning Scientific Realism

ABSTRACTA formulational debate is a debate over whether certain definitions of scientific realism and antirealism are useful. By contrast, an epistemological debate is a debate over whether we have sufficient evidence for scientific realism and antirealism, defined in a certain manner. I argue that Hilary Putnam's definitions of scientific realism and antirealism are more useful than Bas van Fraassen's definitions of scientific realism and constructive empiricism because Putnam's definitions can generate both formulational and epistemological debates, whereas van Fraassen's can generate only formulational debates.

Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism

Two conceptions of the contemporary philosophy of science are taken under consideration: scientific realism and constructive empiricism. Scientific realism presupposes 1) the conception of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality, 2) the real existence of entities postulated by a theory. The constructive empiricism puts forward the idea of empirical adequacy: science aims to give us the theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of the theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. To compare methodological resources of these two positions in the philosophy of science the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is involved. As a methodological realization of scientific realism the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics is taken under consideration. K.Popper’s version

Kusch and van Fraassen on Microscopic Experience

Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen’s controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not “windows on an invisible world”, but rather “image generators”. Both authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic view about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary to what Kusch maintains, this might not be a neutral way to render scientific evidence. Moreover, a constructive empiricist can support a realist interpretation of microscopic images. In fact, constructive empiricism and van Fraassen’s own anti-realism do not necessarily amount to the same thing.

ADAPTIVE EMPIRICISM

This paper presents a sketch of a moderately anti-realist position in philosophy of science that is a modification of Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and that I call ‘adaptive empiricism’. This modification is motivated by the intuition that assessing what is or is not observable should be an important element of theory choice for an empiricist. (I use cases of underdetermination as examples.) Thus I argue that Van Fraassen’s distinction between what is observable and what is unobservable should be adapted to changing theoretical and experimental contexts. I close with some ideas as to how to develop this position more fully.

Constructive Methods in Economics

Constructive methods and constructivity have been under extensive discussion in the philosophy of science. In mathematics and experimental sciences, constructive methods have a long tradition. From experimental sciences, constructive methods broadened to empirical sciences, as constructive empiricism demonstrates. For the last few decades, scientists from social sciences have been discussing social constructionism, which is a new direction in this multidimensional tradition of constructive methods. In economics, mathematical methods such as game theory are generally used. The mathematisation of science can be done in the spirit of the pedagogic-scientific mode or technocratic-scientific mode, which both are present in economics. Mathematical and other constructive methods may allow us to find out scientific understanding for particular phenomena. However, there is a real danger that the whole of science becomes technocratic. The question is not about constructions, but the whole aim of science – whether it is pedagogical or not.

Can Quantum Objects Be Tracked?

Impressively successful at the empirical level and open to multiple interpretations at the theoretical domain, quantum theory provides a rich source of examples of underdetermination. A more promising line of support for realism about quantum mechanics emerges from experimental physics. Some significant experiments have been conducted that prima facie seem to lead to very natural realist readings. The author first considers the challenge these experiments seem to raise to current forms of empiricism, particularly constructive empiricism. Three arguments are examined: the experiments challenge an important form of underdetermination employed by empiricists; the nature of quantum particles, in particular their identity and individuality, seems unproblematic in the context of these experiments, and the experiments provide an unprecedented form of access to the quantum particles involved. The discussion of an empiricist response to these three arguments is shaped by questions regarding the identity, individuality, and individuation of quantum particles in experimental contexts.