scholarly journals Gender political correctness in German (on the material of political leaders public performances)

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-79
Author(s):  
M. A. Chigasheva
Keyword(s):  
Gender Equality ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Political Correctness ◽  
Social Role ◽  
Research Process ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
German Language ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Continuous Sampling ◽  
Christian Social Union

The issue of gender equality is currently being studied on the basis of different languages and from various positions, most intensively from the point of view of language policy. In this case, we are talking about the choice of language tools in oral or written speech that allow to unambiguously reflect gender and the social role of the named person. The word-building capabilities of the German language, in particular suffixation and substantiation, represent a significant potential for creating gender-correct lexical units. The main objective of the study was to identify lexical means of expressing political correctness in the speech of representatives of various political parties of Germany (Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union, Social Democratic Party of Germany, Free Democratic Party, Green Party, Left Party, Alternative for Germany) in close interconnection with extralinguistic factors. In the research process, the continuous sampling method, semantic, contextual, and statistical analysis were used, which made it possible to identify units with a gender marking. Based on semantic attributes, the identified lexemes were classified into four groups: feminitives, gender-neutral, gender-asymmetric, and gender-symmetric units. The analysis shows the changes in the German language towards gender equality. The main tendency of this process is feminization, the signs of which are found primarily in the language of female politicians, which also reflects the national-cultural specificity of the modern German language.

Austria's “Ostpolitik” in the 1950s and 1960s: Honest Broker or Double Agent?

1995 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 129-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Rathkolb
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
The United States ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Christian Democratic Union ◽  
Christian Social Union ◽  
Double Agent

In literature on diplomacy, the term Ostpolitik refers to the new foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany introduced in 1966. The policy, was initiated by the grand coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Social Democratic party (SPD) and was continued after 1969 by the SPD and Free Democratic party (FDP) coalition. The policy aimed at reconciling Germany with Poland and the Soviet Union. Willy Brandt, the SPD foreign minister from 1966 to 1969 and chancellor from 1969 until 1974, and Walter Scheel, FDP foreign minister from 1969 to 1974, were the architects of this new “selective Détente.” From the beginning, Brandt's Ostpolitik was “controlled” by the Nixon administration, especially by Kissinger. The United States feared that Brandt and Scheel would go too far without taking account of Washington's geo-political point of view.

Past Imperfect, Future Tense: The SPD before and after the 2013 Federal Election

2014 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 46-58
Author(s):  
Jonathan Olsen
Keyword(s):  
Coming Out ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Public Image ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Federal Election ◽  
The Social ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Angela Merkel ◽  
Christian Social Union ◽  
The Impact

In the 2009 federal election, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) achieved the worst electoral result in its history. Immediately afterwards, the party worked to improve its public image and fine-tune its policies and electoral message, hoping that state elections in the ensuring period might provide some momentum going into the next national election. Yet, in 2013, the Social Democrats improved their result only modestly, with Angela Merkel and the Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) again gaining a decisive victory. This article explores the reasons behind the SPD's failure to radically improve its electoral showing, arguing that this can best be explained by a combination of the impact of the past—namely, the legacy of its economic reforms during the Schröder era and the SPD's disadvantages coming out of the previous Grand Coalition—as well as the weakness of its 2013 chancellor candidate, Peer Steinbrück, and the popularity of Angela Merkel. The article therefore suggests that the immediate future does not look particularly bright for the SPD: any chances of gaining the chancellorship are largely out of its hand, dependent on both stumbles by its rival, the CDU/CSU, as well as the taming of a possible coalition partner, the Left Party.

Selling the Economic Miracle: Public-Opinion Research, Economic Reconstruction, and Politics in West Germany, 1949-1957

2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark E. Spicka
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Federal Republic ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Party System ◽  
West Germany ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
World War ◽  
Economic Miracle ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
Christian Social Union

Perhaps the most remarkable development in the Federal Republicof Germany since World War II has been the creation of its stabledemocracy. Already by the second half of the 1950s, political commentatorsproclaimed that “Bonn is not Weimar.” Whereas theWeimar Republic faced the proliferation of splinter parties, the riseof extremist parties, and the fragmentation of support for liberal andconservative parties—conditions that led to its ultimate collapse—theFederal Republic witnessed the blossoming of moderate, broadbasedparties.1 By the end of the 1950s the Christian DemocraticUnion/Christian Social Union (CDU), Social Democratic Party(SPD) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) had formed the basis of astable party system that would continue through the 1980s.

Germany: little hope in times of crisis

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uwe Jun
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Social Democracy ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Christian Democratic Union ◽  
The Social ◽  
Christian Social Union ◽  
Forward Looking

This chapter addresses social democracy in Germany. For many years, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has performed poorly at the German parliamentary (Bundestag) elections, and crucially, has been unable to puncture the dominance of the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union). The SPD is facing a range of problems, on numerous fronts. Programmatically, the SPD lacks a vision for society that is sufficiently coherent and forward-looking to attract voters. Moreover, the SPD's credibility has declined over the last two decades largely due to a combination of its failure to implement campaign promises and the difficulties it has experienced while seeking to address its tarnished legacy of office in the periods after 1998 and 2009.

The SPD after Brandt’s Fall–Change or Continuity?

1975 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Paterson
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Turning Point ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Federal Election ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Christian Democratic Union ◽  
History Of ◽  
Christian Social Union ◽  
Post War ◽  
First Time

THE RESULT OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER I972 APPEARED to many as a turning point in the post-war history of the German Social Democratic Party. For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic, the SPD. was the largest party winning 45.9 per cent of the list votes (230 seats in the Bundestag) to the CDU/CSU's 44.8 per cent (225 seats). In 1957 the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union had enjoyed a lead of 18.4 per cent over the SPD. This lead was steadily whittled away after the party adopted the moderate Bad Godesberg Programme in 1959. The SPD gained 4.4 per cent in 1961,3. 1 per cent in 1965, 3.4 per cent in 1969 and 3.2 per cent in 1972

scholarly journals German Politics and Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Eurozone Budget

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-240
Author(s):  
Shawn Donnelly
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
German Government ◽  
Christian Democratic Union ◽  
German Politics ◽  
Fiscal Transfers ◽  
Party Positions ◽  
The Social ◽  
Christian Social Union

This article examines selected political party positions on a Eurozone budget and fiscal transfers between 2018 and 2021. It posits that German government positions on common European debt and fiscal policy have undergone a significant but fragile shift. It must contend with continued domestic hostility before it can be said to be a lasting realignment. A great deal with depend less on the Social Democratic Party that is largely responsible for bringing it about with the support of German Greens, and more on the willingness of the Christian Democratic Union, their Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union and the German voting public to adopt a more interventionist fiscal policy as well, generating shared commitments to economic policy at home and in Europe. That has not happened yet.

New German government will consolidate Merkel’s legacy

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Grand Coalition ◽  
Growth Potential ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Green Party ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Christian Democratic Union ◽  
The Social ◽  
Christian Social Union ◽  
Regional Elections

Significance Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will once again govern in a grand coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). Impacts Regional elections in Hesse and Bavaria at the end of 2018 will be the first tests for the grand coalition. The AfD will continue to grow in the short term, but incompetence may restrict its growth potential. The Green Party could emerge as a viable left-of-centre alternative to the SPD. Merkel’s electoral mishap diminishes her standing in the EU and could embolden countries opposed to French-German reform efforts. Domestically, euro-area reform could be hindered if dissent spills over from the AfD into the more conservative ranks of the CDU/CSU.

German parties are preparing for early elections

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
German Government ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Christian Democratic Union ◽  
The Social ◽  
Christian Social Union ◽  
One Year

Subject Update on the German government. Significance Just over one year after the grand coalition between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was renewed, all three parties are preparing for its breakdown by sharpening their profiles. Impacts Conflicts between the coalition parties may deepen if deteriorating economic conditions force hard budgetary choices. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s international influence is likely to decline as her domestic position weakens. Low poll ratings could moderate the parties’ desire for early elections.

On the Constitutionality of aHauptausschuss(Main Committee) in the GermanBundestag

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Pierre Thielbörger ◽  
Tobias Ackermann
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Qualitative Assessment ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Considerable Time ◽  
Christian Democratic Union ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
Christian Social Union ◽  
The Government ◽  
German Parliament

Since the end of 2013, Germany has been governed by a “grand coalition” of the biggest parties—Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), together with its Bavarian sister, the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). While one can generally call the hitherto work of the current government quite productive (regardless of any qualitative assessment), the first few months of the 18th legislature period painted a different picture: due to tough and slowly progressing negotiations over a new government, the German Parliament was paralyzed for a considerable time. After the election of 22 September 2013, in which Ms. Merkel's CDU missed an absolute majority, the constitutive session of theBundestagtook place on 22 October 2013, which was the last possible date within the thirty-day deadline as set out by Art. 39(2) of theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The new government, however, was elected not before 17 December 2013. In between, the newBundestogcould not effectively begin to work as the interplay with the government is an important part of the Parliament's work. Urgent business had to be left untouched. In order to end this deadlock, the factions of CDU/CSU and SPD took a unique step: they established a so-called “Main Committee” (Hauptausschuss), which was intended to serve as a preliminary body dealing with the most urgent tasks until a new government would finally be formed.

The Megalomania of a Political Party: The FDP Loses before the Federal Constitutional Court and then Loses the Election

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Meredith Anne Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
General Election ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Christian Democratic Union ◽  
Coalition Partner ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Christian Social Union

During Germany's recent general elections the Freien Demokratischen Partei (Free Democratic Party – FDP) sought to position itself as the focal point of the heated political race between the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), led by Bavarian Governor Edmund Stoiber, and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), led by incumbent Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. By staking out the ideological middle ground and employing a well-packaged campaign, the FDP hoped to assure itself the role of coalition partner in any government formed after the September 22nd general election. The FDP, in a first for one of the smaller political parties, ran its photogenic Chairman, Guido Westerwelle, as an independent candidate for Chancellor. The party also set for itself the goal of obtaining 18% of the popular vote (a target nearly triple its performance in the 1998 general election), making “18/2002” the party's campaign slogan. Had the FDP succeeded in obtaining only 9% of the popular vote (half its goal), it would have indeed played the controlling role in post-election negotiations over a coalition government. As it turned out, however, the FDP stumbled through debilitating controversy up to the last minute of the election and ended with a mere 7.4 percent of the vote. Incumbent Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was able to turn to the Green Party (which charged to a surprising 8.6% of the vote), his coalition partner of the last four years, to break his party's deadlock with the CDU/CSU and remain in power.

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