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2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110396
Author(s):  
Nick Lin ◽  
Nikoleta Yordanova

Existing research largely agrees that to minimize ministerial drift, political parties in multiparty governments tend to use parliamentary committees to monitor each other. Particularly, they strive to chair parliamentary committees corresponding to ministerial departments to keep tabs on their ruling partners. Yet, policing ministerial activities through a chair-based monitoring system requires perfect correspondence of jurisdictions between ministries and committees. We suggest that when perfect correspondence is absent, ministerial parties may strategically circumvent committee oversight. Specifically, motivated by policy preference divergence with the coalition partner, ministers can draft proposals to make their referral to a friendlier committee more likely than referral to a hostile watchdog committee chaired by the partner. Our analysis of committee referrals of over 2800 ministerial proposals from the Finnish Eduskunta (2001–2015) confirms this expectation. The results, therefore, bring important new insights to our understanding of parliamentary scrutiny and partner oversight under coalition governments.


2021 ◽  
pp. 528-552
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Smith

This chapter explores patterns in legislative speech in the House of Representatives of Japan from 1996 to 2017. In the two main arenas of legislative debate—plenary sessions and committee meetings—the inter-party dimension of speech is characterized by the disproportionate share of speaking activity by opposition parties, as well as the dominant Liberal Democratic Party’s junior coalition partner, Kōmeitō. Within parties, senior members and leaders speak more than others in plenary debates, where debate time is more limited. Backbenchers, including those who lost a single-member district (SMD) race but won a seat through the proportional representation (PR) tier of the mixed-member majoritarian electoral system, are relatively more active in committees. Although women are under-represented in terms of seats, they are not significantly under-represented in terms of relative speaking activity in either arena.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110288
Author(s):  
Camilla Bjarnøe

How parties compete by utilizing frames in the public debate is not well understood. A widespread understanding is that parties tend to compete by talking past each other, i.e. when they utilize dissimilar frames. This article relies on a unique data set of parties’ framing of four individual policy questions over two decades in Denmark to examine frame overlap, i.e. when parties adopt similar frames. Results show that parties utilize similar and dissimilar frames in the public debate. However, a high degree of frame similarity was generally found across parliamentary blocs (between the leading mainstream party from each bloc, their leading junior coalition partner, and the two blocs) and most often a very high degree of overlap was found within parliamentary blocs (between the leading mainstream party and its junior coalition partner). This result suggests a need to rethink thoroughly how to understand and study interaction among parties utilizing frames.


Significance Reaching an agreement with the UK government will support Australia’s efforts to secure new markets for goods affected by political tensions with China, but early benefits once the FTA is signed are likely to be limited. Impacts The Liberal Party’s coalition partner may demand changes if it sees the FTA as failing to protect rural interests. Pending regulatory clauses, including tough UK standards on data protection, could create tensions in final negotiations. The FTA will allow ships flagged in the United Kingdom or Australia to provide feeder services between the respective ports.


Author(s):  
James Loxton

This chapter discusses the UDI in Chile, arguing that its success was the product of authoritarian inheritance and counterrevolutionary struggle. The first section provides historical background, including on the decline of the country’s traditional conservative parties. The second section discusses the Movimiento Gremial, the precursor of the UDI, and the role that it played in the struggle against the leftist government of Salvador Allende (1970–1973). The third section examines the participation of these gremialistas in the Pinochet regime (1973–1990). The fourth section discusses the UDI’s status as an authoritarian successor party, and the ways that it resembled and differed from its coalition partner, RN. The fifth section discusses how the UDI benefited from its ties to the military regime, inheriting a party brand, clientelistic networks, and territorial organization. The final section discusses how the UDI’s origins in counterrevolutionary struggle served as a powerful source of cohesion.


2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 520-540
Author(s):  
Kerstin Völkl

The clear winner of the state election in Saxony-Anhalt on June 6, 2021 was the CDU, which was well ahead of the AfD . The FDP, which managed to re-enter the state parliament, was also among the election winners . The big loser was the Left Party, which achieved the worst result in Saxony-Anhalt’s history . The election’s decisive result factor was the extraordinarily high popularity of Prime Minister Reiner Haseloff (CDU), who benefit­ed from his incumbency bonus across party lines . Not only did the citizens hardly know the other leading candidates; moreover the CDU was perceived as having strong problem­solving competence for the dominant issues of Corona and in other relevant policy areas . Likewise, the CDU and Haseloff’s strategy to clearly distinguish themselves from the AfD and the Left was successful . Since Prime Minister Haseloff wanted a stable government for the state, a tripartite alliance was the only option . Due to the conflicts between the CDU and the Greens in the previously ruling so-called Kenya coalition (black, red, green), the CDU chose the FDP as a new coalition partner alongside the SPD, and more than three months after the election a so-called Germany coalition (black, red, yellow) was concluded .


Decyzje ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (34) ◽  
pp. 49-65
Author(s):  
Uğurcan Evci ◽  
◽  
Marek Kamiński ◽  

Before the parliamentary elections in 2018, the ruling party in Turkey, AKP, introduced a new apparentement provision in the electoral law, which allowed parties to make electoral alliances in order to meet the electoral threshold. We claim that this was an ex post mistake. AKP’s electoral engineering was motivated by their fear that its coalition partner, MHP, would not exceed the 10% threshold. While MHP actually met the threshold in the election, the opposition party, İP, failed to do so. Thanks to the new law, the votes for İP were not wasted, as would have happened under the old law. AKP less than 50% of seats and it consequently lost the parliamentary majority. Under the old electoral law, AKP would have won the majority. We use four alternative scenarios in order to estimate the seats and evaluate the political consequences of the unsuccessful electoral manipulation


2020 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 1231-1242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Klüver ◽  
Jae-Jae Spoon

Significance The Taliban agreed to talk to Kabul's delegation only reluctantly, under US pressure. The Kabul authorities were scarcely any keener. The insurgents' negotiating strategy appears cohesive and disciplined, whereas their interlocutors reflect the turmoil within an Afghan governing coalition riven by President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani's differences with Abdullah Abdullah, both a rival and a coalition partner. Impacts Ghani's control over the delegation undermines and delegitimises Abdullah as a coalition partner. Concomitantly, Ghani's domination of negotiations will mean he is held responsible if they stall or collapse. The Taliban's choice of delegation chief suggests Pakistan's behind-the-scenes influence is waning.


Significance The government had just 50 days in power. LVV’s junior coalition partner, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), initiated the ballot: 82 parliamentarians voted for the motion, including most LDK members, and 32 opposed it, mainly LVV members. Impacts The LVV’s fall from power ends Kosovo’s best hope for political and economic reform since the country broke from Serbia in 1999. The government’s expulsion from office has outraged many, although the COVID-19 lockdown means people cannot take to the streets in protest. The lifting of 100% tariffs has allowed Serbian imports to resume, to the benefit of Serbian exporters and Kosovo consumers.


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