Critiquing Sovereign Violence
Sovereign violence is a dominant issue in contemporary political theory and has attracted much attention from proponents of critical theory, biopolitics, post-structuralism, and deconstruction. While heterogeneous, these commentators are united in rejecting the classic-juridical conception that holds sovereignty to be indivisible and orientated towards the establishment and maintenance of juridical order. This book argues that this rejection has been based on three distinct logics, termed the radical-juridical perspective, the biopolitical one, and the bio-juridical. The first, outlined through chapters on Benjamin, Schmitt, Arendt, and Deleuze and Guattari, offers a number of increasingly radical critiques of the classic-juridical conception of sovereignty, but continues to focus the inquiry around the creation/preservation/disruption of the juridical order. The second biopolitical logic, outlined through chapters on Foucault and Agamben, goes further by undermining the primacy that the classic and radical-juridical models give to law. Instead, sovereign violence is held to be concerned with the regulation of life, with this occurring through exclusion from law. The first two critical logics do, however, set up a binary opposition between law and life: the former affirming the sovereign’s connection to the former, the latter reversing this to claim that it primarily refers to the latter. The third model—called the bio-juridical and developed from Jacques Derrida’s late work on the death penalty—is held to overcome this by developing a compatibilist understanding in which sovereign violence is placed between law and life, simultaneously creating and regulating each through the other.