scholarly journals Bahasa Dan Kebenaran Menurut John Langshaw Austin

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-216
Author(s):  
Antonius Widyarsono
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
Coherence Theory ◽  
Performative Utterance ◽  
Correspondence Theory Of Truth ◽  
The World ◽  
John Langshaw Austin ◽  
Deflationary Theory Of Truth ◽  
Deflationary Theory ◽  
Specific Contribution

Abstrak: John Langshaw Austin menjadi terkenal sebagai filosof Lingkaran Oxford yang menekankan pentingnya tuturan performatif. Namun dalam artikelnya “Truth” (1950) ia menggunakan teori korespondensi dalam memahami masalah kebenaran. Austin mengkritik Strawson yang menggunakan teori deflasioner tentang kebenaran berdasarkan analisis mengenai pentingnya tuturan performatif. Dalam tulisan ini akan dijelaskan mengapa Austin lebih memilih teori korespondensi dari pada teori deflasioner dalam memahami kebenaran. Juga akan ditunjukkan sumbangan khas Austin yang membarui teori korespondensi umum yang menggunakan metafora “cermin” dan “peta” realitas dengan menekankan sifat konvensional ide korespondensi. Menurut penulis, hal ini merupakan suatu usaha yang serius dan berguna dalam mengartikulasikan cara kita menggunakan simbol-simbol bahasa yang ditentukan secara sewenang-wenang untuk merepresentasikan realitas dunia.   Kata-kata Kunci: Kebenaran, teori korespondensi, teori koherensi, teori deflasioner, teori tindak-tutur, aspek ilokusioner bahasa, tuturan deskriptif, tuturan performatif, konvensi deskriptif, konvensi demonstratif.   Abstract: John Langshaw Austin is an “Ordinary Language Philosopher” of Oxford, who is famous for emphasizing the importance of performative statements. In his article, “Truth” (1950), however, he used correspondence theory for understanding the problem of truth. Austin criticized Strawson, who uses the deflationary theory of truth that is compatible with the analysis of performative utterances. This article will explain why Austin chooses the correspondence theory of truth rather than deflationary one. It will also elaborate Austin’s specific contribution in changing the version of the correspondence theory, which uses the metaphor of “mirroring” or “mapping”’ the world, to a conventional correspondence theory. It is, in my opinion, a serious and notable attempt to articulate our use of arbitrary symbols in the representation of brute reality. Keywords: Truth, correspondence theory, coherence theory, deflationary theory, speech-act theory, the illocutionary aspect of language, descriptive utterance, performative utterance, descriptive convention, demonstrative convention.

Realism v. Idealism

Philosophy ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 61 (237) ◽  
pp. 295-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. J. C. Smart
Keyword(s):  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
Coherence Theory ◽  
Correspondence Theory Of Truth

It is characteristic of realists to separate ontology from epistemology and of idealists to mix the two things up. By ‘idealists’ here I am mainly referring to the British neo-Hegelians (‘objective idealists’) but the charge of mixing up ontology and epistemology can be made against at least one ‘subjective idealist’, namely Bishop Berkeley, as his wellknown dictum ‘esse ispercipi’ testifies. The objective idealists rejected the correspondence theory of truth and on the whole accepted a coherence theory. The qualification is needed here because H. H. Joachim, in The Nature of Truth, found the coherence theory unable to deal with the problem of error.

scholarly journals Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Boyd
Keyword(s):  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
The World ◽  
Deflationary Theory Of Truth ◽  
Deflationary Theory

Kripke’s Wittgenstein is standardly understood as a non-factualist about meaning ascription. Non-factualism about meaning ascription is the idea that sentences like “Joe means addition by ‘plus’” are not used to state facts about the world. Byrne and Kusch have argued that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is not a non-factualist about meaning ascription. They are aware that their interpretation is non-standard, but cite arguments from Boghossian and Wright to support their view. Boghossian argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incompatible with a deflationary theory of truth. Wright argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incoherent. To support the standard interpretation, I’ll respond to each argument in turn. To the degree that my responses are successful, Byrne and Kusch have an unmotivated interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Wilson provides a factualist interpretation that is not based on Boghossian and Wright’s arguments. Miller argues for a non-factualist interpretation against Wilson, but I’ll show that Miller’s interpretation faces a dilemma. Miller’s argument cannot be maintained if a coherent interpretation of the skeptical solution is to be provided. I’ll show how this dilemma can be avoided and provide an independent argument against Wilson so that a non-factualist interpretation of the skeptical solution can be maintained.

scholarly journals La relatividad conceptual y el problema de la verdad: Bases para un realismo ontológico moderado

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Diéguez
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
Intrinsic Structure ◽  
Ontological Realism ◽  
Philip Kitcher ◽  
Conceptual Schemes ◽  
Correspondence Theory Of Truth ◽  
The World ◽  
Selection Of

RESUMENAlgunos defensores del realismo científico, particularmente Ilkka Niiniluoto y Philip Kitcher, han intentado moderar las tesis ontológicas más fuertes del realismo buscando la integración de la teoría de la verdad como correspondencia con alguna versión matizada del relativismo conceptual propugnado por Putnam, según el cual el mundo carece de una estructura propia y, por tanto, la ontología depende de nuestros esquemas conceptuales. No es claro, sin embargo, que ambas cosas se puedan armonizar fácilmente. Si nuestro conocimiento del mundo está mediado por nuestras categorías y conceptos, y si además la elección de esas categorías y conceptos puede variar en función de nuestros intereses y no obedecen a la existencia de unos supuestos géneros naturales o a una estructura propia del mundo, se torna entonces problemático establecer a qué corresponden nuestros enunciados verdaderos. ¿Corresponden al mundo independiente de nuestra mente (un mundo que, si asumimos la relatividad conceptual de forma estricta, carecería de estructura ontológica propia) o al mundo estructurado por nosotros mediante nuestras categorías y conceptos? En este artículo se presentarán las principales dificultades que encuentra este proyecto de realismo moderado tanto en Niiniluoto como en Kitcher, se analizarán sus propuestas para solventar dichas dificultades, mostrando sus insuficiencias y, finalmente, se propondrá una modalidad de realismo ontológico moderado que, recogiendo algo del espíritu de la relatividad conceptual de Putnam, es lo suficientemente fuerte como para sustentar una teoría de la verdad como correspondencia.PALABRAS CLAVERELATIVIDAD CONCEPTUAL, VERDAD COMO CORRESPONDENCIA, REALISMO ONTOLÓGICO, REALISMO CIENTÍFICO.ABSTRACTSome proponents of Scientific Realism, specially Ilkka Niiniluoto and Philip Kitcher, have tried to moderate the strongest ontological realist thesis with the aim of making compatible the correspondence theory of truth with some version of Putnam’s conceptual relativity (i. e., the claim that the world does not have an intrinsic structure and, then, that ontology depends on our conceptual schemes). However, it is not quite clear that both things could be harmonized. If our knowledge about the world is mediated by our categories and concepts, and if the selection of these categories and concepts may vary according to our interests, and they are not the consequence of the existence of certain supposed natural kinds or some intrinsic structure of the world, it is very problematic to establish what our true statements correspond to. Do they correspond to a world independent of our mind but lacking of any own structure, or do they correspond to a world structured by our categories and concepts? This paper analyzes the main difficulties in this project and the proposals to solve them. Finally, a modality of moderate ontological realism will be proposed that, despite of keeping the sprit of the conceptual relativity, is strong enough to support a correspondence theory of truth.KEY WORDSCONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY, CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH, ONTOLOGICAL REALISM, SCIENTIFIC REALISM.

Heidegger on Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth

Dialogue ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Tietz
Keyword(s):  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Early Nineteenth Century ◽  
Spiritual World ◽  
Correspondence Theory Of Truth ◽  
The World ◽  
The Usa

In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger asserted that “it wasnot German idealism that collapsed; rather, the age was no longer strong enough to sustain the greatness, breadth, and originality of that spiritual world, i.e., truly to realize it” (1961, p. 37). He was at this point launchinginto one of the major themes of his later work: the “darkening of the world” in the form of the materialism and “demonism” typified by the antitheses of the USSR and the USA, a polarity of seeming opposites obscuring an underlying fundamental similarity. This was the modernist faith of both cultures in the power of science to solve all of the problems that have plagued humanity for untold centuries, a faith in the power of science to tell us the absolute truth about the nature of reality. In 1955 Heidegger also characterized science and technology in “The Question Concerning Technology” as an “enframing” (Gestell), a particular dominant interpretation of reality dependent on the interest of control and which conceals far more than it reveals. For one thing, “the essence of technology isin a lofty sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to the mystery of all revealing, i.e., of truth” (1977a, p. 33). Although enframing “lets man endure,” only art (poiesis) as the successor of philosophy transcends techne by allowing us to see that “the essence of technologyis nothing technological” (1977a, p. 35). Much earlier, in Being and Time, he gave his first sustained account of science as the interpretationof reality driven by technological interests, and spoke of Being as the “transcendens” lying beyond “every possible character which an entity can possess” [p. 38]. It remains debatable whether this characterization of Being survived into Heidegger's later period, but despite his nostalgia for the spirituality of the early nineteenth century, the role of Beingin these earlier works might best be explained as some kind of realism.

Hegel's Correspondence Theory of Truth

1994 ◽  
Vol 15 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
H S Harris
Keyword(s):  
Logical Truth ◽  
Logical Structure ◽  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
Correspondence Theory Of Truth ◽  
The World ◽  
Cognitive Experience ◽  
Special Subset ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Ideal

“The world”, said Wittgenstein, “is the totality of facts, not of things”. According to the “correspondence theory”, therefore, “the truth” will be the totality of assertions that state “the facts”. In Hegel's mature theory of “truth”, this is not “philosophical truth” at all, but the ideal limit of “correct statement”. “Philosophical truth” however – like Wittgenstein's Tractatus – is a rather special subset of “the truly assertible facts”. It is the set that contains all of the true assertions about the logical structure of human cognitive experience. Thus, it is a set of “logical facts”; and if we are to know scientifically, what “human knowledge” is, we must be able to state these “facts” correctly. Hence Hegel's theory of “truth” is not independent of his theory of “correctness”. He has a “correspondence theory” of “truth”; but “Truth” is a property of assertions about “knowledge”, not of assertions about “the world”. For this reason, the theory of “truth” becomes a complex and interesting topic in Hegel's view, and not the boringly simple matter already disposed of in the formal definition of “correctness”. What is called “the correspondence theory” does not deserve the honorific name of “theory” at all. It is a formal logical truth that can be stated in a single sentence. Only in Hegel's theory of “experience” does “correspondence” become, for the first time, interesting.

scholarly journals Hakikat Ilmu Pengetahuan dalam Perspektif Modern dan Islam

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 81
Author(s):  
Via Linda Siswati
Keyword(s):  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Coherence Theory ◽  
Natural Phenomena ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Truth Theory ◽  
Sources Of Knowledge ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
Structure Of Knowledge

Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy that reflects, radically and integral about the nature of knowledge itself. This writing aims to understand: (1) understanding of knowledge and science in etymology and terminology. (2) the difference of science, knowledge and religion in epistimology. (3) the extent of science in Islam. (4) the basic characteristics of science. (5) truth theory. (6) sources of knowledge. (7) the boundaries of science (8) the structure of knowledge. The results of this paper are: (1) science is from Arabic, 'alima. The meaning of this word is knowledge. And science in terminology is the whole conscious effort to investigate, find, and improve human understanding from various aspects of reality in human nature and we know (2) The location of the difference is the science is a summary of a collection of knowledge or the result of knowledge and facts, The order of faith or order of belief in the existence of something absolute outside man, in accordance and in line with the order of faith and order of worship. (3) The principal features of science are as follows: (a) Systematic, (b) Authenticity, (c) Rationality, (d) Objectivity, (e) Verifiability, (f) Communality. (4) The theory in a theory of truth there are 3 namely: Correspondence Theory, Coherence Theory, Theory of Pragmatism. (4) The source of human knowledge uses two ways of obtaining correct knowledge, first through rationality and secondly through experience. (5) Science limits its exploration to human experience, hence science begins on exploration of human experience and ceases to human experience, and that is the limit of knowledge. (6) Science is essentially a collection of knowledge that explains the various natural phenomena that allow humans to perform a series of actions to master these symptoms based on existing explanations.

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