On the necessity of necessary connections: critical realism and Kant’s transcendental idealism

MIS Quarterly ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 819-834 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Volkoff ◽  
◽  
Diane M. Strong ◽  

In contrast to other helping professions, social work does not currently define itself as scientific, or as a scientific discipline. Starting with the work of John Brekke, this volume considers what a science of social work might look like. These ideas have developed from an extended collaboration among the chapter authors and others. Aspects of the framework described here include approaches to ontology and epistemology (scientific and critical realism); science and the the identity of social work; the context of Grand Challenges for social work; the place of values in a science of social work; the importance of theory in social work science; and how ideas from the philosophy of mind can also inform what a social work science should be. The volume then describes the application of social work science to social work practice, managing the tensions between rigor and relevance, and ways to educate future scholars. The concluding chapter suggests some ways in which this framework might affect social work practice and education in the future.


Author(s):  
Paul F. Snowdon

The overall question of this chapter is: what relevance do Kant’s Paralogisms have for current philosophy? After characterising Kant’s negative points about rational psychology, it is argued that once we abandon transcendental idealism and we appreciate that Kant’s assumption that we lack intuitions of ourselves is problematic, then Kant’s approach lacks a convincing basis. It is further argued that Strawson’s much more favourable reading of Kant’s argument relies on certain conceptual assumptions that are also unwarranted. The major and important lesson for our time, it is suggested, is that Kant identifies a serious weakness in a popular style of pro-dualist reasoning.


Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi

Whereas a certain popular (Fregean) interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality makes Husserl into an internalist and methodological solipsist, the aim of Chapter 4 is to show that Husserl’s commitment to transcendental idealism prevents his theory from being either. I first discuss competing interpretations of Husserl’s concept of the noema, and argue that the Fregean interpretation misreads the transcendental character of Husserl’s phenomenology. I next present an interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism that highlights its difference from metaphysical idealism and shows why Husserl’s conception of the mind–world relationship cannot be adequately captured within the internalism–externalism framework. In the final part of the chapter, I discuss how the claim that Husserl is a methodological solipsist fails to engage properly with his account of transcendental intersubjectivity, and how that latter account eventually transforms the very character of the transcendental project.


Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Vassallo

AbstractThe dynamics of general relativity is encoded in a set of ten differential equations, the so-called Einstein field equations. It is usually believed that Einstein’s equations represent a physical law describing the coupling of spacetime with material fields. However, just six of these equations actually describe the coupling mechanism: the remaining four represent a set of differential relations known as Bianchi identities. The paper discusses the physical role that the Bianchi identities play in general relativity, and investigates whether these identities—qua part of a physical law—highlight some kind of a posteriori necessity in a Kripkean sense. The inquiry shows that general relativistic physics has an interesting bearing on the debate about the metaphysics of the laws of nature.


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