scholarly journals Impact of Personality of Company Directors as a Behavioral Risk Contributor on Corporate Governance Process

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-24
Author(s):  
Muhammad Ahmed ◽  
Saima Naseer
2019 ◽  
pp. 328-339
Author(s):  
Sandeep Goel

In light of the increasing number of corporate frauds worldwide, there is a growing emphasis on corporate governance. These corporate misappropriations not only destroy shareholder value but also act as a detriment to economic growth and social change. Therefore, investors look for companies with better corporate governance to maximize their returns. Still, this aspect of corporate governance has been largely neglected in the existing studies. This chapter is therefore an attempt to address corporate governance and its effect on business performance in the context of economic growth and social transformation at the global level. It goes inside the black box of the financial matrix. The central issue that emerges is the criticality of key parameters in the corporate governance process for organisational performance. It is hoped that it will provide a new dimension to the existing body of corporate governance for global development with policy implications for the required growth and social change.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-14
Author(s):  
Hairul Azlan Annuar

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs), other than the control role prescribed by agency theory and reformatory documents such as the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative research design, consisting of face-to-face interviews with 27 company directors of Malaysian-owned PLCs, was instigated. Findings The interviews revealed that INEDs do more than just monitor their executive counterparts. Apart from the control role, INEDs of Malaysian companies provide a conduit for mitigating uncertainties in the environment and perform invaluable services to the host companies. Research limitations/implications This research utilized interviews. Generalizations may be an issue when interviews are used as the method of inquiry. Also, the sample is not random as access to many of the interviewed directors depended on recommendations. In addition, respondents were consciously selected in order to obtain various board positions that include independent and non-independent directors. Originality/value There are limited studies using qualitative research design in investigating INEDs’ performing other roles apart from the control role of the board in developing countries. Many of previous studies and literature in this area of corporate governance were predominantly based upon experiences of western economies.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morten Huse

The objective of this paper is to explore important contingencies for boards and governance designs. The paper is made in a setting where governance in SMEs in transition economies is to be developed, and knowledge from advanced market economies constitutes the framework to be built on. The core of the paper is the presentation of six groups of important contextual variables that must be analyzed and understood when corporate governance systems shall be developed. The framework presented in the paper includes understanding the perspectives of both internal and external actors in the corporate governance process, and that the design of a governance system will include issues related the board working style as well as thee board members.


2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-274
Author(s):  
Louise Gorman ◽  
Theo Lynn ◽  
Mark Mulgrew

While a great deal of research has focused on the factors driving adoption of codes of best practice in corporate governance, only recently has the influence of the news media been considered. Corporate governance literature has largely converged upon internal monitoring and shareholder activist strategies as methods of shareholder protection following the decline of the market for corporate control. Commentators and activists alike have generally neglected the opportunity for an independent party, which watches over the management of companies, to guard shareholders’ interests. Ireland is just one country where the value of media coverage of corporate governance violations to: (i) shareholders, (ii) policymakers and (iii) company directors has not been assessed. This paper investigates the reaction of these groups to newspaper coverage of corporate governance violations so as to determine the influence of the newspaper media on the corporate governance practices of public limited companies (plcs) listed on the Irish Stock Exchange. Using newspaper articles, media activity was analysed and measured in 15 instances of corporate governance violations and the relationships between this activity and the actions and behaviours of investors, policymakers and company directors as indicated by stock market data8, government reports9 and newspaper articles respectively were examined. Evidence from this study suggests that the Irish newspaper media influences (i) the boards of directors of Irish listed plcs, in that subsequent newspaper articles report reformatory measures taken by the boards in the vast majority of companies in the sample; (ii) the government authorities who are responsible for the legislative and regulatory infrastructure in which they operate, with statistical evidence of increases in government attention to corporate governance issues following increased newspaper coverage of theses issues and (iii) the investing decisions of investors in Irish listed plcs, with statistical verification of a relationship between movements in share price and volumes of newspaper articles relating to corporate governance violations by listed companies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Svetlana Sharokhina ◽  
Olga Pudovkina

The article discusses the features of corporate governance associated with the distribution of ownership and management functions. The components of corporate governance elements are considered in two directions: from the standpoint of the requirements of the current law; from the position of identifying corporate governance with the overall management system in the enterprise. The necessity of applying a systematic approach to the allocation of management functions is justified and their relationship in the corporate governance system is determined. The authors argue that in analyzing corporate governance, one cannot identify it with the enterprise management system in general and exclude the influence of owners on the corporate governance process. The authors propose from the set of corporate governance functions called the following list of functions arranged according to their priority, ambiguity, essence: planning, organization, accounting, control, analysis, regulation. The article describes the goals of implementing individual corporate governance functions and outlines the relationship of some functions with others. The authors call the features of the implementation of the analytical function associated with the opposite of interests. So, if for the management of the company carrying out analytical calculations should contribute to the scientific justification of management decisions, then carrying out analytical calculations by owners is most often aimed at assessing the effectiveness of the enterprise through the activities of management personnel. It is substantiated that the need to study the analytical subsystem, taking into account the requirements of a system-functional approach, is dictated by the fact that it is a subsystem in the general corporate management system, which has an informational relationship with other functional subsystems and is implemented both by the owners and the management of the enterprise. In the course of the study, it was found that the main feature of corporate governance is associated with the distribution of the overall management system between the enterprise management and its owners. At the same time, certain functions are implemented only by certain corporate governance bodies, while others are inherent to both owners and management.


Author(s):  
Lee Roach

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. Company Law Concentrate helps readers to consolidate knowledge in this area of law. This fifth edition includes coverage of the government’s corporate governance review, proposed updates to the UK Corporate Governance Code and the UK Stewardship Code, developments regarding unlisted companies and corporate governance, and notable case law developments, such as His Royal Highness Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell plc [2018] and Re Sherlock Holmes International Society Ltd [2016]. Chapters examine business structures, incorporation, the constitution of the company, directors, members, corporate governance, capital and capital maintenance issues, members’ remedies, and corporate rescue and liquidation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-51
Author(s):  
Ying Zheng ◽  
Harry Zhou

This article presents an intelligent corporate governance analysis and rating system, called IDA System, capable of retrieving SEC required documents of public companies and performing analysis and rating in terms of recommended corporate governance practices. With the techniques of analogical learning, local knowledge bases, databases, and question-dependent semantic networks, the IDA system is able to automatically evaluate the strengths, deficiencies, and risks of a company's corporate governance practices based on the documents stored in the “SEC EDGAR database by (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2013)”. A produced score reduces a complex corporate governance process and related policies into a single number which enables concerned government agencies, investors and legislators to assess the governance characteristics of individual companies.


Author(s):  
Rosemary Teele Langford

The issue of directors’ accountability and responsibility is never far from the public spotlight, as recently highlighted by corporate governance reforms initiated by the UK government and by the proceedings of the Banking Royal Commission in Australia. A topic of increasing practical and regulatory complexity is the conflicts faced by company directors. Conflicts may occur between directors’ self-interest and the interests of the company, between duties owed to more than one company or principal or between the interests of different stakeholders. This is a core source of concern, and of commentary, in a number of common law jurisdictions. As the complexity of commercial transactions and of corporate life in general increases, the application of the duty to avoid conflicts has necessarily become more complicated. At the same time there is a constant tension between ensuring accountability and not deterring responsible risk-taking. Concerns have been expressed that the legal and regulatory burden is too high. Providing certainty and comprehensive coverage of key aspects of the law relating to directors’ conflicts is therefore vital.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 609-636
Author(s):  
Paula del Val Talens

Juridical persons may be appointed as company directors in a number of European Member States, such as France, Belgium Spain or Italy, while this practice is forbidden in other jurisdictions (traditionally, Germany and, today, the United Kingdom). The lawfulness of the so-called «corporate directors» depends on a policy decision that legislators may make after balancing potential benefits and risks deriving from placing corporate bodies on the board. Corporate directors are not an essential tool for the European business environment, but are indeed a European corporate governance practice which does provide flexibility and operative advantages. This paper evaluates regulatory alternatives for both domestic legislation and prospective European instruments. It analyses how placing legal entities on a board may affect corporate governance and underlines their potential applications, namely, in groups of companies. It then examines two opposite policy approaches to corporate directors, an express prohibition and an explicit admission, as considered by certain Member States and article 47.1 of the Societas Europaea Regulation. We further explore the predominant model for the admission of corporate directors, which is based on three core elements: an enabling provision, the compulsory appointment of a permanent representative, and a joint liability rule.


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