Popular Sovereignty vs Parliamentary Sovereignty

Author(s):  
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott
Author(s):  
David Judge ◽  
Cristina Leston-Bandeira ◽  
Louise Thompson

This concluding chapter reflects on the future of parliamentary politics by identifying key puzzles implicit in previous discussions which raise fundamental questions about what Parliament is and why it exists. The goal is to determine the ‘predictable unknowns’ as starting points for exploring the future. Three principal puzzles that need ‘hard thinking’ in order to understand legislatures are considered: representation, collective decision-making, and their role in the political system. The chapter also examines the difficulties in reconciling ideas about popular sovereignty and direct public participation with notions of parliamentary sovereignty and indirect public participation in decision-making; the implications of the legislative task of disentangling UK law from EU law in the wake of Brexit for Parliament's recent strengthened scrutiny capacity; and how Parliament has integrated the core principles of representation, consent, and authorization into the legitimation of state policy-making processes and their outputs.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 439-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim McConalogue

The evidence from parliamentary and legal processes flowing from the European Union referendum in June 2016 and the vote to leave – including invoking Article 50 and subsequent Withdrawal Bill votes, nuancing of party positions in Parliament, adopting parliamentary scrutiny through ongoing party competition and subsequent legislation – suggests a strong resettling of Parliament’s sovereignty based on a potentially new, enhanced constitutional settlement. Two significant precedented, historical constitutional forms, strongly dependent upon Burke’s and Dicey’s view of government by consent, prove central to the further resettling of parliamentary sovereignty following the European Union referendum. This approach contrasts with theories asserting that sovereignty is being challenged by unwieldy executive authority, popular sovereignty, or democratic nostalgia. When the United Kingdom’s present day, post-1973 constitutional form is in conflict with a new feature, as in the case of the European Union referendum, a contemporary resettling of parliamentary sovereignty occurs.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart G White

The 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU has led to much questioning of the place of the referendum in the UK’s constitution with a particular emphasis on the status of Parliamentary and popular sovereignty. Some commentary suggests that the UK has shifted from a constitution of Parliamentary sovereignty to one of the popular sovereignty. Drawing on A.V. Dicey’s discussion of the UK constitution in his Introduction to the Law of the Constitution, this article sets out the case that the referendum is the site of a change in the UK’s constitution. However, according to this case, the change is not accurately described as a shift from Parliamentary to popular sovereignty. It is better understood in terms of the emergence of a new constitutional convention which has altered the manner by which Parliament, as the legal sovereign, is kept subordinate to the ‘people’ as the political sovereign. The article offers some preliminary empirical assessment of this case for constitutional change and indicates areas for future research. These include considering the possible influence of democratic constitutionalist thinking in the UK’s use of referendums and the desirability and implications of a full transition to democratic constitutionalism.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 341-363
Author(s):  
Bárður Larsen ◽  
Kári á Rógvi

Abstract The Bill for a Faroese Constitution [StjórnarskipanFøroya] submitted to Parliament [Løgtingið] on 6 March 2010, proposes a comprehensive Constitution for the Faroe Islands, for the first in history. This seems left somewhat on the late side, since the Faroes are an ancient polity with similar historic developments to Norway and Iceland, both of which got their full-bodied constitutions as sub-sovereign entities, in 1814 and 1874 respectively. Furthermore, few metropolitan powers should prima facie be more accommodating to sub-sovereign constitutions as Denmark, to whose Crown the Faroes have been associated, as she has historically recognised both an Icelandic constitution ‘besides’ and both a Common Constitution1 and EU quasifederal2 structure ‘above’ the Danish one. However, the same proud civil service that produced a beautiful construction of federation with the ‘Basic-Law on the Rights of Nationality’ of 1756 with its elaborate hierarchy of ‘Realms and Lands’ and ‘equivalents’ has perplexingly advised rather strongly against the proposed expression of popular sovereignty of the equivalent Nation of one of these Lands and the intended invitation to continue a long-standing peaceful plurality. In a Note of 2 June 2010, and a supplementary Note of 20 June 2011, the Danish Justice Ministry expressed the disgust of the Danish administrative establishment. The critique mostly focused on the supposed collision course with the Basic Law of the Danish Realm [groundless] and claimed that the Faroese Constitution would create considerable ‘doubt of a constitutional character.’ We argue that the issues raised do not follow from any convincing constitutional doctrine but are more ideological and based on an anti-pragmatic, a-historic and fundamentalist view of constitutional law, best categorised as late-late statutory positivism. As an alternative, we suggest the tradition of the Home Rule compact as a pragmatic and constructive disagreement that the Justice Ministry is about to abandon at its peril. Blocking the development of a living constitutional culture on the Faroe Islands will create tension that will be released somehow. The Ministry’s preoccupation with the proclamation that all power stems from the People of the Faroe Islands is at odds with the classic and almost trivial democratic notion of popular sovereignty. However, this is but the latest skirmish in a larger tragic and unnecessary campaign against realism and, indeed, reality that creates all sorts of problems for a small polity that needs to focus on principled solutions and gradual developments of the particulars of law in all fields.


Author(s):  
Joel Colón-Ríos

This chapter considers the legal and institutional implications that different 19th-century authors derived from the theory on constituent power and that, in many cases, were reflected in actual constitutional practice. Part I briefly examines the general historical context in which the works discussed in the chapter were written. Part II considers the constitutional theories of a group of authors who focused on the exclusive character of the nation’s constituent power. Theirs were theories that largely rejected the English tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, that is, of a parliament able to engage in both constituted and constituent activity. Importantly, these conceptions were developed at a time when it was not uncommon for written constitutions to lack amendment rules. Part III considers the work of a group of authors who, while largely operating under the Sieyèsian ‘constituent power of the nation’ approach, attempted to provide a more concrete form to ‘the nation’ without fully embracing Rousseau’s system of popular sovereignty. Finally, Part IV examines the work of authors who approach the theory of constituent power from a natural law perspective.


Author(s):  
Tony Wright

The future shape of British politics is impossible to predict. ‘Whither British politics?’ explores what happens when representative democracy collides with direct democracy and parliamentary sovereignty with popular sovereignty. While the recent turbulence has led some MPs to discover that they have more in common with each other than their respective parties, no cross-party collaboration has taken place and unresolved questions about Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales are back on the table. Despite the erosion of some of its foundations, the party system survives. Following the 2019 election of a Conservative government with a majority, it remains to be seen whether the crisis will lead to meaningful political reinvention.


Author(s):  
Leif Wenar

Article 1 of both of the major human rights covenants declares that the people of each country “shall freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources.” This chapter considers what conditions would have to hold for the people of a country to exercise this right—and why public accountability over natural resources is the only realistic solution to the “resource curse,” which makes resource-rich countries more prone to authoritarianism, civil conflict, and large-scale corruption. It also discusses why cosmopolitans, who have often been highly critical of prerogatives of state sovereignty, have good reason to endorse popular sovereignty over natural resources. Those who hope for more cosmopolitan institutions should see strengthening popular resource sovereignty as the most responsible path to achieving their own goals.


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