A Constitution for Aotearoa in the context of Parliamentary Sovereignty

<p>This dissertation argues that human rights and constitutional amendment provisions should be entrenched eternally in the course of adopting a formal constitution in New Zealand. This would prevent abuses of powers within state institutions and provide sufficient protection to basic human rights. The constituent power, which consists of parliament and the electorate, can bind the ordinary parliament through the entrenchment of certain provisions in a formal constitution. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty would not be breached if this doctrine is understood to only apply to parliament when acting as an ordinary legislature.</p>

A Constitution for Aotearoa in the context of Parliamentary Sovereignty

<p>This dissertation argues that human rights and constitutional amendment provisions should be entrenched eternally in the course of adopting a formal constitution in New Zealand. This would prevent abuses of powers within state institutions and provide sufficient protection to basic human rights. The constituent power, which consists of parliament and the electorate, can bind the ordinary parliament through the entrenchment of certain provisions in a formal constitution. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty would not be breached if this doctrine is understood to only apply to parliament when acting as an ordinary legislature.</p>

Why Europe Does not Need a Constitution: On the Limits of Constituent Power as a Tool for Democratization

In this article, I question the use of the notion of ‘constituent power’ as a tool for the democratization of the European Union (EU). Rather than seeing the absence of a transnational constituent power as a cause of the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’, I identify it as an opportunity for unfettered democratic participation. Against the reification of power-in-action into a power-constituted-in-law, I argue that the democratization of the EU can only be achieved through the multiplication of ‘constituent moments’. I begin by deconstructing the normative justifications surrounding the concept of constituent power. Here I analyze the structural aporia of constituent power and question the autonomous and emancipatory dimension of this notion. I then test the theoretical hypothesis of this structural aporia of the popular constituent power by comparing it with the historical experiments of a European popular constituent power. Finally, based on these theoretical and empirical observations, I propose to replace the ambivalence of the concept of popular constituent power with a more cautious approach to the bottom-up democratization of European integration: that of a multiplication of transnational constituent moments.

Constituent power, citizenship, and the European Union

<p>The European Union (EU) has undergone constant political and economic integration since its inception in 1952. It has developed from a community in the aftermath of World War Two, into a Union of diverse states with its own political and legal system. It is the best example of international integration and co-operation in the world. A number of treaties represent the primary law of the EU. The treaties represent the EU’s commitment to promote human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. The Treaty of Lisbon¹ was introduced and adopted by the Member States to increase participatory democracy within the EU. Originally called the Reform Treaty, it amended the existing EU and EC treaties, providing the EU with the legal framework to meet the future challenges and to respond to the increasing demands of the citizens’ for a more transparent and open institution. The European Parliament is the only directly elected institution of the EU, and traditionally had the least amount of power of the EU institutions. The Lisbon Treaty attempted to address the so-called democratic deficit through a range of institutional reforms that recognised the importance of European citizen involvement in the EU. Citizen involvement in the EU has also been increased through the implementation of the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). The ECI represents a further step towards the EU becoming a true participatory democracy. This purpose of this paper is to critically assess the democratic involvement of European citizens in the operation of the EU, and how the constitutional foundation of the EU provides for this involvement. The paper will seek to answer to what extent European Citizens’ have the ability to affect real and meaningful change upon the EU, a power that currently sits with the governments of Member States. Democracy is often associated with the power of the citizens to affect change in the institutions that govern them. The theory of constituent power goes one step further and argues that it gives citizens the ability to alter not only the governing institutions, but the also the power that those institutions exercise. This begins with an introduction of the main institutions of the EU, before moving to discuss the theory of constituent power, before assessing what factors would be necessary for constitutent power to be successful in the EU. ¹ Official Journal of the European Union 2007 No C 306/1 (herein after referred to as the Treaty of Lisbon). Adopted 2008, entered into force 1 December 2009.</p>

Constituent power, citizenship, and the European Union

<p>The European Union (EU) has undergone constant political and economic integration since its inception in 1952. It has developed from a community in the aftermath of World War Two, into a Union of diverse states with its own political and legal system. It is the best example of international integration and co-operation in the world. A number of treaties represent the primary law of the EU. The treaties represent the EU’s commitment to promote human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. The Treaty of Lisbon¹ was introduced and adopted by the Member States to increase participatory democracy within the EU. Originally called the Reform Treaty, it amended the existing EU and EC treaties, providing the EU with the legal framework to meet the future challenges and to respond to the increasing demands of the citizens’ for a more transparent and open institution. The European Parliament is the only directly elected institution of the EU, and traditionally had the least amount of power of the EU institutions. The Lisbon Treaty attempted to address the so-called democratic deficit through a range of institutional reforms that recognised the importance of European citizen involvement in the EU. Citizen involvement in the EU has also been increased through the implementation of the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). The ECI represents a further step towards the EU becoming a true participatory democracy. This purpose of this paper is to critically assess the democratic involvement of European citizens in the operation of the EU, and how the constitutional foundation of the EU provides for this involvement. The paper will seek to answer to what extent European Citizens’ have the ability to affect real and meaningful change upon the EU, a power that currently sits with the governments of Member States. Democracy is often associated with the power of the citizens to affect change in the institutions that govern them. The theory of constituent power goes one step further and argues that it gives citizens the ability to alter not only the governing institutions, but the also the power that those institutions exercise. This begins with an introduction of the main institutions of the EU, before moving to discuss the theory of constituent power, before assessing what factors would be necessary for constitutent power to be successful in the EU. ¹ Official Journal of the European Union 2007 No C 306/1 (herein after referred to as the Treaty of Lisbon). Adopted 2008, entered into force 1 December 2009.</p>