Explaining the moderate platform of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood: Against the inclusion-moderation hypothesis

<p>Throughout its existence, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) has consistently maintained a moderate policy on governance. The main aim of this study is to explain this moderation. Previous literature has usually explained moderation in similar movements by an “inclusion-moderation hypothesis”, which holds that moderation results when movements have the opportunity to participate in pluralist political processes. However, the SMB has been progressively excluded from the Syrian political arena since 1963. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis implies, as its converse, that exclusion leads to radicalisation. This study shows that contrary to this expectation, the SMB’s ultimate exclusion from the Syrian political arena in 1982 was in fact the primary driver of its moderate policy. The SMB also participated in parliamentary politics in its early history, and therefore has not moderated over time, as the inclusion-moderation hypothesis would require. Thus, the inclusion-moderation hypothesis does not work for this case, and this dissertation advances an alternate explanation for the SMB’s continued commitment to a moderate policy on governance. This study’s central thesis is that the SMB’s moderate policy on governance can be explained by the Brotherhood’s primary target audience, that is to say, the political force which, in the SMB’s view, can deliver its political objective. As this definition implies, the target audience shifts over time, in accordance with changing circumstances. In 1980, the primary target audience comprised diverse actors in opposition to the al-Asad government: the Fighting Vanguard, the Syrian ulama, and the secularist opposition. In 2001, the audience was the Bashar al-Asad government. In 2004, it was the secularist opposition; and in 2012, it was the foreign sponsors of the secularist opposition.</p>

Explaining the moderate platform of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood: Against the inclusion-moderation hypothesis

<p>Throughout its existence, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) has consistently maintained a moderate policy on governance. The main aim of this study is to explain this moderation. Previous literature has usually explained moderation in similar movements by an “inclusion-moderation hypothesis”, which holds that moderation results when movements have the opportunity to participate in pluralist political processes. However, the SMB has been progressively excluded from the Syrian political arena since 1963. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis implies, as its converse, that exclusion leads to radicalisation. This study shows that contrary to this expectation, the SMB’s ultimate exclusion from the Syrian political arena in 1982 was in fact the primary driver of its moderate policy. The SMB also participated in parliamentary politics in its early history, and therefore has not moderated over time, as the inclusion-moderation hypothesis would require. Thus, the inclusion-moderation hypothesis does not work for this case, and this dissertation advances an alternate explanation for the SMB’s continued commitment to a moderate policy on governance. This study’s central thesis is that the SMB’s moderate policy on governance can be explained by the Brotherhood’s primary target audience, that is to say, the political force which, in the SMB’s view, can deliver its political objective. As this definition implies, the target audience shifts over time, in accordance with changing circumstances. In 1980, the primary target audience comprised diverse actors in opposition to the al-Asad government: the Fighting Vanguard, the Syrian ulama, and the secularist opposition. In 2001, the audience was the Bashar al-Asad government. In 2004, it was the secularist opposition; and in 2012, it was the foreign sponsors of the secularist opposition.</p>

Malawi

This chapter represents one of the very first quantitative analyses of parliamentary speechmaking in an African democracy. Looking at Malawi in the parliamentary term 2009–2014, we find that MPs in ministerial positions and party leadership speak significantly more than other MPs. We also find that those representing the major opposition party speak significantly more than other MPs. Given the candidate-centric nature of Malawian parliamentary politics and high levels of formal parliamentary openness, these findings run counter to the theory presented in this volume. We suggest that in order to understand speechmaking in the Malawi parliament, one has to take into account both the generally weak position of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive and the role-orientation of Malawian MPs. In a system with high MP turnover rates and significant local developmental needs, MPs tend to prioritize constituency development over contributions to the national legislative agenda. With resources highly centered on the executive, backbench MPs are unlikely to see significant benefits in pursuing an active legislative agenda. Consequently, MPs representing the government or those higher in opposition party hierarchies can dominate parliamentary speechmaking.

The Generative Politics of Presentism in Post-15M Spain

This essay revises post-15M movement political party landscape, emphasizing the intentional yet unusual use of the present within the New Left's organizing grammar. Against sectors of the traditional Left, who see presentism as a product of neoliberalism, I claim that in the post-15M conjuncture, the present constituted a battleground in the struggle for a dignified life. First, I focus on the Catalan left-wing nationalist party CUP's use of anarchist symbols to suggest that references to sabotage were deployed to disrupt parliamentary politics, forcing constant interruption. Second, I analyze Podemos founding member Iñigo Errejón's speech after the party's 2016 national election defeat, where his rhetoric linked the temporality of the present with anti-austerity protestors’ embodied presence. Last, I read the rise of neomunicipalisms as another iteration of presentism, aiming to politicize everyday life. To conclude, I advance that such material practices of “generative presentism” problematize presentism's assumed depoliticizing nature.

Citizen Wayn? The Struggle of Parliament in Contemporary Jordan

This article is part of the Special Issue “Parliaments in the Middle East and North Africa: A Struggle for Relevance”. Because the politics of citizenship is felt at all stages of the parliamentary process, the very question of parliamentary relevance itself cannot be answered without reference to the citizenry. That Jordan’s citizenship regime influences and impedes parliamentary politics is explored through two cases. The first being decentralization, understood as a relocating of tasks, decision-making and mandates from a centralized location to different, more localized levels. The second study focuses on the uprisings occurring from May 30, 2018 against the draft domestic tax law introduced to parliament by the government of then-Prime Minister Hani al-Mulki. Both cases are implicated in the Kingdom’s parliamentary politics, and their selection is a conscious move away from election analysis. Taken together they elucidate how citizenship is a key battleground on which any future emancipation/development of parliament will be fought.

The August 1910 Elections

The August 1910 elections, for a doubled sized revisionary assembly, was the basis for change, provided the leader could resolve differences among the 'new men' and channel new ideas into practical politics. The contest was between the old political world, palaiokommatismos, built around old and powerful families (Theotokis, Rallis, etc) sometimes labelled oligarchy, and new men, independents standing for some version of revival (anorthosis). The old parties won a clear majority of seats, but the independents, new men, with about one third of the seats, had made a compelling entry to parliamentary politics and could not be ignored. They were themselves divided into groups of liberals, socialists, agrarians, republicans etc. They needed someone to bring them together and lead them, i.e. Venizelos, and a structure and organization, i.e. a political party. The aim must be to channel their energy and ideas into practical politics. Venizelos wound up his affairs in Crete and moved to the Athenian stage.

Liberalism

Weimar liberalism reflects the difficulties of political and economic liberalism to adapt to parliamentary democracy and the economic consequences of the First World War. These difficulties pushed liberalism into a crisis that led to new liberal formations on an organizational and intellectual level. The two main liberal parties experienced a steady decline, resulting in their political insignificance at the end of the Weimar Republic. This process was accompanied by liberal controversies over the benefit and mischief of democracy and capitalism, calling established liberal ideals into question. Liberals considered the restriction of parliamentary politics, of unbounded economic activities, liberal internationalism, and the coordination of capitalism as possible solutions to contemporary challenges. These controversies disillusioned many former adherents of liberalism, but also provoked a renewal of liberal concepts in various fields.