Grundrechtsbindung Privater

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maximilian Seyderhelm
Keyword(s):  
Data Protection ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Public Forum ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Existing Data

The effect of fundamental rights among private individuals is breaking away from the usual patterns as a result of recent decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court. The work not only provides terminological clarity, but also elaborates the criteria that directly bind private individuals to fundamental rights. The author then looks at emerging constellations and examines the binding nature of fundamental rights there. The operator of Facebook fulfils both criteria described in more detail. These are the opening of a "public forum" and a predominant position of power. It is thus bound by fundamental rights. SCHUFA is not bound by this obligation, also because it is kept in check by existing (data protection) provisions of the legislator.

El derecho a ser informado como elemento esencial del derecho a la protección de datos. Una visión crítica de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional y de su cambio de doctrina en la STC 39/2016

2016 ◽  
pp. 191-216
Author(s):  
Miguel Ángel CABELLOS ESPIÉRREZ
Keyword(s):  
Video Surveillance ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Surveillance Systems ◽  
Control Technology ◽  
Specific Regulation ◽  
The Right

LABURPENA: Lan eremuan bideozaintzaren erabilerak ondorio garrantzitsuak dakartza funtsezko eskubideei dagokienez, esate baterako intimitateari eta datu pertsonalen babesari dagokienez. Hala eta guztiz ere, oraindik ez daukagu araudi zehatz eta espezifikorik kontrol-teknika hori lan eremuan erabiltzeari buruz. Horrek behartuta, errealitate horri araudi-esparru anitz eta generikoa aplikatzeko modua auzitegiek zehaztu behar dute, kontuan hartuta, gainera, Espainiako Konstituzioaren 18.4 artikulua alde horretatik lausoa dela. Konstituzio Auzitegiak, datuen babeserako funtsezko eskubidea aztertzean, datuen titularraren adostasuna eta titular horri eman beharreko informazioa eskubide horretan berebizikoak zirela ezarri zuen; hortik ondorioztatzen da titularraren adostasuna eta hari emandako informazioa mugatuz gero behar bezala justifikatu beharko dela. Hala ere, Konstituzio Auzitegiak, duela gutxiko jurisprudentzian, bere doktrina aldatu du. Aldaketa horrek, lan eremuan, argi eta garbi langileak informazioa jasotzeko duen eskubidea debaluatzea dakar, bere datuetatik zein lortzen ari diren jakiteari dagokionez. RESUMEN: La utilización de la videovigilancia en el ámbito laboral posee importantes implicaciones en relación con derechos fundamentales como los relativos a la intimidad y a la protección de datos personales. Pese a ello, carecemos aún de una normativa detallada y específica en relación con el uso de dicha técnica de control en el ámbito laboral, lo que obliga a que sean los tribunales los que vayan concretando la aplicación de un marco normativo plural y genérico a esa realidad, dada además la vaguedad del art. 18.4 CE. El TC, al analizar el derecho fundamental a la protección de datos, había establecido el carácter central en él del consentimiento del titular de los datos y de la información que debe dársele a éste, de donde se sigue que cualquier limitación del papel de ambos deberá estar debidamente justificada. Sin embargo, en su más reciente jurisprudencia el TC ha realizado un cambio de doctrina que supone, en el ámbito laboral, una clara devaluación del derecho a la información por parte del trabajador en relación con qué datos suyos se están obteniendo. ABSTRACT : T he use of video surveillance systems within the work sphere has major implications for fundamental rights such as privacy and data protection. Nonetheless, we still lack of a detailed and specific regulation regarding the use of that control technology within the work sphere, which obliges courts to define the application of a plural and generic normative framework to that issue, given the vagueness of art. 18.4 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court, when analyzing the fundamental right to data protection, had settled the centralityof the consent of the data rightholder and of the information to be provided to the latter, and from this it followed that any restriction on the role of both rights should be duly justified. However, in its most recent case law the Constitutional Court has changed its doctrine which means, within the work sphere, a clear devaluation of the right of information by the employee regarding the obtained data of him/her.

Verfassungsanalogien – Das Bundesverfassungsgericht an der Grenze der Verfassungsinterpretation

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41
Author(s):  
Carsten Bäcker
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Sich Eine ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Federal Constitutional

Analogien sind methodologisch hoch umstritten; sie bewegen sich an der Grenze der Gesetzesinterpretation. Dem methodologischen Streit um die Analogien unterliegt die Frage nach den Grenzen der Gesetzesinterpretation. In der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts finden sich eine Reihe von Verfassungsanalogien. Diese Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz werden zwar nur selten ausdrücklich als solche bezeichnet, sie finden sich aber in einer Vielzahl von dogmatischen Konstruktionen in der Rechtsprechung – wie etwa der Erweiterung des Grundrechtsschutzes für Deutsche auf EU-Bürger oder der Annahme von Gesetzgebungskompetenzen des Bundes als Annex zu dessen geschriebenen Kompetenzen. Die Existenz derartiger Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz verlangt nach Antworten auf die Fragen nach den Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation. Der Beitrag spürt diesen Grenzen nach – und schließt mit der Aufforderung an das Bundesverfassungsgericht, die Annahme von Verfassungsanalogien zu explizieren und die sich darin spiegelnden Annahmen über die Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation zu reflektieren. Constitutional analogies. The Federal Constitutional Court at the limit of constitutional interpretation From a methodological point of view, the use of analogies in legal argument is highly controversial, for they reach to the limits of statutory interpretation. Underlying the methodological dispute over analogies is the question of what the limits of statutory interpretation are or ought to be. A number of analogies from constitutional law can be found in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. Although these analogies to constitutional law are rarely explicitly designated as such, in the case law they can be found in a variety of dogmatic constructions – for example, in the extension of Germans’ fundamental rights protection to EU citizens, or the assumption of legislative powers of the federal state as an appendix to its written powers. The existence of such analogies to constitutional law calls for answers to the question of the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution. It is the aim of this article to trace these limits, and in its conclusion it calls on the Federal Constitutional Court to explicate the adoption of analogies in constitutional law and to reflect on the assumptions found therein – respecting the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution.

Judicial Review of Economic (and Monetary) Policy: The National Courts

2020 ◽  
pp. 245-285
Author(s):  
Menelaos Markakis
Keyword(s):  
European Central Bank ◽  
National Level ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Economic Rights ◽  
Social Challenges ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

This chapter examines the jurisprudence of national courts on crisis-related measures. The material presented in this chapter will be divided into two parts. First, this chapter will examine some of the most important judgments delivered by courts in lender states during the Euro crisis, the emphasis being on the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court. These cases primarily focus on the effects of financial assistance mechanisms and revised EU fiscal governance rules on the principle of democracy, parliamentary prerogatives, and national budgetary powers. A further strand of case law focuses on the measures adopted by the European Central Bank. Second, this chapter will look at review by national courts in borrower states, the principal focus being on social challenges brought by austerity-hit litigants in Greece. The comparative analysis sheds light on the different types of challenge facing courts in borrower and lender states, as well as the different starting points and the subtle differences in the reasoning provided by courts in their judgments. As regards borrower states in particular, the twin challenge is to examine to what extent litigants had any success in challenging in national courts the bailout conditions; and the extent to which arguments about civil or socio-economic rights had purchase at national level. The chapter further looks at review by national courts in other jurisdictions, as well as review by supranational and international courts or bodies. Last, it puts forward a number of ideas on fundamental rights adjudication in times of economic crisis.

19 Art. 20 GG: Democracy

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bumke Christian ◽  
Voßkuhle Andreas
Keyword(s):  
Public Information ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Political Will ◽  
Information Campaigns ◽  
The People ◽  
State Authority ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
District Assemblies

This chapter discusses the democracy principle as articulated in Art. 20 of the Grundgesetz (GG). Art. 20 para. 2 GG defines democracy in this manner: ‘All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people’. GG associates the concept of democracy with the concept of the state. Although the Federal Constitutional Court has avoided any reference to the principle of democracy, it has interpreted some fundamental rights in light of the principle. The chapter first considers the Court's jurisprudence regarding political will formation in a representative democracy, focussing on cases dealing with voting rights of foreigners, elections to district assemblies, popular referendum, and public-information campaigns. It then examines cases relating to exercise of state authority, with emphasis on the position of Parliament in relation to other branches of government, forms of democratic legitimation, and functional self-government.

scholarly journals Backlash against the Court of Justice of the EU? The Recent Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court on EU Fundamental Rights as a Standard of Review

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Dana Burchardt
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Constructive Dialogue ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Individual Decisions ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Eu Fundamental Rights ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court

AbstractThis article discusses two landmark judgements by the German Federal Constitutional Court (CC) on the relationship between domestic and EU fundamental rights protection (Right to be forgotten I and II). In these judgements, for the first time, the CC uses EU fundamental rights as a standard of review. In addition, the CC establishes a novel framework of “parallel applicability” of EU and domestic fundamental rights for subject matters that are not fully harmonized by EU law. The article first presents the new approach, showing that it structurally changes the parameters of the relationship between the CC and the CJEU. Second, the article assesses the legal-political tendency reflected in this change: is this constructive dialogue or rather pushback against the CJEU? The article argues that this new jurisprudence should be characterized as an instance of resistance. The CC resists against the CJEU in its function as fundamental rights court, attempting to reduce the authority of the CJEU and reversing a development that it considered to be unfavourable to its own authority. This is structural pushback aimed at the CJEU’s function rather than at individual decisions or norms - however, without rejection the CJEU as an institution altogether.

scholarly journals Some Kind of Right

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 40-44
Author(s):  
Jud Mathews
Keyword(s):  
German Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
Specific Reason

AbstractThe Right to Be Forgotten II crystallizes one lesson from Europe’s rights revolution: persons should be able to call on some kind of right to protect their important interests whenever those interests are threatened under the law. Which rights instrument should be deployed, and by what court, become secondary concerns. The decision doubtless involves some self-aggrandizement by the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which asserts for itself a new role in protecting European fundamental rights, but it is no criticism of the Right to Be Forgotten II to say that it advances the GFCC’s role in European governance, so long as the decision also makes sense in the context of the European and German law. I argue that it does, for a specific reason. The Right to Be Forgotten II represents a sensible approach to managing the complex pluralism of the legal environment in which Germany and other EU member states find themselves.

scholarly journals The Constitutional Status of Karlsruhe’s Novel “Jurisdiction” in EU Fundamental Rights Matters: Self-inflicted Institutional Vulnerabilities

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 19-26
Author(s):  
Karsten Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Binding Effect ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Eu Fundamental Rights ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

AbstractThe First Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has recently introduced the express promise that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself could directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. There are, however, differences between the Basic Law as the relevant standard of review and other standards of review that are dangerous to ignore. The constitutional status of the FCC’s jurisdiction depends crucially on whether the Court relies on the constitution or on EU fundamental rights. If the constitutional status of the novel jurisdiction covered any binding-effect, and that is a big if, the FCC still would not safeguard the unity and coherence of Union law. Leaving aside the fact that the First Senate is confined to reversing and remanding (unable to enforce anything directly), no beneficial effect on legal certainty grows apparent. Any binding-effect of the novel jurisdiction only provides for consistency without finality. And to venture further into the question: Even if anyone welcomed this novel kind of consistency without finality (virtually “provisional consistency”), this oddish consistency would still be a localized consistency, i.e. in German courts only.

„Der Staat ist von Verfassungs wegen nicht gehindert..."

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Chr. van Ooyen ◽  
Martin H. W. Möllers
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Domestic Security ◽  
Federal Constitutional

A problematic ‘German constant’ can be observed in the Federal Constitutional Court: It is the ‘Staat’ (state) as a sovereign political entity. And it is the ‘Volk’ (people) as a homogeneous community. The Constitutional Court’s political theory—so the thesis goes—‘oscillates’ between a liberal and pluralistic conception of citizens, constitution and society and a national and identitarian form of statism. In this book, this is exemplified by: the theories of constitution and democracy that are represented, fundamental rights in relation to domestic security, European integration, foreign policy and the emergency constitutional law as a result of 9/11 and the coronavirus pandemic

Germany's Federal Constitutional Court and the Regulation of GPS surveillance

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (12) ◽  
pp. 1805-1812 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline E. Ross
Keyword(s):  
Personal Data ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Intelligence Gathering ◽  
Surveillance Technology ◽  
Global Positioning ◽  
American Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Ongoing Surveillance ◽  
Privacy Risks

In its recent decision of April 12, 2005, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) addressed concerns that advances in the technologies of surveillance will erode fundamental rights. Though it rejected the petitioner's call to limit use of the Global Positioning System (“GPS”) to track the movements of suspects, the Court did warn that surveillance technologies working in tandem posed privacy risks that were greater than the sum of each one working alone. The Court required investigators from different agencies and states to coordinate their activities and disclose all ongoing surveillance when seeking judicial approval of additional methods and technologies. It likewise cautioned the Bundestag (German Federal Parliament) to monitor advances in surveillance technology and to develop new statutory safeguards that would protect personal data by limiting the use of more powerful innovations. Yet the Court's opinion left many questions unanswered. It did not explain how legislators or investigative agencies could avoid unnecessarily and intrusively multiplying the use of surveillance, given the overlapping jurisdiction of intelligence agencies with state and federal police. And insofar as the German Strafprozessordnung (Criminal Procedure Code – StPO) regulates only those modes of surveillance that produce criminal prosecutions, statutory suppression remedies have no clear impact on the investigative use of surveillance for purely preventive or intelligence-gathering purposes. My essay will explore the implications and limitations of the Court's opinion with an eye on analogous American law (introduced to gain a comparative perspective.)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document